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Dissertation Abstract 
THREE ESSAYS ON
THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING LAWS
The theoretical foundation of this model is the economic theory of 
regulation as developed by Stigler; in addition, modifications of the 
economic or special interest theory implied by the Public Choice school 
of thought are employed. A synthesis of these two theories of regulation, 
then, provides the framework upon which to develope a general model of the 
causes and consequences of laws regulating the bargaining rights of state 
employees.
Topic One is devoted exclusively to the determinants of state-wide 
bargaining rights laws. The data are pooled over two years, and state 
laws are classified into one of three possible categories: bargaining
prohibition (or nonexistence of a law), mandatory meet and confer, and 
mandatory bargaining. The dependent variable, then, is ordinal. Each 
observation is a discrete realization of the underlying, unobservable 
variable, sentiment toward public unionism. Estimation procedes by the 
technique of McKelvey and Zavonia (1976). The independent variables are 
divided into two categories: economic/demographic, and political.
Inclusion of variables in the former category is motivated by the Chicago 
School's interest group theory, while the Public Choice School and 
Economics of Legislatures School suggest variables proxying 
characteristics of the political process.
Topic Two, employing the basic model developed in Topic One, 
estimates the determinants and effects of bargaining laws simultaneously.
vi
The dependent variable in the "effects" equation is union density. Single 
equation estimation of either process is assumed to suffer from 
simultaneous equations bias, the consequences of which are biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates. An econometric technique developed by 
Heckman (1978) is employed in order to account for the estimation of an 
ordinally measured endogenous variable within a simultaneous equations 
system.
Topic Three applies the simultaneously estimated general model 
developed in Topic Two to three separate employee groups: teachers,
firefighters, and police officers. By doing this, comparisons may be 
made among individual sub-groups, and the applicability of the general 
model tested.
vii
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three Topics on public 
sector unionism and bargaining laws. Its purpose is to 
determine whether bargaining law determinants and the extent 
of unionization are joint outcomes which are properly 
specified within a simultaneous system. In addition? the 
process surrounding the enactment of legislation is modelled 
according to the economic theory of regulation; therefore, 
the validity of this theoretical framework is also tested.
Almost all of the literature on public sector unionism 
consists of single equation models of either union outcomes 
or union regulations. According to the economic theory of 
regulation, legislation is endogenous, modelled within a 
demand and supply framework. The price theoretic foundation 
also underlies the determination of union density (or 
bargaining coverage): the proportion of the public sector
unionized is an outcome of the demand for and supply of 
union services. Thus, micro foundations explicitly underlie 
this union model, which is not always the case in 
traditional industrial relations research in labor 
eco n o m i c s .
In addition, a large proportion of the published
research in this area deals with just one public employee 
group: teachers. This dissertation improves on previous
work in this regard in two ways. First, a general model of 
state-wide public employee unionization and bargaining laws 
is estimated in order to make inferences about the most 
general case; few studies have attempted this. Second, the 
general model is disaggregated into three separate employee 
groups (teachers, firefighters, police) in order to make 
comparisons among the individual groups, and between them 
and the general model. This could shed light on the 
validity of a general model representing disparate groups. 
That is, it could lead to the identification of a core group 
of explanatory factors common to all employee groups, and 
thus fundamental to the process determining laws and 
unionism in the public sector; it could also highlight 
systematic differences between groups, providing future 
research topics.
Finally, this dissertation improves on previous 
estimation techniques above and beyond the employment of a 
simultaneous system. One of the reasons simultaneous 
estimation is rarely employed in this type of analysis is 
because of the econometric difficulties associated with 
simultaneous systems containing a limited endogenous 
variable. In this model, the two jointly dependent 
variables are union density, which is continuous, and 
bargaining law status, which is discrete. Heckman (1978)
developed a simultaneous estimation procedure designed to 
handle both discrete and continuous endogenous variables; he 
derived the case for a dichotomous endogenous variable. 
This procedure is extended here to account for an ordinal or 
n-chotomous dependent variable, which characterizes the 
general model described above.
Topic One developes a single-equation model of the 
determinants of bargaining laws across states and over time. 
Its purpose is to test the validity of the model of 
legislation put forth by the economic theory of regulation. 
Topic Two then adds to this general model of bargaining law 
determinants a model of public employee unionization; this 
equation, then, represents the effects of legislation. By 
treating these two variables as endogenous, their true 
effects within this legislative process can be inferred. 
That is, the direction(s) of causality are estimated without 
the possibility of bias which may arise from improperly 
specified single-equation models. Topic Three then
estimates the simultaneous equation model for three 
individual employee groups, providing interesting and useful 
comparisons among these workers.
The other comparison of interest is between single­
equation estimates of all the equations of Topics Two and 
Three and their simultaneously estimated counterparts. When 
the process surrounding public sector unionization and the 
statutes regulating its activities are correctly specified
as simultaneous, the inferences derived from estimation 
provide clear evidence of the gain to be had from treating 
laws and unionization as jointly endogenous.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO TOPIC ONE
Examining the determinants of public sector collective 
bargaining laws is an exercise in the application of the 
economic theory of regulation: it provides the basis for
the specification of a model of the demand for and supply of 
labor legislation. This literature can be divided into 
three partitions, and at its base is the Chicago School or 
special interest theory. The special interest theory was 
advanced as it became increasingly clear that the 
traditional public interest theory of regulation did not fit 
the data; that is, the orthodox rationale of regulation as a 
means of correcting market failures was not supported by 
actual regulatory behavior, structure, and outcomes. The 
focus of this theory is on income redistribution: competing
interest groups demand regulation as a means of eliciting a 
wealth transfer from the state, and support-maximizing 
politicians supply regulation based on characteristics of 
the political process. The Chicago School focus is on 
interest group demand; it comprises the demand side of the 
economic theory.
An extension of the Chicago School framework is
provided by the supply side emphasis of the remaining two 
components of the economic theory of regulation: the Public
Choice School, and the Economics of Legislatures School. 
The primary contribution of the former in this context is to 
emphasize the active role and influence of legislators and 
constituents in the determination of legislative output. 
Essentially* this results in supply constraints which are 
consequences of the political costs of producing regulation. 
The latter school, the Economics of Legislatures, introduces 
additional supply constraints. This school analyzes
legislatures as firms which produce legislative output. It 
accounts for the political and institutional factors which 
affect the costs of reaching collective decisions: in other
words, the economic costs of legislation.
Modelling the determinants of legislation occurs within 
this economic framework. In the determination of state-wide
bargaining laws, then, demand is specified by identifying
interest groups which expect to be directly or indirectly 
benefited or harmed by the regulation. Benefitted groups 
provide support, while the pressure exerted by taxed groups 
is in opposition. The supply of special interest regulation 
is specified using the same cost-benefit calculus, this time 
applied to legislators. Those factors expected to affect
the political and economic costs of supplying regulation are
weighed against the expected support from special interests. 
In short, those factors which affect the economic self­
interest of rational, maximizing politicians, pressure 
groups and constituents determine the outcome of the 
regulatory process.
Chapter S contains a review of the literature. The 
first section deals specifically with the economic theory of 
regulation literature. This review establishes the
theoretical framework within which economists model the 
determinants of economic legislation. The second section 
contains a review of the literature on these determinants. 
First, a summary of the theoretical derivation of the 
general economic model of the political process is 
presented; it is within this general model that the economic 
theory of regulation is derived. Second, the empirical 
literature is surveyed. This covers the actual model 
specifications and empirical proxies used, the econometric 
techniques employed and the consequences associated with 
their use, and last, the implications and results of this 
res e a r c h .
Finally, chapter 3 developes a general model attempting 
to explain the determinants of public sector bargaining laws 
across states, and describes the econometric technique. The 
dependent variable is ordinal, taking one of three possible 
values representing the strength of the existing bargaining 
laws. The bargaining law index is aggregated over employee 
groups in order to identify the common factors surrounding 
this particular type of regulation. Estimation of the model
8is by ordered probit analysis.
CHAPTER S 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
5.1 The Economic Theory of Regulation
The seminal article in the theory of regulation and the 
cornerstone of the Chicago School is S t i g l e r ’s The Theory of 
Economic Regulation (1971). This article provided the 
foundation for the revisionist positive economic theories, 
and focused on the demand for and supply of regulation. The 
coersive power of the state, with its ability to tax or 
subsidize different groups, creates incentives for these 
groups to compete for a positive wealth transfer. This 
wealth transfer may come in the form of any of four basic 
government policies: direct subsidy, entry controls,
controls over substitutes and complements, and price fixing. 
Although Stigler assumes that most regulation is demanded by 
the regulated industry itself, his analysis clearly accounts 
for the cases of onerous legislation upon industries. This 
of course refers to the demand for controls over substitutes 
and complements.
The differences between political versus economic 
markets constrain industry cartel policies, implying that 
where private cartelization is possible, its benefits to
10
members exceed those obtainable from regulated 
cartelization. The limitations of the political process 
impose the implementation of costly procedural safeguards* 
change the distribution of power among firms in the 
industry* and finally, allow the admission of "powerful 
outsiders" to membership in industry councils.
The analysis of the costs of obtaining regulation is 
particularly significant within a political framework. It 
explains why rational voters in a democracy permit wealth 
transfers to special interests to whom the benefits fall 
short of s ociety’s deadweight losses. The issue is 
coersion: the democratic political decision making process
compels everyone to abide by the majority outcome* whether 
he or she had voted yes, no, or abstained. In contrast, a 
voter in the product market places individual votes the 
consequences of which follow directly from his or her 
decision (i.e., to consume or not and in what quantity). 
Stigler notes the two fundamental differences between 
political and economic decision making processes which arise 
from the element of coersion in political markets. It is 
the cost 5 implied by these two differences which are 
significant in the special interest t h e o r y ’s analysis.
First, simultaneity by voters (or their
representatives) is required. As a result, direct voting by 
individuals on a large number of issues is too costly? 
therefore, elected representatives must be given wide
11
discretion, and changes in marginal preferences by voters 
will be unaccounted for by the representatives.
Second, the political process does not allow 
participation in direct proportion to interest and 
knowledge. The democratic process cannot exclude
uninterested parties, and does not allow extremely 
interested parties more than one vote. As a result, 
incentives to acquire costly information about political
goods are attenuated relative to those existing in the
economic marketplace.
The primary means by which these two elements of the
democratic political marketplace are handled is by the
election of representatives; that is, representative 
democracy. The cost to voters of acquiring information and 
of voting itself, the low probability of any single voter 
affecting outcomes, and the measurement error in the 
precision of preference expression introduced by uninformed 
voters all add noise to the channels of the political 
process. It is this noise or grossness in a representative 
system which causes the strong preferences of the majority 
and many strong preferences of minorities to be effectively 
transmitted and thus implemented by the representative. 
Marginal preferences of either the majority or minorities 
are not effectively transmitted.
Turning to the sellers of legislation, i.e., the 
political parties in which politicians are organized, the
1 2
supply price is measured in units of political support. 
Votes and resources provided by special interests seeking 
regulation constitute this support.
Stigler hypothesizes that the costs of obtaining 
legislation increase with industry size* but at a rate less 
than the increase in size. The reasons underlying the 
former hypothesis are increases in industry organizing and 
maintenance costs* increases in the size of the transfer 
demanded which increases opposition* and increases in free 
rider problems. The latter hypothesis is explained by the 
"fixed" size of the political market within which these 
industry cost increases are set.
S t i g l e r ’s article provided the general theoretical 
framework for the revisionist economic theory of regulation* 
allowing a broad range of empirical testing of the special 
interest t h e o r y ’s validity in explaining legislative 
outcomes. On its own, however, it provides few specific 
testable hypotheses of optimal industry size or of effects 
on optimal size and support of changes in the level of 
costs, transfers, welfare losses and opposition. The 
following articles analytically derive these and other 
hypotheses through extensions and modifications of S t i g l e r ’s 
t h e o r y .
The major analytical extension of the Chicago School 
foundation is provided by Peltzman <1976). This article 
emphasizes the positive nature of S t i g l e r ’s economic
13
analysis in specifying the demand for and supply of 
regulation; in contrast, the traditional public interest 
theory specifies no mechanism by which demand for regulation 
is made effective, and in addition virtually ignores supply 
c o s t s .
The important role of Peltzman in generalizing Stigler 
is in his analysis of the relationship between group size 
and the role of costs in determining efficiency within 
political markets. That is, by generalizing and formalizing 
S t i g l e r ’s framework, Peltzman analytically derives results 
on optimal group size. Peltzman formalizes the model by 
assuming the regulator maximizes net votes or a majority 
<M). In this simplified model, the regulators choose
the size of the winning group (and thus the size of the 
taxed group). The regulator’s objective function is 
specified as
M - n*f - <N-n)*h, 
where n is the number of potential voters in the beneficiary 
group, N-n is the number of potential voters in the taxed
group (i.e., N — number of potential voters), and f and h
are net probabilities of a beneficiary granting support and 
of a taxed individual opposing, respectively. The function 
f is determined by per capita net benefit, and is not simply 
zero or one owing to information and voting costs. Thus, f 
= f(g), where g = < T-K - C(n) )/n, and T is the total
wealth transfer to the beneficiary group, K the dollars
14
spent by the group to obtain the transfer, and C(n) the 
organizing cost of the group, C ’<n) gt O. Peltzman assumes 
for simplification that the regulator chooses both K and T; 
in reality, K and T are simultaneously determined by the 
interaction of demand and supply.
Since the transfer is the product of a tax, it may be 
written as
T * t*B*(N-n), or t = T/(B*(N-n), 
where t = tax rate, and B = wealth of the non-benefitted 
g r o u p .
Turning to the net probability of opposition from the 
taxed group, h, it is a positive function of t and a 
negative function of per capita voter education expenditures 
(z ), where
z = K / < N - n ) .
The assumptions about f and h are as follows:
fa gt O, f oa It O, i.e., diminishing returns to 
benefits? h* It 0, h** gt 0, i.e., diminishing returns
to per capita education expenditures; and
h t; gt 0, ht, gt 0, i.e., increasing costs of taxation. 
The first order conditions are then derived with 
respect to the three choice variables M, T, and K. 
Combining these expressions and solving for n yields 
n/N - 1 - < f a*(g +■ a) )/<f + h - f 0-Mm - a) ), 
where a = C/n and m “ C M n ) ,  the average and marginal costs 
of group organization, respectively.
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The first result Peltzman derives is obtained from the 
first order condition taken with respect to T ,
M* = f0 - (1 / (B + t*b„) ) = 0.
This condition states that the marginal political return 
from a transfer must equal the marginal political cost of 
its tax. It can be seen that (B + t*B^) must be positive 
for an interior maximum (since fa and ht are positive).
Since this term is the marginal product of the tax rate t in 
raising revenue, that it must be positive implies that a 
vote maximizing politician will impose an amount of tax less 
than the revenue maximizing tax level. This first result, 
then, is simply that the revenue generated from a regulated 
cartel must be less than the revenue possible from a 
privately organized cartel.
A related result follows after dropping Peltzman's 
initial assumption of a uniform tax. Relaxing this
assumption allows more than one single economic interest 
group to win. Thus, the rational regulator may exploit
differences within the losing (i.e., taxed) and the winning 
groups so that some losers win and some winners lose. 
Peltzman derives this result analytically, and it is seen 
that the tax on any individual member of the losing group (a 
function of demand, elasticity of demand, and tax
responsiveness) may be positive or negative.
Peltzman then turns to factors affecting the size of 
the winning group: support, opposition, and organization
16
costs. In the first of three simple cases* he shows dn/df 
gt O, i.e., an increase in the probability of support 
(holding benefits constant) increases the size of the
winning coalition. The second case is a parametric shift in
opposition* h: dn/dh gt 0 for the same reason that dn/df gt
0. As opposition technology improves, the regulator allows 
some members of the taxed group to avoid the tax, and thus
become winners. The third case, a parametric shift in
organizing costs C, is ambiguous. Stigler argued that the 
free rider dilemma would limit the size of the group, but 
the sign of dn/dC is determined by the sum of offsetting 
components. The first component describes S tigler’s effect 
of concentrating benefits (i.e., a smaller n) in response to 
an increase in C. The second component is a decrease in K 
(essentially payment to the politician or party) resulting 
from the increase in C, which produces the third component. 
This is the effect the fall in K has on increasing n; that 
is, with a lower K, lobbying efforts are more efficiently 
employed on a smaller taxed group, so that n rises. 
Stigler’s hypothesis holds, then, if this latter effect is 
small relative to the initial "free rider” response, which 
seems reasonable.
Peltzman then generalizes the model further and derives 
several more results from a specific analysis of price-entry 
regulation. The results include effects on prices and 
profits, and on demand for new regulation.
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The politician is assumed to maximize a majority 
generating function the arguments of which are the wealth of 
various interest groups* subject to a constraint on total 
wealth. Groups are assumed independent of one another, and 
the game is zero sum in transfers. Applying this
formulation to the case of two groups, producers and 
consumers, and to regulation in the form of price setting 
and entry controls, the constrained objective function may 
be written
L = ) + PC tt - f(P,C>>,
where
P = output price, C = production cost,
tr = producer wealth, P = a Lagrangian multiplier,
M p It 0, gt 0, M pp It 0, It 0, M ttp = 0.
Maximizing this Lagrangian with respect to P, it , and p  
yields
"(Mp/fp > = M,,. = - p.
This condition specifies that the marginal political 
product of one d o l l a r ’s worth of profits (M ) must equal the 
marginal political product of a price cut (-Mp ) relative to 
a one dollar profit loss resulting from the price reduction 
(fP ) .
In deriving the comparative static results of changes 
in cost or demand on price, Peltzman defines a "political 
wealth effect". That is, a change in the cost function has 
a positive effect on price (as in the unregulated case).
However* this effect is composed of two elements: the
typical economic response facing both unregulated and 
regulated firms, and a political response or political 
wealth effect. In general terms, the political wealth 
effect indicates that a r e gulator’s purchases of the "good" 
political support are positively affected by the reg u l a t o r ’s 
wealth or income, assuming normality of the good. For this 
specific example, this effect arises because the surplus to 
be distributed by the regulator has decreased, inducing him 
or her to purchase less support. However, an important 
implication is that a rational regulator will not decrease 
political support purchases from a single group only, or 
increase purchases from a single group in the case of cost 
reductions. It follows that consumers will be forced to 
share p r o d u c e r ’s losses from cost increases; conversely, 
when costs fall, regulators purchase more political support 
from both groups so that producers share some of c o nsumer’s 
g a i n s .
For the effects of a change in demand on price, the 
same two components comprise the comparative statics 
expression: a typical positive economic component, and a
political wealth effect which in this case is negative. As 
the reg u l a t o r ’s wealth increases due to an increase in 
consumer demand, the political wealth effect induces the 
regulator to buy more support from both groups; thus, 
producers buffer consumer losses resulting from the increase
19
in demand.
Peltzman summarizes the implications for regulatory
behavior from this price-entry regulation application of a
very general special interest model. First, the analysis
immediately preceding implies that regulation tends to be 
favorable to producers during recessions and to consumers 
during expansions. Second, regulation is in general a 
normal good and therefore entry into regulation is 
endogenous. Third, regulatory lag will tend to be more 
pronounced during demand rather than cost changes. This is 
due to the opposing effects of the economic and the 
political components on price in the case of a demand 
change. Fourth, studies indicating that regulation on an 
industry has had no effect may be measuring the net effect 
over time. For instance, initial producer protection should 
over time shift to consumer protection in a growing and 
technologically innovative industry. Thus, distinct and 
opposing regulatory effects exist, and their measured net 
effect is zero. Fifth, regulated firms with the highest 
profits should also have the lowest prices. This negative 
price-profit correlation exists because as the surplus to be 
disposed of increases, the regulator has the incentive to 
purchase more support from both groups, i.e., to increase 
profits and to lower prices. Sixth, conditions of elastic
demand and scale economies favor consumers. That is, a more 
elastic demand increases the consumer surplus of a price
decrease* while decreasing the profitability of a price
increase. Taking the case of scale economies, and assuming 
that marginal cost is falling but total costs are 
essentially unchanged due to diseconomies of smaller
outputs, a price increase will be less profitable; a given 
price decrease, then, is associated with enhanced voter 
productivity. Thus, both these conditions imply consumer
protection. Finally, a seventh implication is that
regulation should reduce risk associated with financial
assets since profits and stock prices are to some degree 
insulated from demand and cost changes.
In the final section, which examines the structure of 
regulated prices, Peltzman derives results for the regulated 
sector reflecting its substitution of political for economic 
criteria. Specifically, the phenomenon of cross­
subsidization emerges as a consequence of the distribution 
of transfers and tax burdens such that marginal opposition 
among competing groups is equal. Summarizing the results, 
cross-subsidization can be explained by the regulator’s 
incentive to spread benefits or costs among all groups, even 
though they were generated by the cost or demand 
characteristics peculiar to a single group. Therefore, 
profit-maximizing forces leading to pure price 
discrimination are suppressed; at the same time, political 
wealth effects create a regulated price structure in which 
low cost customer groups subsidize high cost groups.
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Finally, Peltzman makes two additional points. First, 
the m o d e l ’s implications for control of entry follow from 
this discussion of cross-subsidization. From the
regulator’s point of view, the existence of cost differences 
among consumer groups always implies that the politically 
motivated price structure will be discriminatory. Profit- 
maximizing price discrimination is not politically optimal, 
but the cross-subsidizing variant is. Therefore, the 
regulator will seek the power to control entry in order to 
prevent cream skimming. Second, entry of regulation is 
more profitable for the regulator the more disparate is the 
industry’s price structure. As long as cost-based price 
differences exist the regulator can increase his or her 
support by spreading the low costs of some customer groups 
to other high cost groups.
In sum, Pe l t z m a n ’s contribution in generalizing 
St i g l e r ’s model is to provide additional testable hypotheses 
regarding regulatory outcomes. Another article extending 
this basic Chicago School framework of regulation as a means 
of wealth redistribution is Becker <19B3). This model is 
capable of explaining both special and public interest 
legislation, and it does so within a framework strongly 
emphasizing the deadweight costs resulting from benefits and 
ta x e s .
B e c k e r ’s model assumes competing pressure groups expend 
resources in order to win political favors, or to
as
redistribute wealth. The political budget equation is 
balanced: the amount raised in taxes must equal the amount
spent on subsidies; influence, then, is a zero-sum game. 
The equations determining the amounts of taxes paid and 
subsidies received incorporate their respective deadweight 
costs. Thus, the revenue generated from a tax of x dollars, 
and further, the deadweight cost of the tax, increases as 
the tax increases. The subsidy received by a winning member 
is a function of the deadweight cost of providing the 
subsidy, so that the actual transfer is less than the dollar 
amount of the subsidy raised; further, the cost of providing 
the subsidy increases as the amount of the subsidy
increases. Therefore, the model is negative-sum in taxes 
and subsidies.
Becker developes influence functions relating subsidies 
and taxes to the amount of pressure generated by two 
homogeneous pressure groups, and to other variables as well. 
A pressure function is then derived for each group, where 
pressure is a function of the number of members in the 
group, and resources spent by the group, e.g. lobbying 
activities, information campaigns, and political 
contributions.
Then, expressions for the full income of each member of 
both the taxed and the subsidized groups are developed:
Z„ = + R„ - a„, and Z* = Z*0 - FU - a*,
where
S3
Z n ~ and Zt,° are the full incomes of a member of the
subsidized group (s) and the taxed group <t) 
respectively;
Z measures the income of each s and t after 
redistribution;
R measures the redistributions to each s and away from 
each t ;
’a' measures the total resource expenditure per member 
of each group (where total expenditure = direct outlay on 
political activity plus cost of controlling free-riding). 
Income is maximized when
dR„/da,„ = 1, and dR^/da*, = -1.
Using this condition, the expressions for each g r o u p ’s 
influence function, and assuming Cournot expectations by 
each group, equilibrium conditions may be derived from which 
optimal values of expenditures and pressure are solved. 
From the comparative static properties of the political 
equilibrium, which defines the optimal amounts of pressure 
by each group, Becker derives his first proposition. 
Proposition One states that an increase in the efficiency of 
producing pressure by a group causes its subsidy to rise or 
its tax to fall. A corollary to this result is that a 
g r o u p ’s influence is determined by its relative efficiency, 
not by its absolute efficiency.
One of the most important results to be determined is 
the effect on a g r o u p ’s influence of an increase in the
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g r o u p ’s size. The total effect depends on the manner in 
which an increase in size affects efficiency* subsidies* and 
deadweight costs. In order to determine these effects* 
however, it is necessary to determine the effects of
deadweight costs on each of the following: pressure, taxes*
and subsidies.
First note that an increase in the marginal deadweight 
cost of taxes increases pressure by the taxed group* while 
an increase in the marginal deadweight cost of subsidies 
reduces pressure by the subsidized group. This means that
taxpayers have the intrinsic advantage in translating 
pressure into influence. Following these results,
Proposition Two states that an increase in deadweight costs 
reduces the subsidy. This implies that a transfer
benefiting a special interest and producing very large 
deadweight costs to society is nonetheless less expensive 
(that is, more efficient) in terms of deadweight costs than 
other potential transfers which were not implemented.
Analysing the effects of deadweight costs on efficiency 
illustrates B e c k e r ’s contention that his model incorporates 
both special interest and public interest (e.g.* 
environmental and health and safety laws) regulation. (It 
is the contention of the public interest school that 
governments correct market failures, thereby raising
efficiency). First, any program benefiting all groups faces 
no opposition. Of greater relevance is the situation in
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which some program increases aggregate efficiency, but 
imposes deadweight costs on some groups. Becker shows that 
these programs may be instituted if efficiency is increased 
at the margin* because in this case the s u b s i d 1zed group has 
the intrinsic advantage in translating pressure into 
influence. This is stated in a corollary to Proposition 
Two: programs increasing efficiency are more likely to be
implemented than those reducing efficiency. Therefore* the 
case of so called "public interest" regulation which 
corrects market failures is accounted for within this 
special interest model.
Finally, Proposition Three states that successful 
groups are small relative to the groups taxed to pay the 
subsidy. The larger the taxed group* the lower are marginal 
and total deadweight costs of taxation and therefore the 
less pressure is exerted by taxed groups.
Becker then turns to the question of whether pressure 
group competition has a bearing on efficiency in terms of 
the methods of taxation and subsidization chosen. It is 
clear that both taxed and subsidized groups should favor the 
most efficient methods of taxation. If a given tax becomes 
more efficient, the taxed group exerts less pressure as 
deadweight costs decline; therefore, the subsidy as well as 
the met income of the taxed group increases.
Proposition Four, then, states that competition among groups 
tends to elicit efficient taxation methods.
Bh
For the case of subsidization methods, however, the 
results are less clear cut. First of all, a more efficient 
method of subsidization yields a higher subsidy, so that the 
subsidized group always supports the most efficient method. 
Furthermore, if the optimal pressure exerted by s falls, 
which would occur if the marginal deadweight cost at the 
initial equilibrium was greater under the more efficient 
method, both t and s would favor the efficient subsidy. Qn 
the other hand, it is also possible that the marginal 
deadweight cost at the initial equilibrium is lower under 
the more efficient tax; in this case, increased pressure by 
s results in members of the taxed group opposing the more 
efficient method.
Pressure group competition, then, may produce efficient 
subsidies, but not necessarily. This implies that seemingly 
inefficient means of regulation need to be examined more 
closely to judge whether conventional conclusions of gross 
inefficiency are warranted.
Looking at the political equilibrium of this model 
<i.e., the equilibrium levels of pressure from taxed and 
subsidized groups), Becker notes that it is not Pareto 
optimal. The influence indifference curves are positively 
sloped since influence is a zero sum game: as pressure and
the influence of one group increases, the other g r o u p ’s 
influence must fall, thus causing its production of pressure 
to rise. This implies that both groups would be better off
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if both reduced their pressure. Their influence levels 
would remain unchanged, and their net incomes would increase 
as expenditures fell.
Finally, Becker notes some possible problems with his 
model. First, his influence functions depend only on 
pressure and other characteristics of the group. Influence, 
however, may be a function of taxes and subsidies due to 
voter ignorance. An example is assigning social welfare 
attributes to private wealth redistribution transfers in the 
form of the minimum wage. If this is the case, then the 
conclusions that efficient taxes tend to predominate, and 
that policies raising efficiency tend to receive more 
support than those lowering efficiency, are certainly not 
valid as general propositions. This situation may very well 
be the case, since voter ignorance is after all rational in 
the political goods market.
Another possible problem occurs by omitting an explicit 
treatment of voting. Becker assumes that voting has no 
significant independent effect, but that special interest 
information campaigns shape voter preferences. If votes are 
not so easily bought, and evidence of significant 
differences in voting patterns by various demographic 
characteristics suggests they may not be, then the model 
would have to be modified to account for constituent voting.
Finally, in common with all previous special interest 
models, B e c k e r ’s analysis does not account for public
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interest regulation which does not raise efficiency. In the 
1970’s, some legislation began to be enacted for the benefit 
of no identifiable g r o u p , in the presence of no obvious 
market failures, leaving behind deadweight losses and lower 
efficiency. Such regulation is not mentioned in B e c k e r ’s 
19B3 article. This amission is accounted for in the 
following article which provides a clear and concise 
theoretical justification for a Public Choice-type extension 
of the Chicago School framework.
McChesney (1987) highlights two deficiencies of the 
private interest theory literature. The first is its 
treatment of the politician as a "passive broker" 
redistributing wealth according to the demands of private 
pressure groups. In fact, the politician does not simply 
supply regulation; he or she also imposes demands on the 
interest groups. This acknowledgment allows the politician 
to derive political gain from activities other than 
political rent creation.
The second deficiency, related to the first, is the 
inability of the economic theory to account Tor the consumer 
oriented regulation just discussed. In general, the 
economic theory does not explain regulation which creates no 
rents for some pressure group(s).
This article developes a theory of a politician playing 
an active role in the market for regulation. This 
reevaluation of the p o l i t i c i a n ’s role accounts for
E9
regulation which does not create rents. Specifically*
politicians use their property rights as public
officeholders to threaten private producers with rent 
extraction. These existing rents may have been created
privately* for example through entrepreneurial ability or 
firm-specific capital investments. On the other hand* the 
rents may have been originally created by political
cartelization. <One way in which the threatened extraction 
may be accomplished is by industry deregulation.) The 
producer will then "pay" the politician* through political 
contributions* to refrain from enacting the threatened 
legislation if this payment is less than the loss of the 
r e n t s .
For the case of expropriation of privately created 
rents, the allocative cost is measured in terms of 
distortions in investment decisions. Less investment in 
firm specific capital is undertaken when the possibility of 
legislative expropriation exists. The expected value of 
these investments falls if protection must be purchased from 
politicians in order to deter harmful legislation. There is 
a shift toward less firm specific investment* and this 
allocative distortion is often overlooked in the measure of 
the social costs of regulation. McChesney notes T u l l o c k ’s 
point that the consequences of this type of regulatory power 
are the same as those arising from theft. If theft were 
legal* people would minimize expected losses by decreasing
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their productive activity: they would have less to lose.
Two methods are effective in eliciting payments from 
producers in order to forestall extraction of producer 
surplus: the threat of reducing prices, and the threat of
increasing costs. A good example characterizing the former 
method is the threatened extraction of privately created 
p r o d u c e r ’s surplus, the result of previous period 
investments in brand name capital, for instance. Regulation 
may be threatened which would "substitute" for the private 
provision of product quality control in the industry. As a 
result, firms whose customers currently pay a premium in 
exchange for the quality assurances created by earlier 
investments will pay politicians to drop this legislation. 
Otherwise, these firms will lose the return on their capital 
investment since the reg u l a t i o n ’s effect will be to lower 
price and increase the elasticity of industry supply.
For the latter method of eliciting payments, a threat 
to increase costs by imposing a per unit tax is an obvious 
example. Another is instituting regulations requiring firms 
to gather information and report it to the government, 
thereby increasing paperwork and red tape. Again, firms 
which would suffer a net loss in producer surplus as a 
result of these mandated cost increases have an incentive to 
pay politicians to refrain from action.
Indeed, McChesney points out that examples of both 
these methods of political blackmail exist. His
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contribution to the economic theory of regulation* an active 
politician who supplies legislation and threatens and 
imposes demands on special interest groups* rectifies two 
important deficiencies of the original model. It allows for 
both the creation and the extraction of rents in the pursuit 
of private political gain.
5.2 The Economics Literature on the Determination of 
Legislation
2.S.1 Theoretical Development of a General Economic Model 
of the Political Process 
The theoretical foundation of the economics literature 
an the determinants of public sector bargaining laws is 
derived from the application of economic analysis to the 
theory of democracy (Downs,1957). Using economic principles 
to analyze the behavior of political parties yields the 
conclusion that p o l i t i c i a n s ’ incentives are basically the 
same as those of entrepreneurs. Politicians will produce 
that combination of legislative outcomes which maximizes 
their votes, or in the more general sense* their wealth. 
Within the political market, then, economically powerful 
individuals and groups may buy political influence from 
politicians in exchange for political support. The demand 
for influence or favorable legislation and its supply by 
politicians simultaneously determine the equilibrium 
transfer and its price.
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The first two articles reviewed are primarily 
theoretical, deriving models of specific aspects of the 
political process. Among these are the determinants and 
effects of political support, and of representative and 
constituent voting. Following these, several empirical 
articles are reviewed to establish those issues on which a 
concensus of opinion has been reached, and those on which 
substantial controversy remains.
One of the most general of the theoretical articles is 
by Ben-Zion and Eytan (197A) . The first section evaluates 
the role of campaign contributions in the traditional <and 
simple) model of the democratic process. A political 
candidate is assumed to maximize P, his expected percentage 
of the votes in an election, by choosing a vector of optimal 
positions on various issues, <S), given personal 
characteristics, <«). The optimal positions are chosen such 
that the candidate minimizes the distance between his and 
the voters' positions. This simple production function P is 
then extended by including campaign contributions, <M). The 
simple model can then be written
P = f (S,M,<x) .
The candidate will have an incentive to solicit 
contributions in exchange for advocating a particular policy 
as long as the votes gained from using the contribution 
exceed the votes lost from changing the policy. Totally 
differentiating the objective function yields dP, the
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(positive or negative) sum of these two opposing effects on 
votes due to a contribution; if dP gt 0, the candidate 
accepts the contribution, and if dP It 0, he or she rejects 
it. Further, the candidate's price for changing policy can 
be found by solving out for dM in the totally differentiated 
equation. The price can be seen to be higher the greater is 
the required change in policy, and the heavier is the weight 
attached to the policy by the voters.
This model distinguishes between campaign expenditures 
made by pressure groups, to which the analysis applies, and 
money contributed by a single individual. The former are 
risky investment expenditures on which a future return is 
expected, while the latter are typically regarded as 
consumption expenditures. These are assumed to enter the 
individual’s utility function as an argument providing 
psychic utility. This is the con t r i b u t o r ’s analogue to the 
public interest theory of regulation.
In examining the conditions for market equilibrium the 
analysis is simplified by looking at one pressure group 
contributor, call it a firm, and one candidate. The firm 
wants specific changes in the candidate’s previously optimal 
policy positions, for which the firm offers a 
contribution,(M ), and from which it derives an expected 
gain, (G). Now, specify S o  as the "classical" optimal 
policy which minimizes the.distance between the candidate 
and the voters in the absence of contributions; therefore,
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any change in policy due to contributions can be written S = 
S„ + t . The market equilibrium is then determined by 
maximizing P = f(S,M»a> subject to M, the contribution 
constraint. The system must be solved simultaneously since 
P and M are jointly determined endogenous variables. 
Substituting expressions for M and S into P, the optimal 
policy vector is dP/d2*. , where 2* denotes the changes in the 
previous equilibrium positions* i = l,...,n. The optimal 
change in a policy Si in the classical case of zero 
contributions is dS/dZi = 0. For the general case of
positive contributions* the expression for the optimal 
policy change indicates that in equilibrium a candidate will 
change policy up to the point at which the marginal gain in 
votes (due to the contribution) just equals the marginal 
loss in votes (due to the change in policy).
Positing a specific distance function and assuming a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form for P yield a simple expression 
for the optimal policy change from which several conclusions 
may be derived. First, the change in policy is greater, the 
greater is the gain to contributors. Second, noted earlier* 
the change in policy is greater* the lower is the weight 
assigned to that specific policy by voters. Third, the size 
of the contribution is greater the higher is the initial 
probability that the candidate is elected, holding constant 
the change in policy. Fourth and finally, if both 
candidates have approximately equal initial probabilities of
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winning, the risk-averse firm may spread the risk of its 
investment by contributing to both.
This type of constrained maximization problem is 
limited by the fact that the candidates’ positions are not 
explicitly modelled. The percentage of votes won is 
modelled as a function of contributions, characteristics, 
and policy positions. In addition, the determinants of 
contributions are specified as a function of policy 
positions and percentage of votes won. Only constituent 
voting and contributions are thus explicitly modelled. A 
complete model must also specify the determinants of 
candidates’ policy positions. The model put forth by Kau, 
Keenan, and Rubin does this by specifying an equation 
determining congressional voting.
Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) postulate a simultaneous 
equation system with three jointly determined endogenous 
variables: constituent voting for Congressmen,
Congressmen’s voting on specific issues, and campaign 
contributions from special interest groups. This model 
reflects the simultaneous relationship between the economic 
and political sectors of society, a relationship both 
political scientists and economists have long studied. 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Downs (1957), 
economists such as Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Olson 
(1965), Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), and 
Becker (1983) have applied economic theory to political
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processes. Many earlier articles have estimated single 
equation models of the influence of constituents on 
C o n g r e s s m e n ’s voting* others have looked at the relationship 
between campaign contributions and C o n g r e s s m e n ’s 
characteristics. These models assume one-way causation and
i
as such are subject to possible simultaneity biases. Other 
previous articles (e.g. Kau and Rubin* 1979, Chappell, 
19B0), have estimated two equation simultaneous 
relationships between either Congressmen and constituents or 
Congressmen and contributors. These models* too* suffer 
from a possible simultaneity bias according to Kau* Keenan, 
and Rubin; therefore, summarizing their theory will specify 
the causes of the biases affecting previous studies, and 
allow a test of S t i g l e r ’s economic theory as well.
Beginning with Congressmen, it is assumed that their 
goal is to be elected* thus, the inputs for this objective 
function are campaign expenditures and voting on 
Congressional bills. Voting fulfills two functions for the 
optimizing Congressman: one, a vote which pleases his
constituents will increase his probability of being elected; 
and two, a vote which pleases potential donors will increase 
the probability of receiving a contribution, which also 
increases his probability of being elected (by increasing 
campaign e x p e n d i t u r e s ) . Furthermore, both of these
relationships involve two-way causality. First,
constituents may vote for a Congressman who votes as they
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wish; on the other hand, a Congressman may change his votes 
according to constituents’ preferences. Second, pressure 
groups may contribute to a Congressman who votes as they 
wish; or,a Congressman may change his votes according to 
contributions reflecting pressure g r o u p s ’ preferences. 
This, then, is the source of the simultaneity within the 
system: constituent votes, Con g r e s s m e n ’s votes, and
campaign contributions are all jointly determined endogenous 
variables.
In addition, there are several other components of this 
theoretical framework. First, the question of exactly what 
it is the Congressman maximizes is left unanswered. Downs 
<1957) assumed votes are maximized, while Riker (1962) 
assumed the goal is a winning majority. Others prefer a 
more general function which maximizes a Congressman’s 
wealth. In this analysis, votes are included in the 
objective function without employing a specific assumption 
about what is maximized.
Another component of the theory is the recognition of 
the influence of seniority on Congressional voting, 
constituent voting and contributions. Seniority implies the 
attainment of influential committee positions and therefore 
power; it is expected to exert a separate influence on 
Congressional voting behavior. By similar reasoning,
seniority should have a positive effect on both 
contributions and constituent voting (i.e., the probability
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of e l e c t i o n ) .
Another issue within the political process* one not 
successfully explained by application of economic analysis, 
is why people vote. Kau, Keenan, and Rubin take the fact 
that people vote as a datum, and hypothesize that 
constituents vote for those who further their interests. 
Within the economic theory of regulation, interests are 
defined solely in economic terms. This article employs a 
more general definition of interest, encompassing 
noneconomic elements as well. Specifically, constituent 
ideology is included as a determinant of both constituent 
and Congressional voting. This allows a test of the 
validity of the more narrow Stiglei— Peltzman-Becker model.
Finally, a note on the empirical specification is 
worthwhile. Interest groups may have one of two motives in 
making candidate contributions: one, to change the position
of likely winners, which implies that congressional voting 
is a function of contributions; and two, to elect candidates 
favorable to their positions, implying that contributions 
are a function of Congressional voting. To allow for both 
of these motivations empirically, the total amount of 
interest group contributions received by the loser is 
included as an explanatory variable in the constituent 
voting equation and in the contributions equation. 
Regarding the former equation, the w i n n e r ’s margin of 
victory should be a negative function of the lo s e r ’s
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contributions; regarding the latter, contributions received 
by the winner should be a positive function of the loser’s 
contributions.
The model can thus be written as follows:
V = f ( M,F»I,S)
F = g<V,S,TL)
M = h(V,I,S,TF,TL),
where
V = Congressional voting,
F = a vector of contributions received by the 
Congressman,
M = electoral margin received by the Congressman,
TF = total contributions received by the Congressman,
TL = total contributions received by the Congressman’s 
last opponent,
I = a vector of economic and noneconomic constituent 
character ist ics,
S = seniority.
The following is a brief summary of the data and estimation 
technique employed, and the empirical results from this 
m o d e l .
The dependent variables are: Congressional voting on
eight bills, chosen on the basis of broad economic impact; 
contribution data gathered by the Federal Election 
Commission; and electoral margin of each Congressman from 
the Almanac of American Politics.
t*0
The econometric technique employed is the mixed logit 
model (see Schmidt and Strauss (1975* 1976) and Nerlove and 
Press (1973)), and it is seen that the empirical results 
largely support the theory. From an economists’
perspective, the most important results are those indicating 
which interest groups favor which laws, and it is these 
results which are summarized here.
First, among the eight bills are votes on OSHA and the 
Consumer Protection Agency. These were included as examples 
of consumer oriented regulation with no obvious 
beneficiaries; in contrast, bills with clear special 
interest beneficiaries were also included. In the
Congressional voting equation, the authors included 
constituent ideology as measured by the percentage of each 
Congressional district which voted for Ford in the 1976 
Presidential election. If its coefficient in the "special 
interest" legislation is not significant, one could not 
reject the hypothesis that only economic interests are 
important in explaining Congressional voting, assuming the 
model used is the "true" one. In fact, the strongest result 
of this paper is the consistently significant ideology 
parameter; in addition, this result is consistent with 
previous work (Kau and Rubin, 1979). However, to what 
extent this and similar measures may be accurately 
interpreted as reflections of ideology is debatable. 
Another view is that these measures serve as proxies for
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omitted or unobservable economic variables (Peltzman* 1904). 
A review of this latter opinion is included subsequently.
The second important result identifies trade unions as 
a special interest group generally supporting more 
government intervention for the eight consumer oriented 
bills. That is, both union contributions and union
membership are asociated with Congressional voting in favor 
of increased government
intervention; as is expected, this result holds for bills in 
which unions have a clear interest.
A third, though weaker, result concerns the special 
interest contributions of firms. The signs of these 
parameter coefficients are always opposite to those of the 
union coefficients, and in the same direction as the Ford 
ideology measure. They are significant only twice, however.
The theoretical significance of this article is in its 
development of the three equation simultaneous system. 
Empirically, an important issue is the strong significance 
of ideology. In fact, the role and measurement of ideology 
is emphasized by Kau and Rubin in an earlier publication. 
Their theoretical development of ideology, and its empirical 
computation and interpretation, are of interest here since 
the common finding that ideology is highly significant 
contradicts the special interest theory of regulation.
H.2.2 Empirical Research on the Determinants of General
4£
Economic Legislation
The purpose of Kau and Rubin <1979) is to distinguish 
between the factors which determine Congressional voting 
patterns: self-interest or economic factors, ideology, and
logrolling. Since roll call voting is analyzed here as a 
single equation logit problem, neither the model nor the 
estimation procedure and results are of great interest now. 
Consequently, the primary focus of this review is on the 
p a p e r ’s development of ■ ideology; in addition, logrolling 
will be briefly discussed since it is frequently mentioned 
in the literature.
To begin, the authors note that a well-developed 
positive theory of the role of ideology is lacking. 
Economists in general are less familiar and presumably less 
comfortable with ideology as an analytical tool than are 
political scientists, who have long analysed roll call 
voting as one part of the political process. (The focus of 
political scientists, however, tends to be on the mechanism 
by which constituent preferences are translated into 
pressure, and then acted upon by Congressmen. The aim of 
economists in this political process is the discovery of the 
groups supporting or opposing the legislation.> The authors 
also note that Schumpeter is most often cited as having the 
best developed economic theory of ideology (Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy, third ed.,1950). He argues that 
the demise of capitalism will occur largely through an
^3
ideological mechanism itself originating within capitalism. 
That is, capitalism creates a body of intellectuals, 
inimical to capitalism, which over time grows in size and in 
influence over the masses. Though incomplete, S c h u m p e t e r ’s 
is the major positive ideological theory existing.
From this u n c o m p e l 1ing theoretical foundation 
underlying the hypothesis that ideology is important in 
determining legislative outcomes, empirical proxies for 
ideology are presented. Two of the most common proxies are 
the ADA and the COPE ratings. Both are compiled by liberal 
pressure groups <Americans for Democratic Action and the 
AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education), in the same 
general manner. They represent the number of times a 
Congressman votes "correctly" on a chosen set of votes. In 
addition, A D A ’s set of votes is chosen in such a way that 
all Congressman earn a mean ranking.
Several other pressure groups, liberal and 
c o n s e r v a t i v e , construct their own ratings, with correlations 
between them quite high. As their first measure of 
ideology, Kau and Rubin use ADA ratings. The purpose of
these ratings is, of course, to obtain as pure a measure of
ideology as possible; that is, the proxy far ideology should 
not reflect the influence of any underlying economic (or
self-interest) variables. Most empirical work simply
includes economic variables in the estimating equation under 
the assumption that these proxies accurately measure and
fully account for self-interest; thus, the ideology measure 
is interpreted as soley capturing non-self-interested 
mo t i v e s .
Kau and Rubin go further in attempting to eliminate the 
influence of any underlying economic variables which the 
ideology measure may be picking up due to measurement errors 
in the independent variables. Since the ADA rating is based 
on votes, many of which are economic in nature, Kau and
Rubin use a residualization p r o cedure1 to purge from ADA
these economic influences. The first step of the procedure
is to regress ADA on several economic explanatory variables, 
such as per .capita income, central city residense, union 
membership, age, and proportion black. The second step is 
to compute the residuals from these ADA equations and
substitute this variable, denoted RADA, for the explanatory 
ADA variable in the regression explaining roll call voting. 
RADA is thus orthogonal to the economic variables in this 
equation. Finally, to eliminate any influence obtaining 
from both the dependent variable and an independent variable 
being based on voting (roll call votes and RADA, 
respectively), the dependent variable votes took place in a 
different year than the votes used to construct the ADA 
rating. In addition, many of the twenty-six dependent 
variable roll call votes were chosen because they were not 
directly relevant to ADA ratings.
Turning to the results of concern here, RADA was
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significant twenty-four of twenty-six times. Evidence which 
may be interpreted as indicating the presence of a liberal 
logrolling coalition is the consistent sign agreement) where 
significant) of central city residents) union members) and 
individuals with an interest in consumer affairs) with RADA. 
(Along with other economic variables) these three were found 
to be significant and positive in explaining the ADA rating; 
that is) these economic variables are associated with 
liberalism.) This is only an indirect test of logrolling) 
however) and the possibility exists that RADA proxies 
liberalism only in the sense of reflecting a liberal 
logrolling coalition.
One final issue of interest) then> is to directly test 
this alternative interpretation of ADA: it measures not
ideology but logrolling. If correct) no role for ideology 
in voting exists; instead) all voting is determined by 
either direct or indirect self-interest. Being a liberal or 
conservative would simply mean one was associated with a 
particular coalition of economic interests. To test the 
hypothesis that RADA measures logrolling) twelve roll call 
votes were chosen such that each bill appealed to a single) 
unique economic interest in the set. Then) the conditional 
logit model was employed to estimate individually each of 
the twelve jointly determined endogenous variables as 
functions of the economic variables) RADA> and the remaining 
eleven bills. (This procedure produces biased and
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inconsistent estimates.) If the votes are significantly 
associated with one another, then this suggests the 
existence of logrolling coalitions. However, if RADA is 
also consistently significant in these twelve equations, 
then one may not reject the hypothesis that RADA is 
measuring ideology, and conclude that ideology is important 
in influencing legislation.
A critique of the common interpretation of ADA and 
similar ratings as measures of ideology is motivated by a 
basic criticism of the specification of Kau/Rubin-type 
models. Peltzman (19B4) sets up a Public Choice-type 
principal-agent model explaining roll call voting which 
employs a different empirical characterization of economic 
interest. This change in the basic methodology used yields 
very different conclusions about the importance of ideology; 
specifically, its significance is lessened greatly.
Peltzman begins with the observation that the use of 
the typical empirical proxies for the p r i n c i p a l s ’ demand for 
legislation, that is, the average economic characteristics 
of the C o n g r e s s m a n ’s district, is inappropriate in the 
context of explaining the principal-agent relationship. 
Instead, Peltzman accounts for the differences in economic 
variables between a c a n d i d a t e ’s supporters and opponents. 
Thus, Peltzman derives a model conventionally assuming the 
legislator maximizes votes (or the probability of 
reelection), but distinguishing between supporters and
opponents; in addition* it contains the percentage of votes 
won in the last election and campaign contributions as 
explanatory variables. The first order condition for a 
maximum is found by taking the partial derivative of the 
objective function, M» with respect to the number of votes 
the legislator cast in the previous session in favor of his 
or her supporters, V. Now, this objective function M 
summarizes the legislator’s expected votes in the upcoming 
election, from both previous supporters and previous 
opponents. Some of the implications of this principal-agent 
model can be conveniently summarized by imposing the 
simplifying assumption that the only constituent economic 
variable that matters is income; in addition, assume higher 
income individuals supported the legislator in the previous 
election, while lower income voters did not. As a result, 
the elected legislator voted on bills which either helped or 
hurt individuals based on their income group, which affects 
their probability of supporting the legislator during the 
next election.
The implications from this simplified model are derived 
from several assumptions: first, as the income of segments
of either voter group (previous supporters or opponents) 
increases, the higher is the probability that members will 
support the legislator in the next election. Peltzman 
assumes that increases in contributions cause increases in 
the probability of support from both groups, and shows that
it is mare likely that increases in V cause increases in 
contributions, although theoretically this sign could be 
positive or negative. Based on these assumptions, some 
implications are derived •from changes in the income of 
either group. First, if either g r o u p ’s income increases, V 
increases. Second, if the variance between the two groups 
increases, holding constant the mean, the effect on V is 
ambiguous. However, applying the median voter model to 
assist in intuitively predicting its sign leads to 
P e l t z m a n ’s primary methodological modification:
distinguishing between supporters’ and opponents’ 
characteristics for use as explanatory variables. To see 
this, note that the income'of the marginal voter in the last 
election must be closer to the opposition g r o u p ’s average 
than the supporting g r o u p ’s average. The income level 
evaluated at the competitive margin, then, is lower than 
that of the legislator’s supporters. This implies that the 
legislator may vote less often for policies favoring his 
supporters, the greater is their wealth relative to that of 
the marginal voter. Thus, this application of the median 
voter theory to a simple principal— agent model yields 
P e l t z m a n ’s innovation: the inclusion of characteristics of
both supporters and opponents, in the objective function. 
Finally, Peltzman cites the lack of a theory specifying the 
direction of effects of several economic characteristics on 
voting preferences for simply allowing the data to indicate
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that information.
Turning to the implications for the significance of 
ideology as an independent determinant* its relative 
importance can be inferred from the magnitude by which its 
explanatory power changes when the matrix of economic 
variables is measured more precisely. Additionally, if
ideology is in fact a proxy for omitted economic variables 
(and not some other unknown factor), then adding these 
economic variables to the equation will substantially 
improve its overall fit. So, if the influence of ideology 
declines greatly when additional or simply more precise 
empirical proxies for economic variables are employed, then 
the conclusion that ideology has little independent effect 
may not be rejected. Thus, the common conclusion of 
previous research that ideology is strongly significant, 
indeed sometimes the most significant variable, is spurious; 
that is, the ideology proxy is picking up the effects of 
omitted economic variables due to model misspecification or 
measurement error.
P e l t z m a n ’s empirical strategy is the followings to the 
model including the conventional measures of ideology and 
average constituent characteristics he adds two elements. 
The first is the difference between average characteristics 
and supporter characteristics; the second, characteristics 
of campaign contributors.
Proxies for supporter characteristics must obviously be
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constructed, since there is no way of knowing who did or 
d i d n ’t vote for a candidate. Supporter characteristics are 
generated by running a least squares regression of a 
s e n a t o r ’s share of the vote in a county on a vector of 
economic and demographic characteristics of residents of 
that county. The explanatory variables used were: median
family income, median education, percent aged over 65 years, 
percent black, percent urbanized, and percent of the labor 
force in the manufacturing sector. Then, to impute
differences between the average voter and the sen a t o r ’s 
supporters, a dummy variable was asigned to each of the 
characteristics in the se n a t o r ’s share regression according 
to its significance: +1 for significant positive
coefficients, -1 for significant negative coefficients, and 
0 for insignificant coefficients. Finally, it is assumed 
that the true difference for each characteristic is a 
transformation of the corresponding dummy variable.
Before estimating the roll call voting equations, 
Peltzman previews one of the conclusions by first running 
regressions of a se n a t o r ’s ADA rating on economic 
characteristics. The explanatory variables are statewide 
averages of those used in the voting regressions plus the 
proportion unionized; differences between these average 
characteristic and supporter characteristics statewide, 
constructed as described above; characteristics of 
contributers, measured simply as labor’s share of total
51
interest group contributions; and last, the senator’s party 
af f i1iation.
P e l t z m a n ’s procedure is to run the ADA regressions 
■first with only average character ist ics as explanatory 
variables, which produces an R s of 0.36; second, to this 
model political party is added, increasing the RE to 0.65. 
Past research has done exactly this, and concluded that 
ideology as measured by party has a significant effect on a 
s e n a t o r ’s voting. However, Peltzman continues by deleting 
party and add ing supporter characteristics, thereby 
producing an R3 of 0.59. To this model he adds contributor 
characteristics, which increases the RE to 0.76. Finally, 
to this last model which takes account only of economic 
variables, he once again adds party to infer its independent 
effect. The RE remains the same, which implies a negligible 
independent effect.
Two final points noted by Peltzman should be mentioned 
before summarizing the roll call voting regressions. The 
first is that from these results one cannot confidently draw 
the conclusion that "political kinship" as proxied by party 
has no effect on voting. The high correlation between party 
and the economic variables employed does not allow such an 
unambiguous statement. And second, one possible conclusion
which is suggested is that party affiliation serves the 
function of all brand names, that of a cheap source of 
information. Therefore, party could be interpreted as
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signalling a constituent about which candidate is most 
likely to vote in a manner consistent with the c o n s tituent’s 
economic interests.
Now, turning to the roll call regressions, 
approximately the same procedure as above is fallowed to 
ascertain the importance of ideology in a nonrandom sample 
of senate roll call votes. The estimation procedure is 
logit, and the goodness-of-fit measure is the logit 
analogue, two times the log liklehood function (2LL), to the 
OLS mean-squared error. Starting with a naive model 
containing intercept only, the addition of average 
characteristics results in an improvement in 2LL equal to 
21.8. Adding supporter characteristics to this model yields 
an improvement equal to 18.2, and finally adding contributor 
characteristics yields an additional 6.3. The sum of all 
interest or economic variables, then, improves the naive 
model by A6.3. Now, to this interest model the addition of 
party adds 3.0, ADA adds 8.3, and so the sum of the ideology 
proxies improves the model by 11.3. The major point here is 
that 80-90V. of the explanatory power of the model derives 
from the three economic variables, leaving a much more 
limited role for ideology than that attributed to it by 
previous research.
Peltzman concludes that these results are not 
sufficient to deny the relevancy of applying traditional 
economic analysis to the political process. With a more
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refined economic methodology> he believes that the 
conventional principal-agent model is an appropriate 
framework) and that serious exploration of ideology may be 
left to political scientists and sociologists.
3.3.3 Empirical Research on the Determination of Public 
Sector Labor Legislation
Another area of research in this literature describes 
the determination of public sector bargaining laws using 
cross-sectional data on states. The next six articles 
reviewed focus on» first) the theoretical framework) and 
second) the explanatory variables most successful in 
empirical applications. One of the earlier quantitative 
attempts to explain state bargaining laws is by Kochan 
(1973). This paper is one of the first to explicitly 
recognize that the determinants and effects of public policy 
are entertwined. Although not putting this relationship 
into a simultaneous equations framework) Kochan views state 
"environmental11 characteristics as determinants p r i o r ? in an 
analytical sense) to the effects of bargaining laws. In 
other words) state characteristics are described as 
intervening variables) influencing and modifying the effects 
of public policy on the dependent variables under study.
Looking at various concepts of public policy is 
useful. First) policy may be explicit) as with
comprehensive regulations on specific issues. On the other
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hand) policy may be passive) through its interpretation 
from common or civil law in the absence of explicit
regulation. The comprehensiveness of public sector
bargaining laws is evaluated in terms of its degree of 
formalization of the bargaining process) since the trend has 
been toward greater formalization.
The empirical analysis involves the development of an 
index of public bargaining laws. Its categories include) 
among others) bargaining rights) strike and impasse
procedures) scope of bargaining) and unfair labor practices. 
Each state is then assigned an ordinal value reflecting its 
degree of comprehensiveness within each category.
At the time this article was written) little 
empirical research had been done on the determinants of 
public policy. Then> as now> theoretical considerations go 
only so far in model specification; in particular) the 
direction of some independent variables in this model is 
left to the data. The environmental characteristics 
considered are first subdivided into three categories: one)
economic and social characteristics; t w o > political 
characteristics; and t h r e e 9 public sector industrial 
relations characteristics (e.g. wage and employment levelst 
unionization) strike activity) and right-to-work laws).
The results of zero-order correlations between the index of
public policy and the state characteristics by category are
as follows: for category one) states with the most
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comprehensive policies tend to be more urbanized and
industrialized* with higher (and rising) per capita income 
levels* and tend to have higher levels of per capita state 
expenditures and greater increases in per capita revenue 
from the federal government. For category two, the most 
comprehensive laws are associated with a decentralized 
decision-making process in state legislatures, the degree of 
partisan conflict* the length of time in existence of a 
merit system, the strength of the governor, the
innovativeness of the s t a t e ’s legislature (measured by 
comparing the years in which states adopted selected 
policies since about 1900), and the amount of competition 
among political parties. For category three, all the 
following are associated with more comprehensive laws:
unionization in the private sector, the number of high wage 
public employees* a rising public employee income level* and 
the absence of a right-to-work law.
The significance of K o c h a n ’s article today is in its 
comprehensive coverage of possible explanatory variables* in 
particular, its inclusion of political variables in an 
economic framework is a potentially useful synthesis. 
Another early study is by Moore and Newman .(1976).
Discriminant analysis is used to evaluate the determinants 
of teacher bargaining laws across states.
The explanatory variables include, first, the 
percentage of a s t a t e ’s employment in the government sector;
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if this proxies the ability of employees to exert pressure* 
then it Mould have a positive impact on a s t a t e ’s
probability of enacting bargaining laws. Qn the other hand* 
its effect could be negative if a larger group of employees 
induces greater resistance to enacting costly laws. Second, 
the percentage of employment in agriculture should have a 
negative influence on passage due to the traditional
difficulties in organizing this sector. Third, a right-to- 
work dummy variable may represent policies unfavorable to 
unions, thus exerting a negative influence on passage. 
Fourth, a regional dummy variable equal to one for Southern 
states, zero otherwise, proxies the S o u t h ’s historical anti­
union bias. Fifth, urbanization is hypothesized to have a 
positive effect? either way, urban residents are expected to
have preferences systematically differing from other state
residents. Sixth, population density is hypothesized to be 
positive; this variable is included to counteract the effect 
previous rural overrepresentation may have in obscuring the 
relationship between urbanization and public bargaining 
laws. Seventh, the share of government employees unionized, 
and finally, the share of total state nonagricultural 
employment unionized should both be positive.
Step-wise discriminant analysis was used to classify 
states into one of three groups describing the structure of 
public teacher bargaining laws from most to least 
comprehensive (or nonexistent). Among the results: the
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percent of government employment is negatively related to 
the passage of mandatory bargaining laws (the most 
comprehensive category); the percent of agricultural 
employment is, surprisingly, largest not for the least 
comprehensive group as would be expected, but for the middle 
group. As predicted, the South dummy is largest for the 
least comprehensive group, and results on the percent 
urbanized imply that an increase in urbanization leads to 
the passage of more comprehensive laws. Population density 
is positively associated with passage, and the percentage of 
government unionization is largest for the most 
comprehensive laws, both as predicted. Contrary to 
expectations, the right-to-work dummy and the percent of 
total employment unionized (which includes members of 
employee associations) are not significant. Overall, the
discriminant model classified 68 percent of the states 
c o r r e c t l y .
A comparison of these last two articles with a more 
recent one illustrates the progress made through the 
availability of improved econometric software. Hunt and 
Uhite (19B3) also examine the determinants of public teacher 
bargaining laws, with estimation by the N-chotomous probit 
technique.
This article explicitly employs the special interest 
theory of the demand for and supply of legislation as well 
as traditional industrial relations analysis. The latter
typically studies the effects of a collective bargaining 
structure on the terms of e m p loyment> taking the legal 
structure itself as given. Special interest theory) of
coursey assumes a simultaneously determined demand and
supply framework. Specifically} this article explicitly 
attempts to identify those groups which are expected to be 
helped or hurt by teacher bargaining laws} as well as the 
latent groups for which the wealth redistribution process
yields stakes too small to generate opposition. The
industrial relations literature specifies determinants of 
the conditions of employment} or the work environment;
assuming that collective bargaining changes this 
environment} these determinants should influence the
structure of bargaining legislation. The authors conclude 
that the special interest theory is far superior to the 
industrial relations methodology in predicting legislative 
out c o m e s .
The dependent variable is an ordinal scale index with 
units zero through four reflecting increasingly favorable 
public teacher collective bargaining legislation. Two of 
the industrial relations employment condition variables 
which are presumed to affect the demand for legislation are 
the number of school districts relative to the school-age 
population} and the average teacher pay relative to median 
male income. Both are predicted to be negative: the former
because the fewer the school districts} the greater their
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monopsony power and thus the greater the demand by teachers 
for more comprehensive laws; the latter because the lower is 
t e achers’ relative pay* the greater are the benefits to be 
derived from bargaining legislation.
Another variable used is a measure of state and local 
education expenditures; the industrial relations literature 
hypothesizes a negative sign to reflect the reduction in 
expected benefits from legislation at higher levels of 
funding. If* however, funding decisions are viewed as 
determined simultaneously with bargaining outcomes* as is 
consistent with the special interest theory* this sign 
should be positive. Again consistent with the special 
interest theory is the identification of groups which 
benefit from or are harmed by the legislation. The percent 
of total public sector employment and the percent of private 
sector unionization indicate groups expected to gain from 
spillovers from teacher bargaining laws. Another group
expected to benefit due to similarities in employment 
conditions is composed of health professionals who are not 
self—e m p l o y e d .
A variable capturing anti-union sentiment of private 
management, a group expected to oppose the legislation* is 
the number of unfair labor practice charges per 
representation election. A special interest group which may 
work to pass bargaining laws is parents of school-age 
children; therefore* the percentage of school-age population
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is included and is hypothesized to be positive. Taxpayers 
as a group, of course* bear the burden of the wealth 
redistribution process engendered by the bargaining laws. 
Thus* the proportion of temporary residents as proxied by 
the estimated labor force separation rate is included and 
expected to have a positive influence on passage.
Income should be included in the model* since demand 
for bargaining laws will increase as income increases 
(assuming education is a normal good). Income is proxied by 
median male education.
Finally* the last two variables reflect a major thesis 
of this article regarding an aspect of the wealth 
redistribution process from teacher bargaining regulation. 
The authors propose that unionization and bargaining rights 
lead to a redistribution of wealth toward career teachers* 
i.e., long tenure in the profession is rewarded. This is 
consistent with what appear to be basic union goals in 
general: promoting the rewarding of seniority, and opposing
subjective merit—based reward structures. Two variables 
included as a test of this hypothesis are the proportion of 
teachers in the labor force. If this variable is positive, 
the authors interpret it to mean that* contrary to their 
hypothesis, all teachers gain from bargaining. If negative, 
they presume it confirms their hypothesis that stayers gain 
at m o v e r s ’ expense, since some proportion of all teachers 
measured are employed in that district an a short-term basis
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only. In addition, career workers are proxied by the 
percentage of male teachers, and this variable will be 
positive if stayers are in fact the net benficiaries of 
bargaining legislation.
The estimation procedure employed is N-chotomous 
probit. The ordinal scale, measured from 1 to A, reflects 
the underlying intensity of preferences for bargaining as 
latent variables which cross thresholds; as thresholds are 
crossed, these continuous preferences are measured 
discretely by the content of existing state bargaining laws. 
The range moves from no bargaining to prescribed bargaining. 
The statistical methodology employed is the McKelvey and 
Zavonia model (1975).
The empirical results suggest that, first, the 
industrial relations variables are of little importance in 
determining legislative outcomes. Second, the thesis that 
stayers are subsidized at m o v e r s ’ expense, or of wealth 
redistribution among teachers, appears to be supported. 
Third, other groups benefitting from teacher bargaining laws 
appear to support the legislation, while groups expecting to 
be harmed oppose it, providing additional support for the 
special interest theory of regulation. Fourth, labor force 
turnover carries a positive coefficient, which could 
indicate that taxpayer incentives to oppose the legislation 
are diminished if many taxpayers do not expect to be 
permanent residents.
6E
Although this article provides some important insights 
into the determination of legislative outcomes from an 
explicit special interest perspective, ignoring the 
simultaneous determination of many of the explanatory 
variables raises, as always, questions about the reliability 
of conclusions based on possibly biased parameter estimates.
An article attempting to address the problem of cause 
and effect in bargaining legislation and growth in unionism 
is Saltzman (19S5). He finds that primary causality runs 
from the enactment of bargaining legislation to the extent 
of unionism. On the other hand, in a model explaining the 
determinants of bargaining laws, the effect of teacher 
unionism is positive but weak; the most important
explanatory variables are the extent of political patronage 
and the bargaining laws in neighboring states.
This paper expands on the few previous econometric 
analyses of bargaining law enactment and teacher union 
growth by expanding the set of explanatory variables and 
using a more appropriate measure of teacher unionization. 
The variables determining the extent of teacher unionization 
(referred to as the extent of teacher bargaining) are 
derived inductively, from observation; in this case, from 
interviews and previous studies. This approach is taken 
because the upsurge in public, sector union membership during 
the 1960’s and 19 7 0 ’s Was neither predicted ex ante nor 
adequately rationalized ex post.
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Briefly» the explanatory variables explaining 
unionization are broadly categorized under the following 
headings: teacher and school characteristics, labor market
conditions, membership in other unions, attitudes toward 
unions, previous extent of bargaining, and public policy 
c h a n g e s .
On the other hand, the regression explaining changes in 
the enactment or nature of bargaining laws (as well as in 
case law) contains the following explanatory variables: 
current extent of bargaining coverage, attitudes toward 
unions, changes in Democratic party strength, extent of 
political patronage, regional patterns, and previous 
bargaining laws. As noted, the dependent variable in this 
regression is the change in bargaining law status, not the 
level. The justification for this usage lies in the fact 
that the status of such laws is, of course, subject to 
change over time; in some cases, currently existing 
bargaining laws were passed years earlier. Therefore, 
current year independent variables better explain changes 
in, rather than levels of, laws. The author contends that 
the most appropriate specification is to lag the dependent 
variable (change in status), and match it with current year 
explanatory variables.
Data for both regressions were obtained by state for 10 
years, biennially. The rationalization for estimating these 
two equations separately, when a simultaneous equations
framework is intuitively expected, rests on the use of the 
lagged dependent variables. That is, changes in bargaining 
laws are assumed to affect bargaining coverage only after a 
lag of months or years, and vice versa. Therefore, since 
the equation explaining changes in the nature of such laws 
employs lagged values of the extent of bargaining, and the 
equation explaining changes in the extent of bargaining 
employs lagged values of bargaining law changes, there are 
no jointly determined dependent variables. In other words, 
the lagged endogenous variables are predetermined, assuming 
the absence of autocorrelation. Therefore, the bargaining 
coverage model is estimated consistently by least squares, 
and the model measuring changes in the nature of bargaining 
laws is estimated by logit analysis; for the latter model, 
the dependent variable takes the value one if a s t a t e ’s 
bargaining law changed from less to more pro-union in a 
biennium, zero otherwise.
The major results for the two models will be very 
briefly summarized. For the LS bargaining coverage
regression, the primary result is the dominance of the 
effect of changes in bargaining laws on bargaining coverage 
relative to all other explanatory variables. That is, the 
proportion of teachers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements is strongly and positively influenced by the 
enactment of laws mandating bargaining. Results pertaining 
to the remainder of the explanatory variables are generally
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as predicted based on previous research; one contrary 
result, however, and difficult to rationalize, is the 
insignificance of labor movement strength as measured by 
membership in other unions.
In contrast, the logistic probability model determining 
changes in a s t a t e ’s bargaining law status produced the 
result that the extent of bargaining (as measured by 
bargaining coverage and union membership) is of only minor 
importance. The most significant explanatory variables are 
contained in the "political characteristics" and the "law 
pattern of contiguous states" categories. In fact, the most 
accurate predictor of more pro-union laws is the proportion 
of contiguous states mandating bargaining. However, two 
closely related measures of legal patterns in contiguous 
states have anomalous signs, which casts some doubt on the 
reliability of parameter coefficients in this general 
category. Finally, another unexpected result (unexpected in 
terms of previous research results) common to both equations 
is the insignificance of COPE ratings as indicators of 
attitudes towards unions.
The major conclusion of this article is that, although 
causality is in fact two-way, by far the most significant 
causal relationship runs in just one direction: from the
enactment of teacher bargaining laws to the extent of 
teacher bargaining. The latter variable exerts only a small 
impact on the former.
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Contradicting this conclusion is evidence on bargaining 
law status from two states* Ohio and Illinois. Saltzman 
(19B8) examines these states which violate the general 
pattern of the evolution of legislation in public sector 
labor relations. Despite being industrialized, highly 
unionized northern states, neither enacted a public sector 
bargaining statute until 1983. An equally anomalous event 
is that despite the absence of legislation, both states had 
many public sector collective bargaining contracts. If laws 
are the major impetus behind union coverage, how are the 
cases of Ohio and Illinois explained?
Saltzman answers this question by examining in detail 
the public sector bargaining and legislative histories of 
these two states, and by conducting personal interviews with 
numerous individuals involved in organized labor and state 
government over this time period. He concludes, first, that 
the long delay in enacting legislation resulted from 
exceptional political factors peculiar to each state, and 
second, that after pro-bargaining laws were finally enacted 
in 1903, a causal increase in bargaining coverage ensued.
In both states, Saltzman finds that political patronage 
was a major obstacle to the legislation. However, the 
weakening of the Chicago Democratic machine after Mayor 
D a l e y ’s death (which had opposed bargaining law enactment as 
it represented a transferral of authority from Chicago to 
the state government), and the Democratic control of the
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Ohio state government ensuing from the 198E elections 
removed these obstacles.
Finally* using quantitative methods of analysis 
Saltzman finds that passage of the 1983 laws positively 
influenced bargaining coverage in both states. For 
instance, descriptive statistics and logistic regression 
results for Illinois teachers imply that the probability of 
bargaining coverage increased significantly after the 1983 
law went into effect. (The conclusion that the enactment of 
the law increased O h i o ’s unionization was also reached;
however, due to data limitations on union membership prior 
to the l a w ’s passage, this conclusion is based on very 
limited existing survey data and information from the 
extensive personal interviews conducted by the author.) 
Saltzman asserts that a causal relationship between
legislation and union density is likely. He believes that 
in the 19 6 0 ’s and early 1970’s, public sector bargaining 
laws and unionism were probably outcomes of the same social 
forces or sentiment. By the 1980’s, however, the examples 
of Ohio and Illinois indicate that changes in the political 
climate and not sentiment will influence the future 
enactment of favorable legislation. This implies that laws 
matter; that is, the increases in bargaining coverage in
Ohio and Illinois were caused by the legislation per se.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with an article by Farber 
(1988). He notes that the estimation of a full structural
model of the determination of bargaining laws and union
membership is optimal in the sense that the direction of
causality could be inferred. Due to data and econometric 
limitations he estimates a reduced form model explaining 
legislation* so that unionization is not allowed to directly 
affect the legal environment. The econometric framework 
consists of a Markov model of transitions. Transition 
probabilities are derived to explain the liklihood of a
state enacting legislation conditional on the initial 
bargaining law category. The two categories of explanatory 
variables capture, first, the intensity of preferences
toward public sector unionism, and second, the costs of 
enacting legislation. Legislation is enacted (i.e., it 
changes from one category to another) if preferences are 
strong enough to outweigh the legislative costs. The 
empirical proxies representing preferences toward unionism 
include congressional voting on labor issues (the COPE 
rating), private sector unionization, per capita income, 
size of the government sector, regional dummies, and a time 
trend. To measure the costs of enacting legislation, the 
number of days a state legislature meets, a measure of 
legislative activity, single party control of state 
government, and a time trend are included.
The transition model is set up in the following manner. 
Using the NBER data set described earlier, Farber uses 
observations on bargaining rights for states from 1955 to
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1984. He specifies an ordinal measure of bargaining rights 
representing increasing permissiveness for each of three 
employee groups: state employees* police* and teachers.
Maximum liklihood estimation is then applied to this 
extension of an ordinal probit model. The first set of 
results presents the parameter estimates for the extended 
ordinal probit model describing bargaining law strength. 
The second set uses these estimates to compute a predicted 
Markov transition matrix.
It is evident from the first set of results* that only 
the variables capturing intensity of preferences toward 
unionization are significant determinants of bargaining law 
status. Proxies for factors affecting the costs of 
producing legislation have no explanatory power. Some 
specific results are the positive and significant influence 
of COPE and non-southern regional dummies on bargaining 
laws. Further, weaker evidence implies that per capita 
income and per capita government expenditures have positive 
influences on bargaining law strength, and in addition 
private sector unionization appears to have no influence. 
Farber concludes at this point that the model is not 
successful in capturing the evolution of bargaining laws, 
and continues to the second set of results as a goodness-of— 
fit test. Using the parameter estimates from the first 
analysis, Farber estimates a Markov process to predict 
changes over time in the aggregate distribution of laws, and
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the cross-sectional distribution of laws (or the predicted 
probability that in a given year an individual state has the 
bargaining law that is actually observed). Comparing these 
predictions to the observed distributions he finds that 
relative to the first test the model seriously underpredicts 
the sharp decrease in states with no law which actually 
occured between 1964 and 1979. H o w e v e r , the model performs 
better in explaining the aggregate distribution of laws 
outside of this period.
Turning to the second goodness-of-fit test, the 
estimated probability that a particular state has the law 
that is actually observed is generally very inaccurate. The 
Markov m o d e l ’s unreliable performance in correctly 
identifying the legal status of individual states again 
points up the inadequacy of the original model in explaining 
the process of bargaining law evolution. Clearly this 
failure lies primarily with the legislative cost variables. 
Farber concludes that either the rationale for the inclusion 
of this category in a model of bargaining law determination 
should be examined more thoroughly, or more appropriate 
proxies for legislative costs are required.
CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Estimation Technique
The model of public sector bargaining laws in this 
thesis employs pooled data on forty-eight states (Alaska and 
Hawaii are excluded) for the years 1970 and 1980. An n- 
chotomous ordered response model (McKelvey and 2avonia 
(1975)) is employed to explain the three public sector 
bargaining law categories representing an escalating 
intensity of preferences towards unionization. If a state 
has either no bargaining provision or it specifically 
prohibits bargaining, then the dummy variable is set to 
zero; if a state has a mandatory meet and confer law (MMC), 
the dummy variable is set to one; and if the state has 
instituted the strongest possible provision, a mandatory 
bargaining law (MBL), the dummy variable equals two. This 
representation of the dummy variable model is that of an 
indicator of latent variables crossing thresholds. That is, 
if the model is written as
Yi « X ’ i*B + u 3, u A NID(0, cr®) , 
then Y_, is the underlying- continuous variable (i.e., 
sentiment toward unionization), and is unobservable. The
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latent variable Yj is denoted by SENTIMENT. What is 
actually observed is an ordinal (or categorical) variable,
Zj, representing the observable category into which the
unobservable Yj Tails. Thus, with M response categories 
there are M+l thresholds. Define these unknown parameters 
as
» Ui , . . • , Urn ,
where
u o  = - o», u m = + ® , and
U0 < Ui < uB < .....  < u m ,
and ui = 0 due to normalization, with a 13 - 1.
For example, in this model the dummy variable 2j falls into
the first category, taking the value zero, if
u Q < Yj 1 ui>
The unknown parameters are estimated by maximum liklihood 
procedures as described in McKelvey and Zavonia. The actual 
estimation was implemented using the LIMDEP software package 
(Greene).
3.2 The Model
The explanatory variables are divided into two
categories: economic and demographic variables, and
political variables. The economic variables are motivated 
by the Chicago School or private interest theory of
regulation, and the political variables by the Public Choice 
School and the Economics of Legislatures School.
Beginning with the first category, the private interest
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theory motivates inclusion of all variables representing 
groups expected to benefit from the legislation. The first 
three variables* then* represent a demand for public sector 
bargaining laws. The first variable is the percentage of 
the public sector organized, (PUBLIC UNION)* which includes 
membership in unions as well as employee associations. The 
second is the percentage of all employment organized, 
(PRIVATE UNION). This variable could proxy one of two 
conflicting effects in the context of the private interest 
theory. The first represents the interest group demand of 
organized labor. Private sector unions have an interest in 
promoting the bargaining position of organized labor* and 
thus PRIVATE UNION may proxy the strength of the labor 
movement. On the other hand, the possibility of divergence 
between the stated goals, beliefs, values and preferences of 
union leadership and rank-and-file membership is frequently 
hypothesized. Although private sector union leadership 
expresses support for and contributes resources to public 
unionism, it is possible that the private sector rank-and- 
file are more influenced by their position as a taxed group 
than their common membership in the labor movement. That 
is, opposition may be generated by the r a n k - a n d - f i l e ’s 
taxpayer costs of implementing strong public sector 
bargaining rights. Whether the costs exceed the expected 
spillover benefits accruing to organized labor is an 
empirical question.
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Third, the percent employed in the public sector, 
(EGS), is included, but its sign cannot be predicted from 
the theory. If passage of legislation is specific to one 
occupation (or one group of occupations), spillovers to 
other public sector occupations may cause overall demand to 
increase and so to produce a postive sign. In addition, if 
the size of the public sector also proxies its strength and 
thus its ability to influence legislation, its effect is 
reinforced. On the other hand, a large public sector may 
also motivate significant opposition as increasing size 
causes costs associated with the legislation to rise. This 
could generate opposition from the suppliers of regulation 
as well as intensify the existing opposition of other 
g r o u p s .
One of the special interests expected to be hostile to 
organized labor and thus to commit resources opposing 
bargaining laws is management. Its opposition is proxied by 
the fourth variable, the number of unfair labor practice 
cases filed, (UNFAIR). Since gains accruing to public 
sector unionism signal benefits to unionism in general, 
management in the private sector will seek to discourage 
legislation providing these gains. The greater the number 
of unfair labor practice charges filed against employers, 
the greater will be management’s opposition to union gains 
in general. Thus, the coefficient on UNFAIR should be 
negative.
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Several additional variables are included as proxies 
•for tastes or preferences toward bargaining rights and 
unionism in general; therefore* they represent demand shift 
variables. They are percent urbanized <URB)» population 
density (POPD), the proportion of the labor force between 
ages 55 and 6^ (SLF), and two dummy variables representing 
Southern states (SOU) and states with a right-to-work law 
(RTW). Let us consider the expected effects of these taste 
var i a b l e s .
The fifth variable is the percentage of a state which 
is urbanized <URB). It is an environmental characteristic 
expected to exert a positive influence on the passage of 
bargaining legislation by influencing tastes toward 
unionism. Previous research has confirmed that this sign if 
in fact typically positive. In addition to this is the 
sixth variable* population density (POPD). This measure of 
the population per . square mile within a state is added 
because the true relationship between urbanization and 
bargaining legislation may be obscured by the 
disproportionately large representation of rural residents 
in state legislatures prior to reapportionment (Moore and 
Newman, 1976).
The seventh variable, SLF or senior labor force, 
represents a personal characteristic affecting preferences 
toward union membership, and thus sentiment toward 
bargaining laws. Experience* or age, appears to be
systematically related to the probability of being a union 
member or of voting yes or no in NLRB representation 
elections. Studies relating age to union membership or to
votes in union representation elections have yielded 
conflicting results. Some indicate union membership
increases with age, others show membership decreases with 
age, and some find age insignificant (Hirsch and Addison, 
1986:p.5B). One possible explanation is that a concave
relationship exists between union membership and experience
(Duncan and Stafford,19S0). Because of multicollinearity 
problems, only the senior labor force is entered as an 
explanatory variable as opposed to entering several 
categories representing young workers and prime-aged workers 
as well. If there is in fact a concave relationship between 
union membership and experience, it may show up as a 
positive sign on SLF and a negative sign on SLF squared.
The eighth variable, RTW, is a dummy set equal to one 
if a state has an RTW law, zero otherwise. Recent research 
on the effects of RTW laws tends to conclude that they have 
no significant independent effect on the extent of unionism; 
rather, they mirror existing attitudes toward unionism 
(Moore and Newman, 1985). The ninth variable (SOUTH), a
dummy equaling one for Southern states, has essentially the 
same motivation. Historically, the South has been more 
hostile to unions than other regions, and this factor has 
inhibited union growth. One explanation advanced for this
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systematic difference in preferences by region is related to 
the level of economic development. The South* traditionally 
a less developed region in the U.S.* may resist unionism 
more strongly on the argument that it creates a less 
attractive environment in which to attract industry 
(Marshal 1,1967). The tenth and eleventh variables are the 
proportion of the labor force which is female (UILF), and the 
proportion which is non-white (NWLF). Past research
indicates that women are less likely and non-whites more 
likely to be union members.
Two additional demand factors are included in our 
legislation model. The twelth variable is the average 
monthly salary of state employees (GOVWAGE). Two opposing 
effects are possible from this variable. The first is the 
interest group demand effect; that is* assuming that union 
services are normal goods* an increase in income results in 
greater demand for these services as well as legislation 
which supports them. On the other hand* some studies have 
found that workers who support unions tend to be relatively 
low wage employees. That is* in studies determining the 
probability that a worker will vote for or against a union 
in a representation election, workers with salaries at the 
lower end of the interfirm wage distribution are the most
likely to vote yes (Farber and Saks (19B0)). Evidence
indicates that one of the'effects of unions is to flatten 
the earnings distribution, thereby benefitting low wage
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employees relatively more than high wage employees. In
calculating the benefits and costs of union membership* one 
of the most important variables is the expected effect on 
the wage; thus* relatively high wage workers perceive lower 
benefits to unionization. Which of these hypotheses 
dominates is an empirical question.
The last and thirteenth demand variable is the 
unemployment rate (UNE), which accounts for labor market 
conditions affecting the strength or militancy of organized 
labor and thus its probability of success in demanding 
legislative gains (or of attempting to secure such gains in 
the first place). The widespread conclusion of U.S. 
research is that variables assumed to measure union 
militancy (e.g.* strike activity) move procyclically (Hirsch 
and Addison* 1986:pp.99-100). That is* the rank and file 
union membership is more militant in terms of organized
demands and the probability of concession when greater 
alternative employment opportunities exist and when past 
real wage increases are lower* as when the price level is 
rising faster than the nominal wage rate (Ashenfelter and 
Johnson* 1969). Therefore* the unemployment rate is 
expected to have a negative effect on the demand for 
bargaining laws.
Turning to the supply side, the second category of
explanatory variables used in modelling the determinants of
bargaining laws is composed of characteristics of the
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political process. The Public Choice School represents an 
extension of the Stigler-Peltzman-Becker economic model by 
explicitly accounting for the limitations on the wealth 
transfer process inherent in the production of political 
goods (Smith, 1982). That is, the Chicago School
assumptions of rationally ignorant voters and passive 
legislators are relaxed. Thus, the wealth transfer process 
is constrained on the supply side by the political costs to 
a legislator (or a political party) of supporting special 
interest legislation. In addition, the Economics of 
Legislatures School accounts for the economics costs of 
agreement, or of collective decision-making.
One measure of political cost is provided by 
calculating state-wide averages of congressional COPE 
ratings (COPE). As noted, this variable is typically 
included in empirical studies as an ideology proxy. Here it 
is assumed that it measures the political cost to the 
politician of supporting labor legislation. If legislators 
tend to vote with rather than against their constituents' 
interests, then high average COPE ratings imply greater pro­
labor sentiment within a state. Therefore, the political 
cost to a state legislator of voting in favor of laws 
upholding public sector bargaining rights is lower in a 
state with higher average COPE ratings. The sign of COPE is 
expected to be positive.
A second variable proxying the political costs of
ao
legislation is PRIOR-LEG, the proportion of contiguous 
states which had passed a manatory bargaining law prior to 
the observation years. According to Saltzman (1985), 
political scientists have shown that state governments tend 
to adopt policies similar to those in neighboring states 
because public officials are more likely to consult their 
counterparts in nearby states, and because neighboring 
states often have many socioeconomic characteristics in 
common. In addition, this variable may also proxy demand 
for bargaining through the demonstration effect of public 
employee bargaining in a neighboring state. Either way this 
variable is expected to have a positive sign.
Finally, several variables were tested as additional
supply constraints representing the economic costs implied 
by the Economics of Legislature’s School. One of the major 
indicators of the economic cost of agreement is the degree 
of interparty competition within a legislature. Variables 
measuring political dominance are thus expected to affect 
special interest legislative output.
The first variable is TURN, the number of times the
majority party changed hands in the last ten years. At 
least two opposing effects from this variable are possible. 
The first is a fixed-east effect and implies a negative
relationship between a change in majority party and
legislative output. This is a result of the start-up costs 
a new regime incurs in organizing and rearranging the means
B 1
of production; as a result* output productivity falls. A 
countervailing effect in this model* however* owes its 
existence to the unique nature of the type of legislation 
under study. Special interest legislation as a component of 
total legislative output may increase with a change in the 
majority party if such legislation were promised in exchange 
for political support during the campaign. If this 
relationship is positive* it supports the contention that a 
higher degree of inter-party competition leads to a greater 
amount of special interest legislation.
Second, control of the legislature by the Democratic 
party is expected to affect the costs (both political and 
economic) of supplying labor legislation. Typically, the 
Democratic party represents and supports labor* therefore, a 
legislature controlled by Democrats may be assumed to face 
less opposition within the legislature (a lower economic 
cost), and less opposition from constituents (a lower 
political cost) to the passage of pro-labor bargaining laws. 
A dummy variable, (UPPER), set equal to one indicates that 
the Democrats control the upper legislative house* zero 
otherwise. An analogous dummy, (LONER), refers to the lower 
h o u s e .
Another variable tested was Log MAJ - P A R T Y , the natural 
log of the percentage of seats held by the majority party. 
Clearly this variable is highly correlated with TURN, and 
its sign cannot be predicted a priori. Crain argues that
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legislative output as controlled by the majority party is 
subject to strong economies of scale. In addition?
diminishing returns to party dominance are predicted by 
Stigler (1972). An opposing view is that large majority 
proportions represent effective entry barriers to 
legislative seats; therefore? the application of monopoly 
theory yields the prediction that less competition (as 
measured by large majorities) results in restricted 
legislative output at a higher price (Anderson and Tollison 
(1988)). Either way? however? diminishing returns to 
dominance are expected.
Other economic cost variables tested were the length of 
the legislative session? the s e s s i o n ’s frequency (annually 
or biannually)? the length of the legislator’s term in 
office? the size of the legislature? and a bicameralism 
indicator (the ratio of the size of the upper house to that 
of the lower house). These variables were all
insignificant? and thus were omitted from further testing.
Preliminary results of the ordered probit analysis 
indicated that the demographic variables URBAN and DENSITY 
play no significant role in explaining variation in public 
sector bargaining laws across states and over time. These 
two variables are highly collinear? not just with each 
other? but potentially with all the other
economic/demographic variables. The consequences of
multicol1 inearity are imprecise parameter estimates. This is
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expected to be a problem in any model which contains as 
right hand side variables both unionization and other 
economic variables which are determinants of unionization* 
and highly correlated among themselves as well. Bath URBAN 
and DENSITY were subsequently deleted from the model. The 
final specification is therefore the product o f » firsts a 
theoretical model the implications of which provide testable 
hypotheses in the form of suggested explanatory variables. 
The second contributions indispensable in empirical research 
due to data limitations as well as limitations in available 
econometric estimation techniquess is specification by 
hypothesis testing. Pre-testing produces parameter
estimates with unknown properties; that i s } their 
distribution is conditional on the "correctness" of the
m o d e l ,
3.3 Ordinal Probit Estimation Results
The empirical results are contained in Table 1.
Discussing some notable omissions first, EGS (the percent
employed in the public sector), and TURN (the number of
times the majority party changes hands in the preceding ten 
years), were both omitted in preliminary testing due to
insignificance. Both these variables are subject to 
opposing influences on sign, as was discussed. It is not
surprising, therefore, that these effects might wash out.
The effect of EGS, for example, is confounded due to its
TABLE 1
ORDINAL PROBIT ESTIMATION: 84
THE DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING LAWS 
(asymptotic t-statlstlcs in parentheses)
Explanatory Dependent Variable *= Bargaining Legislation
Variables_______________________________________________________
INTERCEPT 16.94
(2.62)
PUBLIC UNION 0.06
(2.60)
GOVWAGE 0.001
(1.69)
UNFAIR -0.0009
(-2.40)
PRIVATE UNION -0.04
(-1.27)
NWLF 0.06
(1.64)
COPE 0.01
(1.59)
PRIOR-LEG 0.01
(1.96)
Log MAJ-PARTY -5.09
(-3.25)
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simultaneous determination by both demand 
and supply.
In addition* the political variables UPPER and LOWER 
were omitted in preliminary models* as was RTW. RTW laws 
cover public sector employees in sixteen of the twenty RTW 
states; if the RTW variable proxies sentiment towards 
unionization as is suggested by recent research* it is 
incorrectly specified as an independent variable in a 
single equation model explaining bargaining law strength* a 
proxy for the same unobservable, latent variable sentiment. 
In this case* bargaining law strength and RTW provisions are 
jointly determined endogenous variables. On the other hand, 
if the existence of a RTW law does in fact independently 
influence the passage of bargaining laws <and thus also the 
level of unionization for example), presumably it would show 
up as a significant and negative variable in a single 
equation model.
Of the reported demand variables* only PRIVATE UNION is 
not significant. Since this variable is expected to 
influence bargaining law passage in opposing directions, it 
is possible that its influence is washed out. PUBLIC UNION, 
UNFAIR, and NWLF are all significant, and have the signs 
predicted. 60VWAGE is significant and positive, supporting 
the hypothesis that union services are normal goods.
In terms of the supply variables, COPE and PRIOR-LEG 
are both significant and positive, supporting the lower
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political cost hypotheses attached to them. Again* however, 
PRIOR-LEG may actually (or additionally) be picking up a 
positive demand-side demonstration effect; this is one of 
the consequences of estimating a reduced form equation. 
Finally, the only economic cost variable attaining
significance is Log M A J - P A R T Y . Its coefficient is negative, 
which supports the monopoly theory prediction that greater 
competition among political parties results in greater 
special interest legislative output. On the other hand, 
this variable could be a rough proxy for the South, since 
this region is dominated by a single party to a much greater 
degree than any other region. (Although the single party 
referred to is the Democratic party, the conservatism of 
traditional southern Democrats is well known; this variable, 
then, may simply be picking up unmeasurable anti-union 
preferences in the South.)
3.A Summary
In sum, this n-chotomous dependent variable model
estimating the determinants of public sector bargaining laws 
across states and over time is consistent with current 
research. In common with this research, one-way causality 
is assumed, ruling out the possibility of the joint
determination of levels of unionization and the passage of 
bargaining laws. It appears that single equation models
such as this have extended knowledge of the causes of
variation in bargaining laws as far as they are able. 
Further extensions in this area are expected from the 
expansion of this basic model to a simultaneous equations 
s y s t e m .
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO TOPIC TWO
Any study attempting to account for differences in 
union density or changes in the level of unionization must 
account for the relevant legal structure. Studies of 
private sector unionism have focused on the effects of 
right-to-work (RTW) laws* since this is the only major 
variable affecting private sector employee unionization 
determined on the state* rather than the federal* level. In 
contrast, laws governing public sector unionism originate at 
the state level, thus providing a wide variety of 
regulations which may be analyzed to explain differences in 
unionization across states and over time.
In Topic One, the determinants of public sector 
bargaining laws were modelled. The purpose of Topic Two is 
to analyze the effects of such laws on differences in public 
sector union density across states. As was discussed in the 
first topic, one of the determinants of the legal structure 
defining the status of public unionism is the extent of 
bargaining or the proportion of the public sector unionized. 
Therefore, the major contribution of the current topic is 
the analysis of the effects of these laws within the context
8Q
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of a simultaneous equations system in which bargaining laws 
and unionization are treated as jointly determined 
endogenous variables.
Again* the economic theory of regulation provides the 
theoretical foundation upon which to build a model of the
simultaneous determination of unionization and bargaining
law status. Extending the Chicago School framework*
political variables implied by both the Public Choice and 
the Economics of Legislatures schools are employed.
Chapter 2 is a survey of the empirical literature on 
the effects of bargaining laws. Since the earliest body of 
work examining the effects on unionization of laws governing 
union status pertains to the private sector* a brief review 
of the RTW literature begins the chapter. Next, the more
recent attempts to measure the public sector effects of 
differing legal structures are included.
Chapter 3 developes a reduced form model of union
status or unionization* i.e.* the 'effects’ equation, to add
to the previously developed equation explaining the
determinants of bargaining law status across states. As 
mentioned, the econometric technique reflects the 
simultaneous determination of one continuous endogenous 
variable (unionization) and one ordinally measured discrete 
endogenous variable (bargaining legislation). Bargaining 
law status, then, must be estimated as an ordinal 
qualitative endogenous variable within a simultaneous
equations system. Chapter 4 describes the econometric 
methodology employed to accomplish this: an extension of
the econometric procedure developed by Heckman (1978). In 
addition, Chapter 4 describes the model to be estimated and 
presents the empirical results.
CHAPTER a 
REVIEM OF THE LITERATURE
S.l The Private Sector: The Effects of Riqht-to-Work Laws
on Unionization 
The early debate over RTW laws was limited primarily to
the economic effects of such a law: did RTW laws exert a
significant, negative, and independent influence on union 
growth, or were they merely proxies for anti-union
sentiment? By the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ’s, however, the finding that 
unionization had a negative influence on RTW status made 
clear the necessity of considering the two to be jointly 
determined endogenous variables (Moore, Newman, and Thomas 
(197A)). Therefore, in a single-equation model of the 
effects of the passage of an RTW law, the RTW estimator is 
expected to be biased and inconsistent; specifically, its 
reported effect on unionization should overstate its actual 
effect if it is picking up two-way causality.
To investigate this possible simultaneous bias, Moore 
and Newman (1975) used ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions to explain the variation in union density across 
states, then re-estimated the model by Two Stage Least 
Squares (ESLS) to allow for simultaneous determination.
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They then compared the RTW parameter coefficients from each 
technique. OLS estimation produced a negative and 
significant RTW coefficient, while the SSLS procedure 
indicated that the RTW variable had no significant impact on 
unionization.
Using a single-equation model and a crude technique to 
separate the directions of causality, Lumsden and Petersen 
(1975) conclude that RTW laws exert no independent influence 
on unionization. Starting from a typical reduced form 
equation derived from a model of the demand for and supply 
of union services, the authors attempt to distinguish 
between two possible interpretations of the effects of RTW 
laws on unionization within a single equation context. One 
interpretation is that RTW laws increase the cost of 
unionization, thereby decreasing the supply and equilibrium 
level of union services. A competing hypothesis is that RTW 
laws merely proxy tastes for or against unionism, and thus 
exert no independent influence. Data on state-wide union 
density is employed for years prior (1939) and subsequent 
(1953, I960) to the passage in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
which allowed states to ban union shops. In the first 
regression, the cross-section was estimated for 1939 and 
1953. For 1953, a dummy variable was set equal to one for 
states with RTW laws in existence by that year; in addition, 
for the 1939 observations a dummy variable was included 
which was set to one for those states which would enact an
RTW law by 1953* zero otherwise. Therefore, the RTW 
parameter for the 1939 observations was interpreted as a 
pure proxy for tastes, since no law was actually in effect. 
The RTW coefficient in 1953, however, could represent a 
combination of both possible interpretations of the RTW 
variable. If, then, the 1953 RTW coefficient is
significantly greater than its 1939 counterpart, one may 
reject the hypothesis that RTW laws reflect tastes only, 
assuming preferences remained constant over time; in this 
case one would conclude that RTW laws per se depress growth 
in unionization levels. In a second test of the hypothesis, 
the same procedure was carried out with the addition of 
observations for 196B. Again, a dummy variable was set 
equal to one for states which would have an RTW law in 
existence in 1968. The purpose of this addition was to 
allow a longer time lag during which any independent effects 
of the law might be manifested.
Regression results from both specifications yielded the 
same conclusion: the hypothesis of no independent RTW
effect on unionization could not be rejected. This 
implication supports the interpretation of RTW laws as mere 
proxies for tastes for or against unionism.
This study seems to provide somewhat stronger evidence 
on the effects of RTW laws than does a simple, conventional 
single-equation model; nonetheless, the correct
specification of the process determining RTW status and
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unionization involves simultaneous estimation as Mas 
undertaken by Moore and Newman (1975) and by the authors of 
the following article.
Warren and Strauss (1979) estimate a two-equation model 
with RTW and unionization specified as jointly determined 
endogenous variables. The RTW dummy variable is a discrete 
realization of a latent, continuous, unobservable variable;
t
therefore, an appropriate estimation technique must allow 
for its qualitative nature. The technique employed here is 
the mixed logit model (Schmidt and Strauss (1976)). Their 
results on the effects of RTW laws on unionization are 
contrary to the two previous studies: they found RTW to
have a significant and negative impact on unionization 
levels. In addition, the effect of unionization on RTW 
status is significant and negative (consistent with Moore et 
a l . (1974)). In comparing these results to those of single­
equation models estimated by others and by themselves, the 
authors conclude that by incompletely characterizing the 
true relationship, single-equation techniques may lead to 
incorrect inferences.
Continuing in the simultaneous equations framework, 
Wessels (1981) extends the basic model by considering two 
sources of bias present in most previous studies. The first 
results from ignoring the simultaneous determination of RTW 
status with wages as well as with union membership. The 
second source of bias stems from ignoring the simultaneity
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between wages and union membership. The first bias may be 
corrected by a procedure developed by Heckman (1978), while 
the second bias is corrected explicitly within this 
simultaneous equations framework by treating as endogenous 
the choice to join a union.
Wessels estimates a four equation model, the purpose of 
which is to analyze the effects of RTW laws on wages, 
unionization, and strike frequency. Strike frequency was 
chosen as a proxy for union militancy, and as Wessels notes, 
the economic literature on RTW effects has concentrated on 
these three variables.
The following briefly describes the econometric method 
employed. First, a four equation model is specified, with 
Mages <w,), union membership <Uj.>, strike frequency (sj , 
and pro-RTW sentiment (RTWSENTi) the jointly determined 
endogenous variables. The subscript i indexes states. The 
last variable, RTWSENT i, is an unobservable latent variable; 
as such, the model specifies (or predicts) that a state will 
have an RTW law only if R T W S E N T * is nonnegative. This 
predicted variable is denoted by R T W * :
RTWi *= 1, iff RTWSENT* > 0,
RTWi = 0, otherwise.
Note that this dummy variable scheme may be described, as in 
Heckman, by recognizing that, dummy variables serve one of 
two distinct roles. First, in W e s s e l ’s model, RTWi takes 
the role of a direct shifter of behavioral equations.
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Second* the role of RTWSENTi is that of an indicator of 
latent variables crossing thresholds. Hec k m a n ’s econometric 
procedure is based on this statistical model* first proposed 
by Pearson in 1900, of the generation of discrete endogenous 
variables by continuous* underlying* unobservable variables 
crossing thresholds.
With this in mind, W e s s e l s ’ structural model may be 
written compactly as follows:
( 1 )  w * —  a i e l i i j . )  +  a  i s  < S i  ) +  a i ^ ( R T W S E N T i ) + b i ( R T W i )
+ Ci(Xii) + eii
<£) u* = aE i (wi ) + aaa (Si ) + a^ .*, (RTWSENTi ) + bE <RTWi)
+ CE ( XE i ) + Gpi
(3) Si = a3 l (Wi) + aa e (Ui) + a3^ (RT W S E N T j ) + b3 <RTWi)
+ c3 (X3 i ) + e3 i 
( )  RTWSENTi = i (Wi ) + ( Uj, ) + a*, 3 ( s* ) + b/+ (RTWi )
+ Ctt ( Xi» i ) + G<t t *
where Xj* is a vector of exogenous variables* and Bji is the 
error term for equation j.
W e s s e l ’s derives consistent* although not
asymptotically efficient* estimates of the structural 
parameters by first estimating the reduced form. Following 
Heckman, the predicted rather than the actual value of RTWi 
is inserted along with the other predicted values of 
endogenous variables in the second stage of estimation. (A 
complete discussion of H e c k m a n ’s technique will be included 
in Chapter Three.) Calculation of the structural parameters
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yields the following results, briefly summarized.
RTWi, the dummy variable directly shifting each 
behavioral equation, has ng_ significant effect on wages,
unionization, or strikes. In addition, the estimated value 
of the unobservable variable representing favorable RTW
sentiment, RTWSENTi, is insignificant in all three
equations. (An unexpected result relating to RTWSENTi is
that it turned out to be posi t ivelv, albeit
insignificantly, related to another measure of pro-union 
sentiment included as an additional endogenous variable in 
the original model.)
Finally, Wessels notes that in accord with Ashenfelter 
and Johnson (1978), Schmidt and Strauss (1976), and Schmidt 
(1978), unionization has no significant effect on wages.
Wages, however, positively and significantly influence the 
percent unionized. Finally, strike frequency, the proxy for 
union militancy, has a significant and positive effect on 
unionization.
Another possible extention of the conventional model 
used to measure the impact of RTW laws is contained in Hunt 
and White (1983). Specifically, they consider the
possibility that in the presence of RTW laws, union behavior 
may differ systematically from that in non-RTW states in 
ways which union membership levels don*t capture. In other 
words, even if RTW laws have no significant influence on 
percent organized as mast studies conclude, other union
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outcomes may be significantly affected. The authors employ* 
among others, the following indices of union success in an 
attempt to capture any genuine RTW effects on union 
outcomes: election voting behavior, the size of newly
certified units, and the rate of union decertification. 
Furthermore, they identify and test three distinct 
hypotheses regarding RTW laws and union outcomes. The first 
is the free rider argument predicting a decreased supply of 
union services in RTW states. The second, the saturationist 
hypothesis, predicts greater organizing activity in RTW 
states due to the concentration of unorganized workers. The 
third hypothesis is that the effects of RTW laws are 
mitigated by systematically differing organizing behavior in 
RTW and non-RTW states.
Using SMSA data from 35 states, the authors test their 
model employing a total of eight different dependent 
variables measuring union outcomes. Each provides some 
index of a u n i o n ’s success rate. A wide array of SMSA level 
variables are available to proxy the perceived costs and 
benefits of joining a union. Assuming that the endogenous 
variables are outcomes of the unionization process exerting 
no influence on the legal structure (i.e., ruling out two- 
way causality), RTW is treated as a purely exogenous 
variable. Also assumed exogenous is another law which is 
assumed to proxy sentiment towards unions: mandatory
teacher bargaining.
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In the interest of brevity, only those results 
pertaining to the two legislative status exogenous variables 
will be reported. First, sample statistics yield the 
following conclusions. One, the free rider hypothesis is 
not supported; RTW status does not significantly influence 
union membership. Two, union election voting turnout is 
significantly lower in RTW states. Three, the size of newly 
certified bargaining units tends to be greater in RTW 
states, and the rate of decertification lower.
Second, turning to the single equation OLS regression 
results, the legislative climate. is significant in 
determining union outcomes. RTW laws are negatively related 
to voter turnout, while mandatory teacher bargaining laws 
also exert a negative influence on the percentage of voters 
choosing the no-union option. Finally, Chow tests were 
performed to determine whether union returns to the various 
characteristics (i.e., independent variables) in the model 
differed systematically between RTW and non-RTW states. In 
five of the eight models the slopes were in fact
significantly different.
The authors conclude that, contrary to much of the
previous work on RTW effects, RTW states experience
significantly different union outcomes as measured by union 
success variables other than percent organized. Their 
evidence also lends credence to the saturation!st
hypothesis, and refutes the free rider hypothesis.
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The significance of this article involves its use of 
union outcome variables other than proportion unionized. 
Subsequent research employing a variety of finely detailed 
proxies for union success may also find these variables to 
be significantly influenced by the legislative climate. 
Furthermore, the use of simultaneous equations models would 
provide more reliable conclusions by avoiding the possible 
bias involved in ignoring the joint determination of laws 
and union outcomes.
Finally, Moore and N e w m a n ’s (1905) survey of the RTW 
literature classifies models according to three major 
specifications, shedding light on the reasons underlying the 
differing results. First, the extreme sensitivity of 
estimated RTW effects according to the econometric 
specification and technique employed is clear. Most of the 
studies which treat RTW as exogenous find it to have a 
significant and negative impact on unionization. This 
result holds true not only for the single equation models, 
but also for the simultaneous equation models which entered 
RTW laws as an exogenous variable. On the other hand, when 
RTW status and unionization are treated as jointly 
determined endogenous variables, the RTW coefficient tends 
to lose its significance. (An exception to this tendency is 
found by Warren and Strauss (1979).)
Second, in the context once again of single equation 
models, those which appear to adequately account for tastes
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by inclusion of relevant control variables reveal that RTW 
status has little impact on unionization. In contrast* 
models in which tastes for unionism are not well proxied 
find that RTW laws play a much more influential role. This 
provides indirect support for the taste hypothesis against 
the free rider and bargaining power hypotheses. (The latter 
hypothesis, as noted by the authors, implies that RTW laws 
cause less demand for union services since wo r k e r s ’ 
expectations of un i o n i s m ’s benefits are lower due to a 
perceived loss of bargaining power; in addition, the supply 
of union services may decrease as unions concomitantly 
experience lower marginal returns to organizing activity.)
The previous studies focused explicitly on the effects 
of RTW laws within the context of a model of the 
determination of union status. Before examining the 
literature on the legislation regulating public sector 
unionism, a series of three articles will be reviewed which, 
using micro data, explicitly derive empirical models from a 
utility-maximizing choice model explaining individuals’ 
union decisions. Building on this framework, the third
article incorporates the effects of an individual’s RTW 
coverage status. Finally, concluding this section on 
private sector unionism is an article accounting for the 
effects of RTW laws on flows into, rather than stocks of, 
unionization.
The first article in the series of three is by Farber
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and Saks (1900). This study attempts to isolate the union 
membership decision from the job decision by using voting 
and other data on individuals participating in NLRB union 
representation elections. As the authors point out, a 
worker can choose to become a union member one of three 
ways: by joining a union in an open shop situation? by
accepting employment in a union shop situation? or by voting 
in favor of the union in a representation election. Most 
studies measure the extent of unionization or of covered 
jobs? therefore, they cannot abstract from the employment 
decision to address separately the union membership 
decision. This model, then not only abstracts from the job 
decision to model the determination of union status, it 
abstracts from past worker determination to focus solely on 
an individual’s current expectations concerning the benefits 
and costs of unionization.
The data allow the estimation of a model with the 
following interpretation: a vote in favor of a union occurs 
if the expected utility from the job becoming a union job is 
greater than from it remaining nonunion. The primary issue 
involved here, then, is the expectation of how unions affect 
wage and nonwage outcomes, controlling for tastes which may 
systematically vary across subgroups owing to differing 
perceptions of u n i o n i s m ’s impact.
Looking at wage outcomes, an important hypothesis of 
this paper is that the effect of unionization on an
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i n d i v i d u a l ’s wage is negatively related to his or her 
position in the intrafirm earnings distribution; in other 
words, the probability of a yes vote is negatively related 
to the intrafirm earnings distribution position. Previous 
evidence supporting this hypothesis is reported by Freeman 
<197Bb), Ccited on p. 3521 who reviewed studies on the 
effects of unions on wage dispersion. He concludes that 
earnings dispersion in unionized sectors of the economy has 
been reduced by intrafirm wage standardization, interfirm 
standardization of blue-collar wages, and the reduction of 
the w h i t e - c o 11a r / b lue-co1lar earnings differential.
The other important feature of unionism affecting 
w o r k e r s ’ cost/benefit expectations is its effects on nonwage 
outcomes: this article focuses solely on changes in job 
characteristics. Farber and Saks focus on one particular 
job characteristic modification: the substitution of
bureaucratic for personal rules in terms of hiring and 
promotion decisions, work schedules, and disciplinary 
procedures. Therefore, the probability that an individual 
will vote yes is positively associated with his or her 
perception of arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of 
workers by management.
As noted previously, the model is specified such that 
individual i votes yes if and only if the expected utility 
from the job becoming unionized ( E W U(1)) exceeds the 
expected utility from the job remaining nonunion (EtV^s, )).
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In particular*
. E ( V rl j, ) P n n *. + Cl P r11 ) V «\ j, *
E(Vu t ) = P,.,**^ + C l - P ^ l V ^ ,  
where P„i = the probability of individual i ’s retaining the 
job if it remains nonunion,
P ui = the probability of individual i ’s retaining the 
job if it becomes union,
and V*,. = the utility individual i attaches to some
available, certainty-equivalent alternative job if the 
current job is not retained.
Therefore, the condition for individual i to vote yes, 
or in favor of the union, may be rearranged and written:
(1) 2* = Pui CVull - ) + (Pul - p ^ X V , , *  - V^i) > 0.
Farber and Saks then related the data to each term in 
equation 1, thereby deriving the empirical model to be 
estimated by probit analysis. Without replicating the 
detailed data analysis provided by the authors, a brief 
discussion of the data employed is presented here.
Beginning with the first term, P,_,i is specified to be a 
positive function of individual i ’s seniority. Next, (Vu l - 
V„i) is determined by individual i's expectations 
concerning the impact of unionization on wage and nonwage 
outcomes, and also by tastes for unionization. The 
empirical variables used in this term are, first, individual 
i ’s adjusted standardized deviation from the within-firm 
mean earnings (DEV*). Second, three dummy variables are
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used to measure nonwage union outcomes. RDETi equals one if 
individual i expects unionization to cause a deteriorization 
in worker-management relations. FIMPi equals one if 
individual i expects unions to increase fairness of 
treatment by management. PRO* equals one if individual i 
believes he or she is likely to be promoted based on merit. 
The hypothesized signs are: RDET < 0, FIMP > 0, and
PRO < 0. The last coefficient is expected to be negative
since unionization typically results in seniority-based 
promotion rules; thus* ambitious individuals tend to believe 
that the imposition of union rules will harm rather than 
benefit them.
Third, several control variables are included as taste 
proxies for individual i. These are age, sex, race, 
education, and urbanization of the location in which the 
individual was raised.
The final term in equation (1) is <PU i - P n i X V m -  
Vai), and is expressed empirically as the following:
(la) B-5 < DIFFi ) + Bd, (DIFFi-tfDSi ) ,
where DIFF* is a dummy variable equalling one if individual 
i expects finding an equivalent job to be difficult, zero 
otherwise, and
DSi is a dummy variable equalling one if individual i 
is not satisfied with the job security of the nonunion job, 
zero otherwise, and it is hypothesized that G s < 0, > 0.
This specification has the following implications:
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one, equation (la) is zero for individuals who expect that 
finding an equivalent job will be easy; therefore, they are 
indifferent between their current job and an equivalent job; 
two, for individuals who believe it will be difficult to 
find an alternative job, and are satisfied with their job 
security, V ril. - > 0 and P ul - P„i < 0, so that they are
less likely to vote yes, i.e., < 0; three, for
individuals who believe it will be difficult to find an 
alternative job, but who are not satisfied with their job 
security, Vrni - > 0 and - P,-,,. > 0, so that they are
more likely to vote yes than the ‘satisfied’ group, i.e.,
> Of four, it is possible that this latter group is even 
more likely to vote yes than those who expect to easily find 
an alternative job, implying that B o  + B*. > 0.
Substituting the empirical components into equation (1) 
yields the probit model, the parameters of which are 
computed by maximum liklihaod estimation. The results 
indicate support for the hypothesis that a yes vote is more 
likely the lower one is in the intrafirm earnings 
distribution. Also, the three dummy variables representing 
the effects of unionization on nonwage outcomes or job 
characteristics (RDET, FIMP, PRO) all had the hypothesized 
effects. Turning to the taste variables, only race and age 
had a significant impact. Blacks are more likely and older 
workers less likely to vote in favor of a union.
The effect of seniority on the probability of job
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retention in the case of a union win was insignificant. 
(Recall that this probability was used to weight net 
expected benefits from unionization.) And finally, the data 
supported the following hypotheses: compared to the base
group of individuals who expect that finding an alternative 
job will be easy, an individual is significantly less likely 
to vote yes if he or she expects it to be difficult to find 
an alternative job and is satisfied with job security (i.e., 
Bcs < 0); and compared with first, the latter group, and
second, the base group, an individual is significantly more 
likely to vote yes if he or she expects it to be difficult 
to find an alternative job but is dissatisfied with job 
security (i.e., B 6 > 0 and B »  + B<b > 0, respectively.
The second in this sequence of articles is F a r b e r ’s 
"The Determination of the Union Status of Workers." This 
paper extends the framework developed in the previous 
article for analysing the determination of the union status 
of workers. Specifically, the model allows the union or 
nonunion outcome to be determined by decisions made by both 
the worker and the potential union employer. That is, it is 
assumed that the union employer has some discretion in 
hiring due to the existence of a queue for union jobs. A 
queue exists as long as for some workers, the benefits from 
union coverage of existing jobs exceed the costs (i.e., 
initiation fees and dues). Workers differ in
characteristics affecting productivity, and productivity is
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assumed to be compensated differently in the union and 
nonunion sectors; therefore, union employers will choose 
those workers who allow the cheapest production of effective 
labor. That is, employers choose the workers from the queue 
who will result in least-cost production. This process, in 
which the "better" workers are chosen for union jobs, must 
be accounted for in order to discern the true effects of 
unionization.
This queueing model improves on previous models of 
union status determination which cannot distinguish between 
a nonunion worker who is nonunion by choice, and a nonunion 
worker who prefers a union job but was not hired by a union 
employer. F a r b e r ’s bivariate model employs data on both the 
union status of workers, and the preferences of those 
nonunion workers for union representation; the latter data, 
of course, represent the union queue. Two important points 
should be noted about this theoretical construction. First, 
this model, unlike that of the previous article, is 
conditioned upon the locus of union jobs. Second, this is a 
censored sample problem. That is, the data representing the 
size of the union queue are censored; only nonunion workers 
are asked if they would vote for or against union 
representation. (The reason that this represents a censored 
sample is because these data represent current preferences, 
while the model of union status determination is specified 
as the product of worker decisions made at the time of
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hi r e . )
Estimation proceeds by first deriving the liklihood 
function for the probabilistic model of union status 
determination, then inserting the data describing each term 
(as in the previous article). Here, three distinct events 
are possible: the worker is unionized (the probability that
the worker desired a union job and was hired by a union 
employer); the worker is nonunionized and currently prefers 
union representation (the joint probability that the worker 
desired a union job but was not hired by a union employer, 
and that he or she currently desires a union job, plus the 
joint probability that the worker did not desire a union job
(at the time of hire), and that he or she currently desires
a union job; the worker is nonunionized and current 1v does 
not prefer union representation (the joint probability that 
the worker desired a union job but was not hired, and that 
he or she currently does not want to be unionized, plus the 
joint probability that the worker did not desire a union job
(at the time of hire), and that he or she currently does not
desire union representation.
In sum, utilizing data on the current preferences of 
nonunion members yields the above empirical specification: 
a trivariate cnesored data model. It allows identification 
and estimation of a model of union status determination 
which accounts for both worker and employer decision-making. 
By estimating this type of model, as opposed to the
1 1 0
conventional utility-maximizing worker choice model alone, a 
distinction may be made between the level of worker demand 
for unionization (i.e., worker preferences toward 
unionization), and the relative supply of unionized jobs 
(i.e., the number of unionized jobs relative to the size of 
the queue). Simple univariate worker choice models cannot 
provide this information.
Briefly, the major results of this m o d e l ’s estimation 
are the following. The queuing model, like univariate 
probit models, finds that nonwhites have a significantly 
higher probability of union coverage; in addition, the 
queuing model suggests that the reason lies on the demand 
side: nonwhites have a greater probability of desiring
union representation. Conditional on each desiring union 
jobs, however, the results indicate that whites and 
nonwhites have roughly similar probabilities of being hired 
by union employers.
Next, both univariate probit models and the queuing 
model indicate that workers in the South are significantly 
less likely to have union jobs than workers in other 
regions. The queuing model provides additional information: 
in the South, worker demand for unionization is 
significantly lower than that in other regions, and also the 
supply of union jobs relative to the length of the queue is 
significantly less. In other words, the conditional
probability of being hired by a union employer given
I l l
presence in the queue is significantly lower for a Southern 
worker. (This latter result is consistent with the 
hypothesis discussed earlier in this section.)
A few more interesting results regard cle r i c a l , 
service, and professional and technical workers relative to 
a base group of blue-collar workers. Clerical workers are 
less likely to demand union representation than blue-collar 
workers, a typical result of univariate probit models as 
well. However, clerical workers who do desire union jobs
are significantly less likely to be hired by a union
employer than are blue-collar workers. Service workers, on 
the other hand, exhibit about the same level of demand for 
union services as do blue-collar workers, but are 
significantly less likely to be hired by a union employer 
given the desire for a union job. Finally, the lower 
probability of union membership exhibited by professional 
and technical workers (relative to blue-collar workers) is 
primarily explained by a lower demand for union services.
A final result of the queuing model is that the 
variables sex, marital status, and education have no 
significant impact on the union status outcome.
The third and final in this series of articles extends
the queuing model of union status determination by
introducing the legal environment in the form of RTW laws. 
F a r b e r ’s "Right-to-Work Laws and the Extent of Unionization" 
allows another test of the hypothesis that RTW laws simply
1 IE
proxy tastes, rather than exert an independent effect on the 
extent of unionization in a state. Farber notes that this 
issue has been approached by treating RTW laws and the 
extent of unionization as jointly endogenous variables. 
F a r b e r ’s approach, however, is to test the effects of RTW 
laws within the context of his queuing model. He then 
examines the results of these effects on both the demand for 
unionization and on the relative supply of union jobs. By 
adding to this analysis the effects of RTW laws on the 
union-nonunion wage differential, he asserts that the free­
rider hypothesis may be distinguished from the taste 
hypothesi s .
First, the empirical implications of the two hypotheses 
are noted. The free-rider hypothesis implies, first, that 
RTW laws reduce the supply of union services; thus, the 
supply of union jobs relative to demand is constrained 
(i.e., a longer queue exists for union jobs). Second, union 
members in RTW states receive a greater equilibrium level of 
benefits from unionization; this implies that the union- 
nonunion wage differential is greater in RTW states. Third, 
Farber notes two second order effects on the demand for 
union services. Demand may be higher in RTW states if 
workers perceive that they will be able to receive the 
benefits from unionization without actually supporting the 
union. On the other hand, if workers perceive a loss of 
union negotiating strength under RTW laws then demand may
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decrease. <One final point: if demand does in fact
decrease due to an impaired ability to secure benefits to 
members, the result is to offset to some degree the 
predicted greater union-nonunion differential.)
The empirical implications of the taste hypothesis are, 
first, that demand for unionization in RTW states will be 
lower. Second, the supply of union jobs relative to demand 
will be unaffected; or, in other words, the length of the 
union queue is the same in RTW and non-RTW states. Third, 
like the free-rider hypothesis, the taste hypothesis implies 
that the union-nonunion wage differential is greater in RTW 
than in non-RTW states. This is true because the pecuniary 
benefits (proxied by the union-nonunion wage differential) 
must outweigh the nonpecuniary costs (proxied by the 
existence of a RTW law) to an individual union member in an 
RTW state. Before turning to the empirical results, Farber 
comments that these two hypotheses are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive; therefore, effects of both could be 
f o u n d .
To estimate the effects of RTW laws on the union- 
nonunion wage differential, Farber specifies a conventional 
single equation semilog earnings function using micro data 
from the Current Population Survey, and estimates it by OLS. 
Based on this equation, the difference between the union- 
nonunion wage differential in RTW states and non-RTW states 
is positive and significantly different from zero. That is,
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the differential is greater in RTW states. This result is 
consistent with both the taste hypothesis, which explicitly 
predicts it, and the free-rider hypothesis, which cannot 
predict the sign a priori. (To account for differences in 
the differential across workers possessing unequal 
characteristics, Farber also estimates separate semi log
earnings functions for union and nonunion workers. The 
results are consistent with those of the single equation 
model: the union-nonunion wage differential is
significantly greater in RTW states than in non-RTW states.)
Completing the analysis, the queuing model is employed 
to evaluate the effects of RTW laws on the demand for and 
the relative supply of unioni 2 a t i o n . Using the same
theoretical framework and data as described in the previous 
article, Farber includes a dummy variable in the w o r k e r ’s 
union preference equation indicating whether an individual 
is covered by an RTW law or not. Its coefficient reflects 
the correlation between the demand for unionization and RTW 
laws. The RTW dummy variable is also included in the 
equation measuring the union e m p l o y e r ’s criteria for hiring 
workers from the queue. In this context, it ’s coefficient 
measures the correlation between the supply of union jobs 
relative to demand and RTW laws.
After constructing and estimating the relevant 
liklihood function for the trivariate censored model, the 
mean values of the predicted probabilities are calculated,
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using various values for region and RTW. On the demand 
side? the probability that a worker desires a union job is 
significantly lower in RTW states. This is an explicit 
prediction of the taste hypothesis? and is not inconsistent 
with the free-rider hypothesis? which cannot predict this 
sign a priori. (No significant differences exist in the 
demand for unionization by workers across regions.) On the 
supply side? the probability that a worker will be hired by 
a union employer given that the worker is in the queue is 
approximately the same in both RTW and non-RTW states. This 
is an explicit prediction of the taste hypothesis? and is 
unambiguously inconsistent with the free-rider hypothesis. 
(Region? however? does appear to play a significant role in 
terms of the relative supply of union jobs: southern
workers in the queue are significantly less likely to be 
hired by union employers than are nonsouthern workers.)
In sum? the results of the queuing model are consistent 
with the taste hypothesis? and not with the free-rider 
hypothesis: RTW laws appear merely to mirror preexisting
tastes toward unionization? and not to exert any independent 
impact on the extent of unionization. As noted previously? 
however? the estimates could reflect some combination of the 
two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses? as a result? any 
conclusions reached should not be imbued with excessive 
confidence. On the other hand? this result does conform to 
the RTW literature which treats laws and unionization as
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end o g e n o u s .
The final article on the effects of the legal structure 
on private—sector unionization is Ellwood and F i n e ’s "The 
Impact of Right-to-Work Laws on Union Organizing." This 
study represents an important departure from the previous 
studies in that its focus is on flows into union membership 
rather than stocks of membership. As concluded by Moore and 
Newman <19B5) in their review of the literature! a consensus 
seems to have been reached that RTW laws are primarily 
symbolic; this consensus was r e a c h e d * however* based almost 
exclusively on stock models of unionization. Ellwood and
Fine argue that flows* as measured by the amount of 
organizing activity* are a more sensitive response variable. 
Stock models may not be capable of discerning significant 
effects on the level of union membership* and thus 
incorrectly conclude that RTW laws do not independently 
depress union membership levels. Actual changes in state­
wide levels of unionization might instead be picked up by 
measuring changes in the number of employees in bargaining 
units before and after passage of a RTW law.
First, a partial adjustment accelerator model of union 
organizing is specified. It accounts for the stock 
adjustments which occur when conditions cause the existing 
level of unionization to differ from the equilibrium level. 
The adjustment flow may be accounted for by changes in the 
size of existing union firms, or by new certification or
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decertification of bargaining units. Thus, since
organization activity is very sensitive and can adjust 
quickly to changes in the local environment influencing 
tastes for or against unionism, it could detect any real 
effects of RTW laws which may exist, and which stock models 
could not.
The first model uses pooled data on states over the 
period 1951 to 1977. The dependent variable is the number 
of employees in bargaining units in which unions won an NLRB 
election, divided by the s t a t e ’s nonagricultural labor 
force. The effects of RTW laws are captured by constructing 
dummy variables in 5-year intervals: that is, = 1 iff
an RTW law were passed from 1 to 5 years ago; D*„x0 = 1 iff 
an RTW law were passed from 6 to 10 years ago, etc. The 
major results with regard to these dummies are the 
following: union organizing activity is reduced by 46
percent in the first five years following passage of a RTW 
law; after 6 to 10 years, organizing declines by 30 percent, 
and after 10 years, the apparent reductions are no longer 
statistically significant. The implications of these 
results are potentially very important. During the sample 
period, the annual flow into union membership is 
approximately S percent. Based on the parameter estimates, 
union membership will be about 8 percent lower ten years 
after passage of an RTW law than it would have been were the 
law not passed. The authors believe that this reduction is
i is
likely to be permanent because the standard errors attached 
to the RTW coefficients after ten years are very large. 
H o w e v e r , it is equally possible that the effect does not 
outlast the short run, so that no long run RTW effect 
ex ists.
In order to account for the possibility of omitted 
variable bias and/or simultaneous equations bias, a model 
allowing fixed effects and simultaneity tests is estimated. 
For the former test, a subset of the first model which 
contains sufficient data on pre- and post-RTW organizing 
activity is estimated. <This technique was used by Lumsden 
and Petersen, and is described earlier in this section.) 
The results of this nonrandom sample are entirely consistent 
with those of the first model: ten years after passage of
an RTW law, organizing is reduced by about 3E percent.
To account for the possibility of two-way causality 
between organizing activity and the legal structure, the 
authors construct a leading indicator, called PRE-RTW. It 
takes the value one in each of the five years preceding 
passage of an RTW law in the subsample states, zero 
otherwise. If organizing activity and the legal structure 
are jointly endogenous, then weakening union strength should 
be reflected in decreases in organizing activity in the few 
years prior to enactment of an RTW law. After passage, no 
significant reduction in organizing is expected. 
Conversely, if RTW laws do exert an independent negative
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influence on u n i o n i z a t i o n , decreases in organizing should 
not occur before passage. The results* again, are
consistent with those of the first model: decreases in
organization appear after RTW enactment, with no significant 
decreases prior to passage.
Finally, the dependent variable (new membership from 
organizing activity) is decomposed to ascertain the primary 
avenues through which RTW laws (as well as the other 
explanatory variables) affect flows into unionization. The 
number of new members is specified as the product of the 
number of elections, the percentage of elections won, and 
the average size of the newly established bargaining units. 
The results indicate that over half of the decline in 
membership resulting from the passage of an RTW law is 
attributable to a reduction in the number of elections, with 
decreases in new unit size accounting for most of the 
r e m a i n d e r .
The conclusion of this article is that contrary to the 
recent concensus, RTW laws are substantive, not just 
symbolic. This indicates that more research using flow 
models of union membership is necessary before completely 
accepting the taste hypothesis regarding RTW laws.
5.S The Public Sector: The Effects of Union Regulations on
Union Outcomes
As noted previously, the wide variety of state
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determined bargaining laws permits a more detailed 
investigation into the effects of the legislative climate on 
public sector union outcomes than is possible in the private 
sector. Again* consistent with the special interest and the 
Public Choice theories, the endogeneity of legal variables 
is emphasized. Regulatory status is not an exogenous event, 
and is hypothesized to be determined by both economic and 
political variables.
Referring to Topic One of this dissertation, Saltzman 
(1965) was reviewed as one of" the few articles to explicitly 
consider both the determinants and the effects of public 
sector bargaining laws vis-a-vis union membership. His 
article looks specifically at one public sector employment 
category, that of teachers. Saltzman specifies two equations 
to be estimated separately: one examines the effects of
changes in lagged values of bargaining law status on the 
extent of unionization (or bargaining) across states; the 
other examines the effects of changes in lagged values of 
the extent of unionization on bargaining law status. The 
use of lagged variables, motivated by the theoretical 
specification, makes the simultaneity issue a moot point; 
simultaneous estimation is not appropriate ijT the assumption 
of no autocorrelation holds. Saltzman found that the 
primary direction of causality runs from the enactment of 
bargaining legislation to union density. On the other hand, 
in the equation explaining changes in bargaining laws, union
l e i
density exerts only a very weak positive influence.
S a l t z m a n ’s empirical results of the QLS estimated 
"effects of bargaining laws" equation will be summarized in 
greater detail than will be the results in subsequent 
articles. This is because Saltzman employs an unusually 
wide variety of explanatory variables from several broad 
categories expected to influence union density. First,
bargaining laws themselves are the dominant influence on 
union density. Pro-union laws cause increases in
unionization; the effect is not immediate, but works through 
a lag. The other explanatory variables employed can be 
categorized under the following headings: teacher and
school characteristics, labor market conditions, membership 
in other unions, attitudes toward unions, and previous 
extent of unionization.
Teacher and school characteristics. The share of male 
teachers and the number of teachers per school both have a 
significant and positive impact on changes in the percentage 
of teachers covered by collective bargaining contracts. 
Saltzman explains the former result in terms of m e n ’s higher 
propensity to organize relative to w o m e n ’s, a result found 
in many previous studies. The number of teachers per school 
may be expected to be positive for many reasons, the most 
important of which relates to the hypothesized existence of 
economies of scale in organizing efforts.
ies
Labor Market Conditions. The growth in teacher 
employment is negative and significant, while the lagged 
unemployment rate is insignificantly different from zero. 
The sign of growth in teacher employment could not be 
predicted a priori. Saltzman argues that decreasing growth 
levels could reflect a weak market position, thus producing 
a negative sign. On the other hand, if the decrease in 
employment growth results in more militancy among teachers 
and teacher unions, a positive relationship could exist.
Attitudes towards union. The only significant variable 
in this category is real per capita income. Its positive 
sign is interpreted as support for the hypothesis that a 
r e g i o n ’s level of economic development provides an indirect 
measure of its attitudes toward unions. A relatively less 
developed region of the U.S. such as the South may exhibit 
more anti-union sentiment if unionization is regarded as a 
barrier to attracting industry. A second measure of
preferences, utilizing the A F L - C I O ’s Committee on Political 
Education <COPE) ratings, is not significant.
As a control variable, the lagged, extent of bargaining 
is included to account for demonstration effects among 
teachers within a state <see Moore and Newman (1975). 
Additionally, the square of this variable is included to 
capture, first, the expected initial rise in the dependent 
variable resulting from the existing stock of bargaining 
units; and second, the subsequent fall in the dependent
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variable (i.e., the change in teacher unionization) as a 
purely mechanical effect: bargaining coverage cannot exceed
one hundred percent. Both of these variables are
significant; as expected, the lagged extent of bargaining is 
positive while its square is negative.
Finally, a result contrary to initial expectations is 
the insignificance of labor movement strength as measured by 
"membership in other unions". This variable was predicted 
to be positive; the labor movement as a whole is expected to 
provide political support for union organizing efforts, and 
to proxy an index of attitudes towards collective bargaining 
activities and outcomes. The author cannot provide an 
explanation for the insignificance of labor movement 
strength in his model.
This article is of primary significance for its wide 
variety of included explanatory variables, and in 
particular, for its explicit treatment of the 
interdependence of cause and effect in the study of 
bargaining laws and union outcomes. An alternative model 
specification reflecting this interdependence is, of course, 
the simultaneous equations system.
Within a simultaneous equations framework, Hunt, Terza, 
White, and Moore (1986) extend an estimation technique 
developed by Heckman (1976). They jointly estimate
teachers’ wages and unionization, and condition the 
estimates on an ordinal qualitative variable representing
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bargaining law status. In this manner* the legislative
climate may be treated as an exogenous event affecting wages 
and union membership, but at the same time the econometric 
procedure accounts for the truncation of the joint
distribution of wages, unionization, and legislative 
environment. In addition, this article explicitly models 
wage, union membership, and bargaining law outcomes in terms 
of the interest group theory of regulation.
In the wage equation w * , where t indexes the cross 
section of states, the exogenous variables included
represent market forces and political considerations. 
Variables measuring the former factor include: the
percentage of teachers who are male (MALE), a proxy for the 
stock of human capital; the number of hiring units relative 
to the population (DIST), a proxy for the competitiveness of 
the labor market; the labor force participation rate of 
females (FLFPR), also a market structure proxy, which may 
affect wages positively if it denotes abundant female 
employment opportunities, or negatively if it denotes an 
abundant supply of teachers (since two-thirds of teachers 
are women). Variables measuring the latter factor include: 
a measure of professionals in the labor force (pRDF), a
proxy for education level; and last, the percentage of total
educational expenditures originating at the state level 
(FIN). This final variable is interpreted as a test of the 
interest group theory. Legislators are assumed to maximize
1S5
self-interest, providing favorable legislation to competing 
interest groups in return for contributions. The benefits 
legislators receive from supplying this regulation must be 
weighed against the costs incurred: the loss of votes from
the taxed group, i.e., the general public. Therefore, it is 
predicted that indirect methods of creating rents for 
teachers, who comprise a strong and active pressure group, 
will be preferred over direct increases in teacher pay (as 
proxied by FIN). The indirect method at issue is, of 
course, legislator support for teacher unionism, or public 
sector bargaining laws for teachers.
In the unionization equation u^ the exogenous variables 
represent the perceived benefits from union membership, and 
include two variables specifically motivated by the special 
interest theory. Measuring perceived benefits are MALE and 
PROF. MALE is expected to be positive, since m a l e s ’ greater 
lifetime labor force attachment results in higher returns to 
seniority provisions, and seniority provisions are 
frequently outcomes of union contracts. PROF is expected to 
exert a negative influence on union membership, since the 
individual bargaining power which often attaches to 
professional status reduces the benefits from unionization. 
From the perspective of the special interest theory, a group 
expected to exhibit anti-union behavior is private sector 
management. If this group opposes the strengthening of the 
position of both private and public sector organized labor
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by assuming the existence of spillovers between the two, 
then the number of unfair labor practice claims (LILP) 
proxies opposition to public unionization. Finally, net 
migration within a state (POP) captures attachment to area 
wage structures. A transient population derives lower 
expected lifetime benefits from unionization? therefore, 
this variable is expected to be negatively related to union 
m e m bership.
To this point, teacher bargaining laws have not been 
explicitly included in the wage-union simultaneous equation 
model. The following is a brief description of the 
procedure used to model the determination of teacher 
bargaining laws, and of the inclusion of this ordinally 
measured, "exogenous" event in the wage-union system.
The ordinal legislative index it, covers three teacher 
bargaining rights categories: category one indicates no law
exists, or bargaining is prohibited; category two indicates 
a stronger pro-union sentiment as measured by meet and 
confer laws, or employer voluntary bargaining; and category 
three reflects the strongest pro-union sentiment, as 
measured by mandatory bargaining. This ordinal dependent 
variable is modelled as a function of the following 
exogenous variables: MALE, PROF, FLFPR, DIST, POP, ULP, and
VOTE. The new variable, VOTE, is the percentage of a 
s t a t e ’s eligible voters who voted in the 1976 presidential 
election. It is included as a measure of active taxpayer
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resistance to special interest subsidies* and as such is 
expected to have a negative sign. It should be noted that 
POP has a different interpretation in a model of bargaining 
law determination. A transient papulation does not expect
to bear the same burden of taxation in the wealth 
redistribution process as does the "permanent" population; 
as a result* the larger the former group, the smaller the 
anti-bargaining resource expenditure.
Now, the statistical implication of conditioning both 
the wage and the unionization equations on legislative 
category is to truncate the joint distribution of w-t,, u ^ , 
and iu. To account for the truncation and produce estimates 
with the properties of consistency and asymptotic normality, 
the authors extend Heckman (1976) to develope the Three- 
Stage N-chotomous Probit estimator (3SNP).
In the first stage, the equation determining bargaining 
law status (with dependent variable i-*) is estimated by the 
N-chotomous probit procedure developed by McKelvey and 
Zavoina (1975). In this manner, an estimate of both the 
parameter vector corresponding to the independent variables 
explaining legislative status, and of the single unknown 
partitioning threshold are obtained. Only one threshold, 
u H , is unknown; in a model of three ordered categories there 
must be four partitions of the unobservable continuum. 
Since the error term attached to the equation determining i * 
is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, the
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endpoint thresholds Uo and u a are negative infinity and 
positive infinity respectively. In addition, u x is
normalized to zero as is conventional in N-chotomous and 
ordinary probit models. Completing the first stage, the 
estimated values of the explanatory variable parameter 
vector and the threshold parameter are used to compute the 
(nonzero) expectations of both the Mage and unionization 
e q u a t i o n s ’ error terms. These conditional mean—valued error 
terms are generated, of course, by taking the expectation of
each equation conditioned on the observed bargaining law
category by state, i t -
This nonzero expectation is the familiar result from a 
truncated distribution: the expectation of w^ (or of u-t) ,
aiven the realization of a particular value of bargaining 
law status, yields the nonstochastic independent variables 
and their parameters, plus a nonzero error term which may be 
consistently estimated in the manner the previous paragraph 
outlined. This error term, composed of standard normal 
P D F ’s and C D F ’s evaluated at the predicted values of i-b and 
l.,2 for each cross-section, may be termed the "legislative 
shift" factor .
After substituting into M t and u* the computed
legislative shift variable *, it may be treated as an
exogenous variable and estimated in conventional fashion. 
Stages two and three of the 3SNP technique, then, consist of 
the simple application of 2SLS to the two equation w„ and u*
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s y s t e m .
To provide a comparison to the results from the 3SNP 
model* the two equation wage and unionization system was 
estimated by SSLS, treating the exogenous bargaining law 
status as a simple dummy variable. First, the 3SNP results 
will be summarized. Beginning with the first stage N- 
chotomous probit estimates of bargaining law status* the 
variables MALE, FLFPR, and POP are all significant. The 
first two have the anticipated signs; POP, however, does not 
and the authors cannot reconcile this result with the model. 
In terms of the 3SNP estimation of the wage and unionization 
equations, in general the economic variables perform well 
and in the predicted manner. The political variables*
however, are not as successful. In the wage equation*
unionization is positive and significant, as is MALE, PROF, 
and FLFPR. Neither of the two political variables, FIN and 
the legislative shift factor ^ t , exert a significant 
influence on wages across states. In the unionization 
equation, wages are positive and significant, as is pi*,. 
Thus, pro-bargaining legislation, as a measure derived from 
the process determining bargaining law status, positively 
affects union membership. Other significant variables, all 
negative as expected, are PROF, POP, and ULP.
In general, the authors conclude that the 3SNP results 
support the special interest theory. In particular,
legislators increase teachers7 wages indirectly: pro­
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bargaining laws are supplied which increase unionization, 
which in turn increases wages. (If lawmakers increase wages 
d i r e c t 1v , the coefficient on FIN in the wage equation should 
be significant, which it is not.)
In comparison, results from a ESLS estimation of w^ and 
Ut,, with a simple dummy variable representing exogenous 
bargaining law status, indicate that the legal environment 
has no significant effect on either wages or unionization. 
In addition, unionization is not found to significantly 
increase wages.
Next, two articles will be reviewed which utilize 
cross- sectional data at the municipal level. First, Casey 
Ichniowski (1988) analyzes bargaining law effects at the 
municipal level by means of a proportional hazard (PH) 
model. He studies police departments over time, and models 
the unionization process as a duration study. That is, he 
wants to determine the factors affecting the length of time 
it takes a police department to unionize after the state has 
passed a law legalizing bargaining. To do this, he analyzes
two different aspects of public sector bargaining laws:
first, the strength of the law (i.e., does it merely permit 
bargaining by employees or does it compel employers to
bargain with employees); and second, the presence and type 
of impasse procedures associated with the law. Since police 
strikes are in most cases illegal, the presence of some type 
of compulsory interest arbitration is expected to increase
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the demand for union membership by ensuring closure of the 
bargaining process.
The control variables in the model include* at the 
state level* regional dummies* the percent of a state’s 
workfoce in the government sector* and private sector 
unionization. At the municipal level, population* per 
capita income* central city status* the number of 
departmental employees* and per capita municipal revenue are 
among those variables included. Estimation of several 
variants of the PH model reveal that the type of bargaining 
law enacted is by far the most important determinant of the 
rate of unionization among police departments over time. 
The stronger the law, the greater the relative propensity to 
unionize. (In addition* the degree of private sector 
unionization, region, and central city status all have 
significant effects on union propensities.) Ichniowski 
concludes that the legal environment is the most important 
factor influencing the growth of public sector unionization, 
the same conclusion Saltzman (1985) reached based on his 
model of public employee unionism.
The second article examines the influence of laws on 
labor market outcomes of local government workers (Freeman 
and Valletta (19B8)>. Specifically, effects on collective 
bargaining coverage, wages, and employment are examined. 
Here only the effects on coverage will be summarized. To 
measure the effects of an index of bargaining law strength
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on an individual’s bargaining contract status, linear 
probability equations are estimated which include various 
municipal public employee groups. After controlling for 
state and municipal level variables, the legal index (which 
represents increasing preferences in favor of bargaining 
laws) is positively and significantly correlated with a 
(0,1) index of bargaining coverage. As always, the question 
of causality must be addressed. Do the laws themselves, or 
omitted, unmeasurable variables cause the correlation?
To answer this question, Freeman and Valletta include 
in their regressions a variable measuring the percentage of 
municipal employees unionized (including members of employee 
associations). They reason that if the sole effect of 
legislation is to increase union membership, which then 
leads to greater contract coverage, then the coefficient on 
the legal index should become insignificant when municipal
union density is included in the equations. Their results
indicate that, although the legal index coefficient is
reduced somewhat, it remains significantly and substantially 
positive.
A final test of the question of causality involves the 
omission of the unmeasurable variable pro-union sentiment. 
If sentiment determines both laws and contract coverage, 
then the measured correlation between the two is spurious.
To test this possibility, the authors control for city-wide 
effects proxying sentiment by transforming the variables for
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all occupations into deviations from city means. This has 
the same effect as including city dummy variables. The 
results indicate that the coefficient on the legal index is 
virtually unchanged* which implies that the measured 
correlation between laws and contract coverage is not the 
result of the omission of sentiment. Based on both test* 
Freeman and Valletta also believe that a causal relationship 
between laws per se and bargaining coverage exists.
The articles discussed in this section have focused 
entirely or primarily on cross-sectional data to evaluate 
the role of bargaining laws in explaining state or municipal 
differences in the level of public sector union membership. 
A comparison of results from these studies to one employing 
individual data could prove instructive. A recent article 
by Hundley (1988) uses a micro-data set to evaluate the 
effects of individual characteristics and bargaining law 
coverage on union membership probability. Furthermore, he 
analyses the effects of a range of legislation dealing with 
public sector unions, permitting a more comprehensive 
understanding of the influence of the legal environment on 
union membership decisions. His findings indicate that the 
implementation at the federal level of proposed pro­
bargaining legislation for public unions could elicit large 
changes in public sector union density.
Using individual data from the 1985 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) provides the author with three major advantages
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re 1 ative to previous studies. First, most of the major 
changes in state-wide bargaining laws were completed by the 
late seventies to early eighties. Therefore* if most of the 
adjustments to these changes are reflected in the 1985 data* 
the results could be considered more reliable than could the 
conflicting results of earlier studies for which the 
adjustments were still in progress. Second* by using 
individual data on union status* the bargaining law variable 
may be assumed to be given to each individual. As a result* 
simultaneous estimation of laws and union membership is not 
required. Third, each individual may be matched with the 
bargaining law specifically pertaining to his or her 
category of public employment; thus* information is not lost 
through aggregation.
In estimating the probability of union membership, 
Hundley employs explanatory variables representing both 
demand for and supply of union services. The costs to the 
union of organizing and providing services to members, the 
major (non-price) determinant of supply, represent an 
implicit cost to workers and thus affect their probability 
of m e m bership1.
Representing demand for union services are the familiar 
individual and occupational characteristics included in 
various combinations in both private and public sector 
studies. Included among the individual characteristics are 
race, sex, education* experience, part-time work status, and
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private sector unionization. Occupational characteristics 
affecting demand include a job’s educational requirements* 
its hazard ranking and repetitiveness, and its supervisory 
or non-supervisory status.
The costs of supplying union services are measured by 
the various legal provisions surrounding public sector 
unionism. An important point of this article is that 
different types of laws affect the probability of union 
membership in different ways. Among the legal provisions 
and their expected effects are the following. Exclusive 
jurisdiction laws should increase the supply and equilibrium 
quantity of union services. Union security provisions, such 
as mandated agency shops, are expected to increase demand. 
The passible effects of public sector right-to-work laws, on 
the other hand, may be drawn from the extensive private 
sector RTW literature; the author predicts that the 
equilibrium level of union membership falls as a result of a 
decrease in supply, with demand remaining constant. A final 
union security procedure, mandatory dues check-off, should 
increase supply by decreasing a u n i o n ’s costs.
Turning to the most frequently studied category, that 
of bargaining rights, it is expected that "voluntary" 
employer bargaining laws (e.g. mandatory meet and confer) 
will exert only a small positive influence on demand. On 
the other hand, mandatory bargaining laws should 
significantly increase the probability of membership.
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Finally, the last category is impasse procedures. 
These are assumed to operate through their effects on the 
costs of bargaining to both management and labor, and thus, 
on bargaining outcomes, bath of which affect the perceived 
benefits from unionism. Two types of impasse procedures are 
discussed: arbitration and the right-to-strike. Compulsory 
arbitration is expected to increase the demand for union 
services. The explanation provided is that workers perceive 
that more favorable bargaining outcomes result under binding 
arbitration, and that in addition its exercise imposes 
negligible costs on them. Nonbinding impasse procedures, on 
the other hand, are not perceived by workers as posing 
substantial constraints on management’s behavior; union 
membership, therefore, should not be significantly affected 
by mediation or fact-finding.
The use of the strike weapon as an impasse resolution 
procedure yields opposing effects in a w o r k e r ’s cost-benefit 
calculus. The threat effect attaching to the right— to— 
strike may promote management concessions, thereby 
increasing perceived benefits from unionism. However, the 
costs incurred by a worker if a strike is called may be 
substantial. It must be left to the data, then, to provide 
the sign of the effect on the probability of union 
membership of legalized strikes.
Turning now to the model, a conventional reduced form 
single equation specification is used to determine factors
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affecting the probability of union membership. The 
dependent variable takes the value one if the individual 
reports membership in a union* zero otherwise. As noted 
earlier, a great advantage in using individual CPS data is 
that each individual may be matched with the state laws 
affecting his or her particular occupational class. Data 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research <NBER> on 
public sector collective bargaining laws categorize state­
wide statutes by five employee groups: state government,
police, fire, teachers, and municipal government.E
Another important point concerning the use of micro­
data and its implications for model specification is the 
potential omitted variable bias arising from the 
predetermined nature of bargaining laws when applied to 
individual data. Although this is the correct
specification, it may be true that more heavily unionized 
states produce stronger bargaining legislation. In order to 
account for this effect within a single equation model, 
variables which proxy tastes for unionism in a state must be 
included in the equations as control variables. In 
Hun d l e y ’s model, private sector unionization across states 
serves this purpose. In addition, he includes dummy 
variables for each of the five employment groups to control 
for within state differences in preferences across groups.
Probit estimation of the reduced form reveals that the 
majority of the individual and occupational characteristics
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are significant and of the expected sign. Summarizing some 
of these results, private sector union density is strongly 
significant and positive, and males and nonwhites are more
likely to be unionized than females and whites.
Additionally, the evidence supports both the concave
unionism-experience relationship found elsewhere, and the 
theory that employers of unionized positions hire more 
highly educated workers. As expected, part-time status and 
supervisory status are highly significant and negative, and 
the variable measuring job hazards is positive and 
significant. The repitition variable, however, is 
insignificantly different from zero.
Turning to the effects of legal provisions on the 
propensity to unionize, mandatory bargaining laws are
significant and positive as anticipated, while the weaker 
"voluntary11 statutes, expected to be insignificant or only 
weakly positive, actually exert a negative influence. These 
two variables are the typically employed measures of the 
legal environment affecting public unionism. The results of 
this model strongly imply that extending the analysis to 
include other legal provisions regulating union behavior 
yields additional insight on the process. Union security
provisions, for example, strongly affect union membership. 
The mandatory agency shop has the largest positive effect on 
membership probability; laws allowing union or agency shops 
exert a smaller positive effect, and mandatory dues check­
139
off 15 also positive.
In the impasse resolution category, non-binding 
procedures do not, as expected, increase membership; 
compulsory arbitration, however, does exert a positive 
influence. In addition, providing the right-to-strike 
decreases membership probability. This may indicate that 
the expected costs to workers associated with the exercise 
of the strike option exceed the potential benefits arising 
from a change in an e m p l o y e r ’s concession curve.
Finally, simulations based on these estimates of the 
effects of proposed federal public sector bargaining 
legislation are undertaken. Three different proposals 
representing varying degrees of pro-union sentiment are 
analysed. The simulations suggest that even the weakest of 
these proposals would generate a substantial increase in 
public union density. Furthermore, the major result of this 
model is that different types of union regulations have 
different impacts on union density; the consequence, 
therefore, of focusing exclusively on bargaining rights 
provisions is a loss of information containing potentially 
significant policy implications.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL DERIVATION OF A MODEL OF UNIONIZATION
The development of a model explaining the level of 
unionization or of union density is derived from the 
standard theory of consumer choice. Following papers by 
Berkowitz <1954), Ashenfelter and Pencavel <1969), Pencavel 
<1971), and Ashenfelter and Johnson <1972), an i n d i v i d u a l ’s 
decision to join a union is analyzed within a conventional 
demand and supply framework: choices are assumed to result
from a utility maximizing decision process, so that 
membership in a union is seen as an alternative way in which 
to hold wealth <also see: Lumsden and Petersen <1975), and
Moore and Newman <19B5>). The analysis of the union
decision, then, involves the determination of the w o r k e r ’s 
choice of investment in union membership versus alterative 
assets, all of which yield services over time.
The theoretical model of an i n d i v i d u a l ’s demand for 
union services is specified as a function of the relative 
price of union membership <P)j permanent income (Y>; its 
return relative to alternative assets: the union-nonunion 
wage differential (<WU-Wn/Wn))i denoted by <S, and non- 
pecuniary union benfits (B); the price of substitutes for
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(T ) .
On the supply side, the production of union services is
expected to be a function of membership price (P), and costs
(C), which are composed of two basic elements: factor
costs* i.e., the costs of organizing and of providing 
services; and in addition, all factors affecting supply, 
positively or negatively, imposed from both outside the 
union (i.e., government policy and legislation), as well as 
from inside (i.e., "any real or psychological costs imposed 
by union leadership or rank-and-file members themselves, 
such as resistance to working with minority groups" (Lumsden 
and Petersen (1975), p . 1238). This latter cost element can 
alternatively be viewed as encomposing union goals.
Imposing the standard equilibrium condition yields the 
following system of structural equations describing the 
demand for and supply of union services:
(1) U* = fd<P*Y,$,B,S,T)
(2) U„ = f_(P,C)
(3) U = Ua = U„.
The equilibrium level of union services, U, is proxied in 
empirical models which use aggregate data by either percent 
unionized (or organized), or percent covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. In making this transformation from 
the theoretical model it is assumed that the level of union 
services is proportional to the percentage of unionized 
jobs, so that the empirical proxy may be viewed as per
l^E
capita consumption of union services.
Extending this topic, it should be noted that 
collective bargaining coverage is a more appropriate proxy 
within this u t i 1ity-maximizing choice model. This results 
from differences in legal structures across states affecting 
the status of the union shop. For instance, in the twenty 
states having RTW laws (and in sixteen of these twenty, 
court decisions have interpreted the RTW statutes as 
covering public sector workers) some workers who are not 
union members will be covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement; it is conceivable that some of these workers may 
have chosen union membership if the union shop were legal. 
The implication is that these nonunion members in RTW states 
in reality perceive that benefits from unionization exceed 
costs. On the other hand, in non-RTW states, it is again 
conceivable that some workers will choose union membership 
who would not do so were the union shop outlawed. The 
implication is that these union members actually perceive 
that the costs of union membership outweigh the benefits. 
Therefore, since an individual does choose his or her jab, 
which includes the characteristic of bargaining coverage 
presence or absence, the use of the coverage variable is 
more consistent with the choice-theoretic framework 
e m p l o y e d .
Returning to the variables in the structural demand and 
supply equations, the only variable common to both is the
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relative price of membership <P>. This variable comprises 
initiation fees* dues* and other expected assessments 
relative to the price of other assets. In practice* it is 
difficult or impossible to get reliable data on the cost of 
membership. As a result* structural demand and supply 
equations cannot be estimated. Instead* a reduced form 
equation of union membership is typically estimated by 
exloiting the fact that U and P are functions of all the 
other exogenous variables; thus* equations <1) and <E) 
comprise a system of two equations in two unknowns* U and P. 
This procedure yields the following reduced form equation of 
the equilibrium level of union services:
U = f (Y,<y,B,B,T,C) .
The preceding analysis of the determination of union 
status is derived from the original literature referring to 
the private sector; to this point* no specific account has 
been taken of the fact that the object of this thesis is 
public sector unions. The reason for this omission is 
simple: the same demand and supply framework developed for
the analysis of private sector unions applies* essentially 
intact, to the public sector as well. Several important 
differences exist between employment characteristics of the 
public and private sectors, however. Two of the major 
differences involve the determination of compensation and 
work conditions, and the legal environment surrounding 
unionism. In the public sector, wage and non-wage outcomes
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are determined in the political market; the implication in 
terms of union activities* then* is that political lobbying 
and voting are more important as union goals in the public 
sector than in the private sector. Regarding the legal 
structure, a great difference exists between the two 
sectors. The passage in 1935 of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) guaranteed private sector employees the 
right to organize* to bargain collectively, and to strike. 
Public sector employees are not covered by the NLRA. 
Instead, organized activities by public employees are 
regulated on a state-wide basis. In the 1960’s and 1970’s 
states began passing laws addressing the rights of state and 
local employees to bargain collectively and to strike. In 
addition, laws addressing union recognition and union 
security provisions in the public sector were passed.
Complicating matters further, different employee groups 
within the same state do not necessarily have the same 
rights. In contrast, the only major legal feature 
distinguishing private sector union activity across states 
is the right-to-work law (RTW).
Another distinction between the sectors involves 
differing union goals motivated by different relative time 
perspectives; that is, the discount rates exhibited by 
public and private sector unions and employers probably 
differ systematically. In the private sector, profit- 
maximizing firms are expected to have a longer time
145
perspective than do unions, with their incomplete ownership 
rights. In the public sector, however, politicians are 
generally assumed to have short time perspectives: their
tenure in office is often not long, and even where it is, 
they are expected to favor special interest wealth transfers 
which are funded by future tax liabilities. The 
characteristic of incomplete property rights applies equally 
to unions in both the public and the private sectors; 
however, since job tenure in the public sector tends to be 
longer than in the private sector, a longer time perspective 
may be expected of unions in the former.
In spite of these differences, however, significant 
similarities between the two sectors remain which allow the 
previously developed framework for analyzing the demand for 
and supply of union services to accomodate both public and 
private employees. The demand for labor in the public 
sector is expected to be a negative function of wages even 
in the absence of profit-maximizing behavior by employers. 
It should be also noted that despite early claims to the 
contrary, the demand for labor in the public sector is not 
substantially more inelastic than in the private sector 
CEhrenberg and Smith (1985), pp. 421, 100). (Clearly,
however, the demand for public employees and thus the demand 
far public sector unionism are dependent upon voter 
attitudes and budget size, both of which may be accounted 
for within the conventional framework.) In addition, the
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supply of labor In the public sector is expected to be a 
positive function of compensation levels greater than or 
equal to those in the private sector.
It is therefore conluded that* despite clear and 
significant differences between the two sectors, it is
nonetheless appropriate to analyze the determination of 
union outcomes in the public sector within the demand and 
supply framework presented above.
One final issue relating to this demand and supply 
framework should be mentioned before returning to the 
discussion of the theoretical variables in the structural 
equations. This issue involves equation (3), L)=Ud=U™> the 
equilibrium or market-clearing condition. As noted by Abowd 
and Farber <1982), this condition is more appropriate to a 
model explaining the union status of jobs rather than of 
individuals. In other words, the market— clearing assumption 
is theoretically more plausible in an aggregate model
explaining the extent of unionism than in a micro data model 
explaining the union status of individuals. The reasoning 
behind this is simple: the major costs of unionization
occur when a unit is being organized; therefore, if the
benefits of unionism exceed the costs, the jobs will become
covered. This implies that, in most current situations, an 
i n d i v i d u a l ’s decision to join a union is in reality the 
product of his or her present choice and past choices made 
by other workers which resulted in covered jobs. Thus, the
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probability that an individual will join a union is a joint 
probability consisting of the following two components: 
P r o b (individual A is in the union queue (i.e.* desires a 
union job) )*-Prob (individual A is selected for 
employment/individual A is in the union q u e u e ) . It can be 
seen* then, that utilising the market-clearing assumption 
implies greater caution be used when interpreting results 
from individual data.
3.1 The Demand for Union Services
Returning to the theoretical variables in the 
structural system, in the demand equation the variables are 
hypothesized to have the following effects on the demand for 
u n i o n i s m :
U V  o, U*v» U 1*, LPk,, LJ 1b > 0.
The relative price variable P was discussed earlier; 
clearly, the law of demand holds. Permanent income Y should 
have a positive effect assuming union services are normal 
goods. On the other hand, it is possible that a negative 
effect exists if the substitution effect dominates: that
is, if the opportunity cast of engaging in union activities 
rises with income. Empirically, permanent income is often
proxied by earnings; ultimately, its sign is an empirical 
question. An important point here is that wages and 
unionization are jointly determined variables (see: 
Ashenfelter and Johnson (197E), Vessels (1981), Hunt, Terza,
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White* and Moore (1986)). A simultaneous equations
specification is indicated in order to avoid possible bias 
in the estimated wage coefficient.
The proportional union-nonunion wage differential 
clearly is expected to exert a positive influence on 
unionization. Obtaining a reliable measure of this variable 
is very difficult* however* since generally one must compare 
the wages received by different individuals in the union and 
the nonunion sectors. It is virtually impossible to 
completely control for personal characteristics which affect 
an individual’s job productivity, and therefore wages. As a 
result, two individuals with the same measured 
characteristics are unlikely to be identical* they will 
probably differ in ways which are intrinsically 
unmeasureable. Thus, omitted variable bias is likely to 
cast severe doubt on estimates of this differential. Due to 
this problem* the differential is often proxied by personal 
and industry variables expected to represent the expected 
benefits and costs of union representation. Often used in 
private sector studies* for instance, are industry variables 
attempting to capture benefits to unionism resulting from 
inelastic labor demand. Product market concentration ratios 
may proxy greater benefits due to more inelastic labor 
demand* as a consequence of lower output demand elasticity* 
in addition* it is hypothesized that highly concentrated 
firms are associated with lower costs of union organization.
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Along these same lines, the capital-labor ratio may proxy 
greater benefits to unionism if highly capital- intensive 
firms exhibit lower elasticity of labor demand. Various 
industry dummies are also frequently used, with appropriate 
hypotheses concerning the effects of their respective 
workplace and job characteristics on the benefits and costs 
of unionization.
In terms of personal characteristics, the variables 
age, race, sex, region, education, and occupational mix or 
skill level among others, are traditionally included to 
proxy expected compensation benefits to unionism. (The 
systematic effect of age, or years of experience, on union 
membership was discussed in Chapter Four of Topic One.) 
Most studies have found that nonwhites are significantly 
more likely than whites to be union members. This result is 
based on many other studies which conlude that a relatively 
larger union wage effect does indeed exist for black males 
than for white males (Ashenfelter (1973), Table H.l, p.33). 
(One should recall the previously noted problems involved in 
estimating union-nonunion wage differentials, however.) An 
alternative explanation supporting the greater relative 
liklihood of union membership by nonwhites is simply that 
nonwhites estimate a greater differential than do whites, 
perhaps due to the perception of less discriminatory 
treatment resulting from structured pay scales and 
seniority-based promotion rules.
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With few exceptions) studies have found women to be 
significantly less likely than men to join unions. In this 
case* most studies find no significant differences between 
estimated male and estimated female union-nonunion wage 
differentials (Ashenfelter (1978)) Table £.1) p. 33). If one 
believes these estimated differentials to be reliable) then 
a preference explanation deriving from differences in 
w o m e n ’s labor force participation rates and occupational 
distribution seems reasonable.
Region is customarily included to proxy pro- or anti­
labor regional preferences. As noted in Chapter A of Topic
One) the South has historically been more hostile to unions 
than other regions) and this factor has inhibited union 
g r o w t h .
In terms of occupational mix or skill level) the work­
place and personal characteristics of production or blue-
collar workers systematically affect their demand for 
unionization. They are significantly more likely to be 
unionized than are white-collar workers. Production workers 
tend to face less flexible work conditions) more team 
production) and greater workei— machine complementarity; 
according to Duncan and Stafford (1980) 198H)) these
characteristics are associated with pro-union preferences. 
In addition) it is hypothesized that organizing costs are 
lower among blue-collar workers due to the following 
associated personal characteristics: less identification
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with management^ smaller liklihood of self-employment, and 
(possibly) more homogeneous preferences in general as a 
g r o u p .
Finally, education has had ambiguous effects in 
different studies. Frequently education is found to have no 
significant effect on the probability of union membership 
after controlling for other characteristics; certainly, this 
is consistent with the finding that union membership is 
significantly less likely at education levels greater than 
high school. On the other hand, education and income are 
positively correlated; if education is assumed to be an 
empirical proxy for income, a positive coefficient is 
interpreted as representing the income effect.
Non-pecuniary union benefits, , exert the same effect 
on the demand for union services as the wage differential. 
Although it is difficult to directly measure the non- 
pecuniary benefits of unionism in the workplace, unionism is 
expected to arise in environments in which formalization of 
work rules, pay scales, promotion criteria, and worket—  
management communications procedures provides the greatest 
benefits to workers. It is expected that these types of 
environments are characterized by large firm size, highly 
capital-intensive production processes, high accident risk, 
and greater expectations of strike activity.
Substitutes for union services, S, include, for example, 
government welfare payments and tax advantages for privately
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financed pension plans (Neumann and Rissman (19B4)).
Finally, tastes and preferences, T, are influenced by 
the wage and non-wage benefits of unions across workers and 
jobs. Personal and industry characteristic control
variables such as region, urbanization, sex, race, age, 
occupation, education, work experience, and RTW laws are 
commonly used to proxy differences in attitudes toward 
unions.
3.2 The Supply of Union Services
Turning now to the structural supply equation, the 
variables are expected to exert the following effects on the 
supply of union services:
U lP > 0, LPc < 0.
The assumption of profit-maximization cannot be 
ascribed to unions; the relationship between union members 
and the union itself is typified by a principal-agent model, 
so that unions exercise incomplete proprietary rights over 
residual revenues. It is the assumption of profit
maximization within the conventional price-theoretic model 
which yields the signs of the partial derivatives of the U m 
function above. Nonetheless, the only assumption required 
to derive these signs is of a binding budget constraint on 
the organization. Since unions must meet organizing costs 
and other costs . involved with the provision of services, 
this is a reasonable assumption. Therefore, the law of
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supply holds with respect to the production of union 
services.
The cost element, as previously noted, is composed of 
two elements: organization costs, and the costs of
providing services. Both have a relatively large fixed cost 
component. Organization costs in particular exhibit
sizeable economies of scale over a wide range, but services 
such as collective bargaining and information distribution 
are subject to declining per unit costs as well. For this 
reason, larger firms and more highly concentrated industries 
are expected to be associated with greater union activity; 
industry dummies are thus often used to proxy degrees of 
scale economies.
Additionally, employers' attitudes toward unionism and 
the legal structure regulating union activities affect the 
costs of providing services. In terms of the private 
sector, firms in very competitive industries which face a 
very elastic output demand schedule may exert strong 
resistance to organization efforts. Also, apart from 
economic incentives to resist unionism, differences in firm 
preferences are expected to exist over regions and types of 
firms, motivating the inclusion of regional and firm dummies 
as proxies. In addition, for both the public and private 
sectors, the level of employer resistance to unionism is 
often proxied by the number of unfair labor practice cases 
charged against firms.
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Finally* in terms of public employees* legislation 
regulating collective bargaining rights* the scope of 
bargaining* union recognition and security provisions and 
the strike weapon* is expected to systematically affect 
c o 5 15 as w e l 1.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4-1 Estimation Technique
The model developed in Topic One of this thesis 
explaining the determinants of bargaining laws is also 
employed here; in Topic Two, however, the model undergoes a 
major specification change. This modification accounts for 
the simultaneous determination of unionization and the legal 
environment regulating unionization. Therefore, a two 
equation model is indicated; bargaining law status is now a 
jointly determined endogenous variable along with the extent 
of unionization.
In the past, econometric difficulties associated with
the simultaneous estimation of discrete and continuous
endogenous variables limited the analysis of bargaining law 
causes and effects. A technique developed by Heckman (1978) 
has more recently been exploited to handle this situation, 
and this thesis employs a variation of the estimation 
procedure outlined in his article.
As mentioned previously, the basis for H e c k m a n ’s
general model (and of course for all the special cases
contained within it) is the assumption that dummy endogenous
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variables are generated by continuous underlying variables 
crossing thresholds. In his article, Heckman explicitly 
considered only binary (or dichotomous) variables; his 
analysis, however, generalizes to the n-chotomous case, 
which is employed in this thesis. First, He c k m a n ’s model 
and two-step estimation procedure is described for the case 
of a dichotomous dummy endogenous variable. Then, a 
procedure is developed which extends this model and 
estimation technique to handle the case of an n-chotomous 
dependent variable.
4.1.1 The Heckman Model
The dual role of dummy variables in this analysis is of 
crucial importance. Dummy variables may serve either as 
proxies for underlying, unobservable variables, or as direct 
shifters of equations. Thus, H e c k m a n ’s most general model 
may be written in the two equation case for two jointly 
determined, continuous latent random variables Yi * and Y a*. 
In addition to this Heckman notes six special cases of the 
model, of which the most general is the Hybrid Model with 
Structural Shift. In this formulation, only one of the 
endogenous variables is latent; the other is an observed 
continuous variable. Since this reflects the empirical 
model estimated in this chapter, the following presentation 
is of H e c k m a n ’s Hybrid Model with Structural Shift (see 
Amemiya (1977)). The model may be written:
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(la) Yi = Q x Ys * + X 1B 1 + £ *d + u *
(lb) Y j g = © e»Y % + X eB e + £ E*d + u e
(lc) d-t, 1 if Y b *- > O
Xi and X s are matrices of known constants; in addition, 
Cun, ,Ue+;} are assumed to be i.i.d. bivariate normal random 
variables, and the restriction £ &  -  -Qi*£x is imposed. This 
restriction is termed the principal assumption; Heckman 
shows that it is a necessary condition for the structural 
and reduced form equations to exist. An intuitive
explanation of the rationale underlying the principal 
assumption is presented shortly. Next, the structural 
equations (la) and (lb) are written as standard reduced form 
equations, under the assumption that the PrQh(dt/XitiXet) = 
1 :
In addition, E(v.lfe )= o-i*5, E ( v atI>= trEe » and c o v ! v i t,ve t ) =
cr1 E . «lso, as is standard in binary or limited dependent 
variable models, the normalization o-a E = 1 is imposed since 
tte, and therefore some of the structural parameters, are 
identified only up to a scalar multiple.
Turning back to the principal assumption, it can be shown 
that this restriction does not allow d to appear on the RHS
( 2a ) Yj - £  ,.d + Xu a + v 4
(2b) Ye * X TT e  V  e
(2c ) d* 1 if Yet* > 0
0 o.w., t=l,...,T
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of equation (2b). The assumption is intuitively plausible 
and may be explained in the context of the reduced form 
equation (Sb): in order to assign a unique probability P*
to the occurence of the events d* - 0 or d * = 1, it is clear 
that this probability cannot be a determinant of the event 
itself. This is why d cannot be included in equation (2b> , 
and thus explains the necessity of the principal assumption 
for the logical consistency of the model.
Estimation proceeds, then, in the following manner. In 
the first step, equation (2b) is estimated by probit 
analysis (that is, by maximum liklihood estimation of the 
probit model) in order to derive the conditional 
probabilities of the events d* = 1 and d* = 0. The
resulting estimate of ire will be denoted by In the
next step, the estimated reduced form equation (2b) is 
substituted into the first structural equation (la), (with 
observed dependent variable Y , ). This yields:
Yi = 01 Xir*E + XjBi + fid + V! - ©1X(m''e - na )
(A) = (XHA )a! + (FA )iJi + w*~,
where = (Tr'Na * J* ) * Ji defined such that XJi - Xi, 
a 1 ! = <©i, B 1!), and
Wj*' = Vi - ©xXdr^s - tts) + & i(d-F) - <?i(F'' - F) ,
where F represents the standard normal c.d.f., so that F and 
FA are the values of the c.d.f. evaluated at (ireX) and 
(tta 2X) respectively. The structural parameters to be 
estimated are oti and &  x i this is accomplished by the
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application of OLS to equation (4).
Having estimated the parameters of the first structural 
equation* we turn now to estimation of the second structural 
equation (lb). Again* substitute the estimated reduced form 
equation (2b) into the second structural equation (lb). 
Since the dependent variable Y e* is unobservable* this
equation is solved for Y* , yielding:
Yi = <l/ea )XTTAe ~ ( l/Sea ) XeBa + £* d + V*
- (l/0a )X(TTAe - TTta>
(5) = (XQ"')p) + (F^ltf, + ws *,
where
w = wa + S  x ^ d-F) &  x (F'*’ F)*
Q A = (tta s  * -Ja ) , Je defined such that X J a = X s ,
and
pi1 = < (i/©a ), (l/esiB1^ ).
The structural parameters to be estimated are $ and £*.; this 
is accomplished by applying OLS to equation (5). (The 
correct standard errors, however, are not yielded by the
usual LS for m u l a s . )
4.1.2 An Extension of the Heckman Model: The Case of an
Ordinal Endogenous Variable 
To account for an n-chotomous dummy endogenous 
variable, the two-equation system of structural equations 
may be written:
(la) Yi „ = 0, Ys ^ * + B ljXit + J » lZt + u ^
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(2a) Yet)"' = QeYit + B 3a Xe-b + eZt + Ugti 
where <Ujt >ust) are i.i.d. bivariate normal) Y , *, is the 
observed random variable, YE ** is the unobservable latent 
variable and is an observable n-chotomous random vector
such that
z i5k = 1 if the k +!h> category is selected 
0 o.w., k = 1,...,M - 1—M * .
The Mim category is omitted; otherwise, z« and the m o d e l ’s 
overall intercept would be perfectly col linear. There are ti 
response categories R lt...,RM and the k * h is observed if 
F k - 1 — Yet*' £ Ft*-., where F o — — » - F i - —
+ ® are threshold values for the latent variable
Yes^*.
In matrix notation, the standard reduced form equations 
may be written
(lb) Y,. = Xtti + Z £ i  + Va,
(2b) Ya * = Xtts  + V R .
Just as before the principal assumption is applied, so that
the matrix of n-chotomous dummy variables 2 does not appear
on the RHS of equation <2b). are bivariate normal
with zero means and covariance matrix £, where 
2 = cr xe <rie
ffia 1 •
The correct asymptotic covariance matrix is derived in 
Waters, Moore, Hill, and Newman (19Q9).
The two-step estimation procedure follows as before;
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however, in the first stage estimation of the reduced form 
equation (2b>» maximum liklihood estimation of an ordinal 
probit model as developed by McKelvey and Zavonia is 
substituted for binary probit analysis. (The McKelvey and 
Zavonia procedure is described in Topic One.)
In terms of the empirical model, the structural 
equation (la) models the determination of state-wide union 
density over two years, 1970 and 19B0. Structural equation 
(lb) models the process by which sentiment toward public 
sector bargaining laws is formed. Sentiment, Y E+.*, is an 
unobservable variable; therefore, the dependent variable is 
measured in discrete units by the observed random variable 
Ztk . As noted previously, for the years 1970 and 1980 our 
dependent variable takes the value zero for states which 
prohibit bargaining (or have no laws) for two or more public 
employee groups; it equals one for states with MMC laws for 
two or more groups; and it equals two for states with an MBL 
for two or more groups. This variable represents an 
escalating intensity of preferences in favor of bargaining 
laws.
The interpretation of the two roles played by the dummy 
variables in our model is the following. represents
sentiment toward bargaining laws or more generally public 
sector unionism; if the intensity of pro-union sentiment in 
a state is sufficiently strong, so that YE -b* > 0, then 
favorable bargaining laws may be enacted. This event is
observed and denoted by the n-chotomous dummy variable zt > 
which acts as a pure shift variable in both structural
equations. Therefore, in equation (la) union density is
affected by two separate components: the presence of
bargaining laws of varying intensity <z*), and sentiment
toward unionism (Y^t,*1). As Heckman points out, this
formulation allows one to infer the true, independent 
effects of bargaining laws on unionization, abstracting from 
sentiment. In other words, if union sentiment were not
included as a separate and explicitly measured determinant 
of union density, then the laws might serve as a proxy for 
sentiment. In this case, the measured effect of legislation 
on unionization would be spurious. In addition, in 
structural equation <Ea) this formulation allows the actual 
presence of laws in a state to affect sentiment toward 
unions. If then the parameter coefficient on the dummy 
variable z* were significant, it would imply that the very 
existence of laws determining the legal status of bargaining 
independently influences p e o p l e s ’ attitudes toward unions.
4.5 The Model
This section describes the two equation model of the 
determinants and effects of state-wide bargaining laws over 
time (1970 and 1980). As noted, the second equation models 
the determinants of legislation with dependent variable 
SENTIMENT, the subject of Topic One. The equation of Topic
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One is estimated here with just one exception: the variable
PRIOR-LEG is excluded. This is a reasonable omission in 
light of the additions to the structural equation required 
by the Heckman formulation: dummy variables representing
the discrete effect of the laws per se on sentiment. Since 
PRIOR-LEG measures the proportion of neighboring states 
having passed an MBL prior to the observation years* the 
addition of explanatory variables indicating the legal 
status of laws in each state introduces an extremely high 
level of collinearity between the two variables. 
Collinearity diagnostics indicate that PRIOR-LEG is also 
fairly highly correlated with GOVWAGE; thus deleting PRIOR- 
LEG from the second equation is preferable within a system 
in which the overall degree of m ultico11 inearity among the 
variables must be of concern.
A.3 The Determinants of Bargaining Laws: Equation Two
The estimated laws equation from Topic One* with 
dependent variable SENTIMENT, contains the following 
variables (excepting PRIOR-LEG). (For a complete discussion 
of the included variables, as well as other variables tested 
but omitted from the final specification, see Topic One.)
4.3.1 DEMAND VARIABLES 
Interest Group
(1) PUBLIC UNION - the percentage of the public sector 
unionized. Its sign is expected to be positive.
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<2) SALARY - the average earnings of all state and local 
full-time employees within a state. As discussed in Topic
I* this sign could be either positive or negative.
Opposition Group
<1) UNFAIR - the number of unfair labor practice cases
charged against employers) lagged one year. This sign 
should be negative.
Third Party Group
(1) PRIVATE UNION - the proportion of nonagricultural*
private sector employment unionized. Again* as discussed in 
Topic I* this sign could be positive or negative.
Tastes
(1) NWLF - the proportion of the s t a t e ’s labor force which 
is nonwhite. Eased on previous empirical research* this 
sign is expected to be positive.
4.3.2 SUPPLY VARIABLES 
Political Cost
(1) COPE - a s t a t e ’s average COPE rating by the A F L - C I O ’s 
Committee on Political Education: the rating of Congressmen
according to their votes on issues of interest to organized 
labor such that a higher score indicates a greater agreement 
with the A F L - C I O ’s positions. This sign should be positive. 
<2) D1 and D2 - as discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
methodology developed by . Heckman allows the true,
independent effect of legislation to be discerned in both 
structural equations. In extending He c k m a n ’s model to
1 6 5
account for a trichotomous ordinal dependent variable, his 
dummy variable as a pure shift factor becomes two dummy 
variables. As noted, one of the categories must be omitted 
to avoid perfect collinearity with the overall intercept. 
Therefore, D1 equals one if a state either prohibits 
bargaining or has no bargaining law for two or more public 
employee groups, 2 ero otherwise. D2 equals one if a state 
has a MMC law for two or more groups, zero otherwise. As 
usual, the estimated coefficients on D1 and D2 are 
interpreted relative to the omitted category; in this case, 
the omitted category represents the most favorable legal 
status, mandatory bargaining for two or more groups (MBL).
This variable acts as a pure shifter of the structural 
equation determining sentiment, representing the effect of 
laws per se. Although D1 and DS are included under supply 
variables, it is equally plausible that they work through 
the demand side. The supply effect rationale involves the 
political (or economic) costs which may be associated with 
changing the status of bargaining laws from less to most 
favorable. For D1 this implies that a legislator in a state 
currently prohibiting (or having no provision for) 
bargaining might associate political or economic costs with 
changing the law to mandate bargaining. Therefore, the 
probability of a favorable change is lower, which is 
reflected in equation two as a negative influence on 
sentiment. The negative effect of D1 is expected to be
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stronger than that of D2, which represents a change from 
voluntary to mandatory bargaining.
The demand side hypothesis is that the very existence 
of laws has the ability to influence the public's attitudes, 
values, and beliefs. This is expected to occur over time as 
a result of some change in behavior which is mandated by 
law. (An example illustrating this possibility is the 
enactment of federal law prohibiting discrimination by race 
or sex, and affirmative action regulations.) It is
possible, then, that overall demand for bargaining rights 
may be shifted down by the presence of unfavorable 
bargaining laws.
Economic Cost
(1) Log MAJ-PARTY - the natural log of the ratio of the 
number of members of the legislature’s majority party to the 
total number of legislators. This variable could be either 
positive or negative.
The Determinants of Public Sector Union Membership; 
Equation One
The dependent variable in the first equation is PUBLIC 
UNION and the following explanatory variables were tested. 
fr.4.1 DEMAND VARIABLES
(1) GOVWAGE - as defined above, with the same ambiguous 
implications in terms of its effect on the union membership 
decision.
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(2) EAG - the percentage of a s t a t e ’s employment in the 
agricultural sector. This variable should have a negative 
influence on unionization.
(3) SOUTH - a dummy variable equalling one if a state is in 
the South* zero otherwise. Its sign should be negative.
(A) EGS - the percentage of a s t a t e ’s employment in the 
public sector. As discussed in Topic I* this sign cannot be 
predicted a priori.
<5) COPE - as above* its sign is expected to be positive* 
implying that greater pro-union preferences within a state 
represent a positive shift factor on the demand for union 
s e r v i c e s .
(6) NWLF - as above* it is expected to exert a positive 
effect on unionization in a state.
(7) PRIVATE UNION - again, the sign of this variable is not 
clear a prior i .
A.4.2 SUPPLY VARIABLES
(1) SENTIMENT - representing increasingly favorable 
bargaining law Cor more generally union) sentiment as 
discussed previously, this variable should have a positive 
effect on unionization.
(2) RTW - a dummy variable equalling one if a state has an 
RTW law, zero otherwise. This variable is tested as an 
attempt to determine whether RTW laws* which apply to 
goverment employees in sixteen of the twenty RTW states, 
independently affect unionization. (Although identified
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here as a supply variable, the discussion of the RTW 
hypotheses in Chapter Two of this Topic indicates that
demand may be affected as well.)
(3) PRIOR-LEG - as defined above, with its sign expected to 
be positive.
(4) D1 and DE - the interpretation of the pure effect of 
the law is more intuitive and straightforward in the context 
of the unionization equation. In analyzing the determinants 
of public unionization across states, H e c k m a n ’s procedure 
allows separation of the pure effect of public sector 
legislation from that of sentiment. Again, D1 should have a 
greater negative impact than DE. If D1 and DE are
significant, then the conclusion may be drawn that laws 
matter; if the parameter coefficients are insignificant, 
this implies that the measured effect of public sector 
bargaining laws in conventional models may be spurious, 
nothing more than a proxy for sentiment.
Although included under supply variables, it is
reasonable to adopt the same hypotheses about the effects of 
D1 and DE that pertain to RTW laws, excluding the taste 
hypothesis. Like most private sector models estimating 
reduced form equations, however, it is not possible to
distinguish between the free rider and the bargaining power 
hypotheses in the context of this specification. In any 
case, the effect on union membership should be negative 
from either a decrease in the demand for or supply of union
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services or both.
In addition to these variables* others were 
experimented with; for example* the proportion of women in 
the labor force, its age distribution, its proportion of 
blue-collar workers, several variables characterizing the 
industrial distribution of the labor force, and 
urbanization. All of these variables, and in addition some 
of the numbered variables above, were omitted in early tests 
of the m o d e l ’s specification due to insignificance.
A.5 Estimation Results
The empirical analysis is reported in Table H. The 
results of simultaneous estimation of the system are 
contrasted with those of single equation estimates of each 
equation. Discussing the simultaneous estimation results 
first, in equation one' SENTIMENT has no significant effect 
on the dependent variable (percentage of the public sector 
unionized); this is not too surprising given the 
col linearity between SENTIMENT and the other explanatory 
variables which also capture tastes. However, Dl, capturing 
the effect of the law per se, does exert a negative and 
significant influence. DE is not significant in either 
equation, and is estimated very imprecisely; this is not 
surprising, however, because only three of the 96 
observations on SENTIMENT fell into the MMC category.
In equation two, with SENTIMENT as the dependent
f- TABLE 2
H
SIMULTANEOUS VERSUS SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION: THE
GENERAL MODEL OF BARGAINING LAWS 
(asymptotic t-atatistlce in parentheses)
Equation One: Dependent Variable - PUBLIC UNION Equation Two: Dependent Variable “ SENTIMENT
Explanatory
Variables
Simultaneous
Estimation
OLS
Estimation
Simultaneous
Estimation
Ordinal Problt 
Estimation
INTERCEPT 48.825 (6.929) 42.786 (9.9267) 15.187 91.874) 14.735 (2.442)
GOVWAGE -0.0119 (-5.186) -0.011 (-5.196) 0.0025 (2.341) 0.0019 (3.704)
EAG -0.793 (-3.665) -0.781 (-3.695)
SOUTH -5.703 (-1.757) -6.183 (-2,779)
PRIVATE UNION 0.2322 (2.0158) 0.222 (2.012) -0.087 (-1.596) -0.055 (-1.628)
PRIOR - LEG 17.360 (3.06B) 13.093 (3.948)
SENTIMENT -2.010 (-1.116) 2.738 (2.770)
PUBLIC UNION 0.199 (1,973) 0.060 (3.527)
UNFAIR -0.0014 (-1.946) -0.001 (-2.746)
NWLF 0.1019 (1.619) 0.041 (1.225)
COPE 0.0217 (1.315) 0.027 (2.421)
Log MAJ-PARTY -6.133 (-2.410) -4.795 (-3.239)
Dl -10.7619 (-1.553) -8.659 (-1.231)
D2 36.118 (0.657) 27.966 (0.495)
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variable* the law per se has no significant influence on 
sentiment; Dl just misses significance at the .10 level.
Also in equation two* the sign of the jointly endogenous 
PUBLIC UNION is positive as expected.
In equation one* GOVWAGE is negative* implying that the 
probability of union membership is greatest for lower wage 
public sector workers. The other variable in this equation 
the sign of which could not be predicted a priori is PRIVATE 
UNION. Its positive influence implies that a large union
presence in the private sector reflects more favorable 
tastes toward unionization within the state* and may but 
does not necessarily imply direct support from private union 
members toward public unionism.
In equation two, GOVWAGE's- coefficient is reversed. 
Higher goverment wages tend to increase sentiment, 
increasing the liklihaod that a more favorable bargaining 
law is passed. In addition* the effect of private 
unionization on sentiment is not significant. One final 
sign which could not be predicted a priori is Log M A J-PARTV* 
included as a supply side determinant of bargaining law 
sentiment. It is negative, which may support the monopoly 
theory hypothesis that less competition for legislative
seats decreases the production of special interest
legislation (see Waters and Moore (1989) for other 
explanations). The remaining variables in both equations 
are of the predicted sign, and significant according to the
17E
appropriate one-tail or two-tail test.
t* . L Comparison of Simultaneous and Single-Eouation
Est imat ion
Least squares estimation of the first equation yields 
very similar magnitudes for the parameter estimates and 
standard errors with the exception of SENTIMENT. The 
coefficient on SENTIMENT is highly significant and positive. 
In this single equation context, SENTIMENT simply represents 
bargaining law strength within a state. Treating laws as 
exogenous leads in this case to the conclusion that more 
favorable bargaining legislation independently increases 
union membership. This is the same conclusion reached when 
SENTIMENT is treated as endogenous; however, in the OLS 
equation it cannot be known with certainty whether the 
independent variable SENTIMENT does in fact represent the 
law itself or is acting as a proxy for unobservable taste 
factors. H e c k m a n ’s procedure allows one to infer with more 
certainty that laws do matter, and in addition indicates 
that after one controls for sentiment explicitly, the effect 
of the law is less significant than OLS estimation implies.
Equation two is estimated separately by ordinal probit. 
Comparing this equation with its simultaneously estimated 
counterpart, it can be seen that the estimated coefficients 
and standard errors of each are reasonably similar. The 
effect of PUBLIC UNION is considerably more significant,
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however. For this equation the advantage of Heckman's 
simultaneous estimation procedure is to allow for the 
possibility that the law per se affects SENTIMENT* 
interpreted as sentiment toward laws as reflected in the 
observed bargaining law category. In the OLS equation, the 
dependent variable SENTIMENT simply represents the 
bargaining law status observed within a state; therefore, no 
such test is possible in a single equation context. 
Although the law <D1> was found to be an insignificant 
determinant of SENTIMENT in the simultaneous system, it 
should be repeated that Dl just missed significance at the 
.10 level. One might infer that the possibility that 
bargaining laws influence attitudes is still open and should 
be explored further within the area of labor legislation.
4.7 Summary
Finally, in terms of the theoretical framework from 
which the empirical model was derived, the.Heckman procedure 
largely supports the theory of economic regulation. The 
Chicago School demand variables receive the strongest 
support, the Economics of Legislatures School cost variables 
the least. This latter result is consistent with Farber 
(19BQ), as is the conclusion drawn: either more appropriate
proxies for legislative supply variables need to be found, 
or the contribution of this school to the theory of economic 
regulation reevaluated.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO TOPIC THREE
The final topic of this dissertation takes the basic 
general model of bargaining laws and unioniZBtion from Topic 
Two* and disaggregates it in terms of the public employee 
groups under study. In Topic Two, the ordinal index 
characterizing legal status is constructed by counting the 
number of employee groups per bargaining law category; if 
two or more groups fall into one of three designated 
categories, then the appropriate value is assigned to this 
jointly endogenous variable (one for bargaining prohibited 
or no law, two for Mandatory Meet and Confer (MMC), three 
for Mandatory Bargaining Law (MBL)). Here, three of the 
five public employee groups are analyzed separately to 
determine the similarities and differences among them in the 
processes which jointly determine bargaining law status and 
unionization. The three groups chosen are teachers
(excluding college and university teachers), local 
firefighters, and local police.
The analysis follows the Topic Two methodology, in 
terms of both the data and the econometric specification. 
That is, state-level data are employed, with unionization
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and legal statue jointly determined. This procedure allots 
direct comparisons among each of the three disaggregated 
employee group models, as well as between them and the 
general model of Topic Two. Chapter 2 contains a review of 
the literature pertaining to the analysis of legislation and 
unionization among individual employee groups. Much of this 
literature is reviewed in Topics One and Two; therefore, 
only the primary conclusions of these articles will be 
repeated here. Chapter 3 presents the empirical analyses of 
the three models, utilizing the basic econometric procedure 
previously described in Topic Two. In addition, Chapter 3 
concludes the topic and suggests further research 
possibilities for local-level sub-group analysis within this 
simultaneous equations context.
CHAPTER g 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Most of the public sector literature dealing with 
legislation and unionization has focused on teachers. 
Rec e n t l y , with the introduction of the NBER Public Sector 
Bargaining Law Data Set, several articles have studied 
characteristics of the bargaining processes of firefighters 
and police. First, the evidence on teacher bargaining and 
legislation will be reviewed; following this are the 
articles analyzing the same attributes of the following 
groups: firefighters, police officers, other local
government employees, and state employees. These articles 
comprise the bulk of the literature review; following this, 
two articles studying bargaining and wage-setting 
interrelationships between police and firefighters are 
summarized. These latter two articles provide an important 
institutional framework linking bargaining coverage as well 
as bargaining law sentiment between police officers and 
firefighters.
S.l Teachers
One of the earliest quantitative articles on the 
determinants of the passage of teacher bargaining laws is
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Moore and Newman (1976), reviewed in Topic I. Using 
discriminant analysis, the following results are reported. 
The proportion of employment in the government sector has a 
negative influence on the passage of pro-union bargaining 
legislation, as does a South dummy variable. The level of 
urbanization and the percent of the government sector 
unionized are both associated with more favorable teacher 
legislation. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the
proportion of employment in the agricultural sector is 
largest for MMC-type laws, and smallest for the least 
permissive law group. Variables found to be insignificant 
are a RTW dummy variable and the total union and employee 
association membership within a state.
The next article examines the same topic: the
determination of teacher bargaining legislation, using SMSA- 
level data. Reviewed in Topic I, Hunt and White (1983) 
report the following conclusions derived from n-chotomous 
probit estimation of a four-level index of teacher 
bargaining status. The variables with a significant and 
positive influence on bargaining law strength are state and 
local education expenditures (as a percent of state per 
capita income), the percent of non-practitioner employment 
in the health profession, the percent of the private sector 
organized, the labor force separation rate, and the percent 
of teachers who are male. The variables exerting a 
significant and negative influence are the number of unfair
17B
labor practice charges (per representation election), and 
the percent of teachers in the workforce. Among the 
variables with no significant effect are the share of 
government employment and average teacher salary (relative 
to median male income).
A third article examining both teacher bargaining 
coverage and bargaining laws within a single equation 
context is Saltzman (19B5). Reviewed in both Topics I and 
II, the major results will be very briefly summarized. 
First, changes in bargaining law status are the most 
significant determinants of changes in the extent of teacher 
bargaining contract coverage. Other significant variables 
are per capita income (positive), growth in teacher 
employment (negative), teachers per school (positive), and 
proportion of teachers who are male (positive). Second, the 
probability that a current law will change to a stronger 
(more pro-bargaining) law is influenced by the proportion of 
contiguous states with a mandatory bargaining law 
(positive), the percentage of government labor protected by 
a merit system (positive), the strength of Democratic party 
control of state government (positive), per capita income 
(positive), and the change in teacher bargaining coverage 
(positive), among others. Third, Saltzman concludes that 
the direction of causality is primarily (but not wholly) 
from the legal environment to bargaining coverage.
The next article provides the only simultaneous
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equations -framework in this area o-f research for the public 
sector. Hunt, Terza, White, and Moore (1986) specify 
teachers’ wages and unionization as the jointly dependent 
variables, and condition the system on bargaining law status 
as discussed in Topic II. Estimation of this system yields 
the following results for the equation explaining the level 
of teacher unionization. The percent of professionals in 
the workforce, the average annual percent change in state 
population, and the number of unfair labor practice charges 
are all negatively related to the extent of unionization. 
Wages exert a positive and significant influence, as does a 
pro-bargaining legislation shift variable.
A recent study by Farber (1988) analyzes the evolution 
of bargaining laws for three groups: police, teachers, and
state workers (reviewed in Topic I). Only the results for 
teachers will be noted in this section. Using a Markov 
transition model to estimate (and predict) changes from one 
legal category of bargaining rights to another, Farber based 
his model on two elements: variables describing the
intensity of preferences for or against public sector 
bargaining (or more generally, public sector unionism), and 
the legislative cost of changing laws. The results of 
unconstrained and several different constrained
specifications indicate clearly that the legislative cost 
variables are completely lacking in explanatory power. (His 
supply constraint proxies are the number of days a
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legislature meets, the number of legislative enactments by a 
state government, and a dummy variable indicating single 
party control of the legislature and the g o v e r n o r ’s office.) 
In terms of the intensity of preferences variables, the COPE 
score is significant and positive, and a South regional 
dummy variable significant and negative.
5.5 Firefighters
Firefighters are the least studied group among the 
three. In a recent article, Valletta (1987) uses a 
selectivity approach to study the evolution and effects of 
collective bargaining activities by both firefighters and 
police. This paper has several goals. One is to estimate 
public union wage effects and in addition public union 
employment effects in a standard single-equation context. 
As noted by Valletta, recent research indicates that 
municipal unions (such as police and firefighters) tend to 
increase the demand for their services, thereby increasing 
both employment and wages (Zax (1985), Freeman and Valletta 
(1986)). The political nature of public employee bargaining 
which allows this dual effect is one of the factors 
distinguishing public from private s e c t o r .u n i o n i s m . Second, 
Valletta estimates the union wage and employment effects 
after accounting for union endogeneity, i.e., the 
selectivity-corrected wage and employment differentials. 
Finally, Valletta models factors influencing the probability
1B 1
of collective bargaining coverage by police and 
firefighters, focusing on the effect of expected wage gains 
to unionism.
Since the focus of this topic is collective bargaining 
and bargaining coverage, only the results pertaining to the 
probability of coverage are included here. This information 
is derived from a general approach to estimating union wage 
and employment effects, allowing for union endogeneity; 
Valletta calls this the "switching model" <see Lee (1978)). 
Union status, or the probability of bargaining coverage, is 
a function of the union-nonunion wage differential, and in 
addition, of appropriate exogenous variables describing city 
demographic characteristics and department-specific factors. 
Then, to allow for interactions between union status and 
wages, separate union and nonunion wage equations are 
specified, each as functions of exogenous department- 
specific and city characteristics. Since the covariance 
between the error term in the union status equation and 
those in the two wage equations is expected to be nonzero, a 
two-step estimation procedure described by Lee (1978) and 
Heckman (1978) is employed. In the first step, the 
conditional means (or selectivity terms) are estimated from 
the (0,1) union status equation. The second step then 
consists of estimating by weighted least squares both 
selectivity-corrected wage equations. This procedure 
provides consistent although not efficient estimates of the
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wage equation parameters. What is of interest hers, 
however, is the union status equation. Therefore, the 
estimated union-nonunion wage differential is substituted 
into the structural probit union status equation as a 
regressor, yielding consistent parameter estimates. In 
addition, this same procedure is used to generate a union- 
nonunion employment differential! both the wage and 
employment gaps are proxies for the expected benefits from 
unionization. These are the results which will be looked at 
to analyze the determinants of the union status decision, 
first for firefighters, then in the following section for 
police.
For fire (and also police) departments, three different 
specifications are estimated, each with the same set of 
purely exogenous variables. The first specification
includes the union-nonunion wage differential, the second 
the union-nonunion employment differential, and the third 
includes bath. The firefighters’ results indicate that in 
no specification does either the wage or employment gap 
significantly influence the probability of a fire 
d e p artment’s coverage by a collective bargaining contract. 
Most of the variation in coverage is explained by three 
variables describing the legal environment surrounding 
public unionism. A dummy variable specifying the presence 
of a union recognition procedure is consistently highly 
significant and positive, as is a nine-category legislative
1B3
index representing an escalating intensity of preferences in 
favor of unionism. This legislative index accounts for 
three different regulations: bargaining rights, impasse
resolution, and strike provisions. Finally, the presence of 
an RTW law covering public sector employees significantly 
decreases the probability of bargaining coverage for fire 
departments. Other included explanatory variables which do 
not exhibit a consistently significant pattern are 
population, percent black in the population, per capita 
income, median value of ownei— occupied housing, median age, 
and three regional dummy variables.
a. 3 Police
The first evidence presented is from the previous 
article; Va l l e t t a ’s results for police departments follow 
essentially the same general pattern as those for fire 
departments. That is, most of the variation in police 
department bargaining coverage is explained by the three 
legal environment variables listed above. Again, neither 
the union-nonunion wage differential nor the employment 
differential contributes to the m o d e l ’s explanatory power. 
Also, none of the other explanatory variables listed above 
is consistently significant in any of the model 
specifications.
Overall, Valletta concludes that both the fire and 
police department models explain the extent of bargaining
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coverage well: the null hypothesis of no slope effects is
rejected at the .01 level by liklihood ratio tests for both. 
Additionally* predictions from both models match the actual 
(0*1) observations on bargaining coverage approximately 75*/. 
of the time.
Finally* Valletta concludes that the apparent lack of 
importance of expected gains to unionization (i.e.* the wage 
and employment gaps)* in explaining the bargaining coverage 
decision for both police and fire departments is the result 
of one of three factors: unobservable variables at the
municipal level* data limitations* or econometric 
def i c ienc i e s .
Continuing with evidence on police unionization and 
bargaining rights, Farber's (1988) results on the evolution 
of police bargaining laws will be summarized. Using the 
previously noted Markov transition model* the results are 
roughly similar to those for teachers. That is, under 
several different specifications* the legislative cost 
variables are consistently insignificant in predicting a 
state's change from one category of police bargaining rights 
to another. Turning to the variables describing intensity 
of preferences toward unionization* in the unconstrained 
model only COPE (positive) and a South dummy variable 
(negative) are significant. In one version of the
constrained model* in which only a constant term is included 
in the legislative cost vector* per capita income and per
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capita government expenditures in addition to COPE and the 
South dummy variable are significant and positive.
Another model of police unionization and bargaining 
laws utilizing an unusual method of estimation is 
Ichniowski’s <19BB> proportional hazards model. As reviewed 
in Topic II, this study attempts to determine the causes of 
growth over time in police unionization* with a particular 
emphasis on the role of the legal environment in this 
process. Briefly recounting the empirical results for this 
municipal-level data, Ichniowski finds that the most 
important factor in determining the rate of police 
unionization is the nature of the bargaining law in effect. 
Other significant variables are private sector unionization, 
regional dummy variables, and central city status. Among 
the variables with no significant effect on police 
unionization rates are per capita city income, per capita 
city revenue, and city population.
5.A Other Groups
Within this bargaining laws framework Farber (1988) has 
also separately modelled changes in legislation for the 
group comprised of all state employees in addition to 
local-level teachers and police as previously reviewed. 
First, F a r b e r ’s state employee results will be summarized 
and compared with his teacher and police evidence. Second, 
an article by Freeman and Valletta (1988) modelling the
1B6
effects of labor legislation for six local government 
employee groups completes this section of the review of the 
1i terature.
F a r b e r ’5 results from the Markov transition model for 
state employees are similar to those for teachers and 
police. The legislative cost variables perform poorly in 
explaining changes in policy. In terms of the determinants 
of the intensity of preferences toward unionization* again a 
similar pattern prevails. For the unconstrained model* 
three variables are significant: COPE (positive)* a South
dummy variable (negative)* and per capita income (marginally 
significant and positive). For the constrained model, which 
includes only a constant in the legislative cost vector but 
the full set of parameters in the intensity of preferences 
vector, one additional variable exerts some influence: per
capita government expenditures is marginally significantly 
pos i t iv e .
A comparison of the three groups tested in F a r b e r ’s 
article clearly reveals the systematic failure of the 
proxies representing the legislative cost of policy changes. 
In terms of the variables proxying the intensity of 
preferences for or against unionism* four variables appear 
to systematically affect the probability that a more 
favorable bargaining law will be passed for teachers, 
police* and state employees: COPE, the southern region, per
capita income, and (less strongly) per capita government
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expend i tu r e s .
Finally, Freeman and Valletta (196Q) examine the 
effects of a legislative index on collective bargaining* 
wages* and employment in municipalities. The index is 
constructed by combining the effects of two legal categories 
pertaining to six local government employee groups* and 
ranking them in terms of their favorableness toward 
collective bargaining. The two legal categories are 
bargaining rights and dispute resolution. In the latter 
category the authors distinguish between three categories: 
nonbinding mediation and fact-finding* compulsory interest 
arbitration* which guarantees closure of the bargaining 
process; and the legal status of strikes.
This study is briefly reviewed in Topic Two* and its 
results for all six employee groups are summarized together 
here* because most of the extensive empirical analysis of 
this paper focuses on wage and employment effects. That is, 
most of the analysis is comprised of the estimation of 
several different reduced— form wage and employment 
specifications* while only a small portion deals with the 
estimation of a bargaining coverage variable for each group. 
Since only the latter results are directly relevant, a 
summary of these results for all groups is briefly presented 
here. As noted in Topic Two* two different data sources 
(the CPS and the SOG) are used to form two separate 
bargaining coverage models. In the CPS model, the
1QB
dichotomous dependent variable takes the value one if an 
individual is either a union member or covered by a 
collective bargaining contract, zero otherwise. In the SQG 
model, the dependent variable is one if the city department 
was determined to have a collective contract, zero 
otherwise. The legal index described earlier, plus numerous 
control variables, are the regressors. Only the estimated 
coefficients on the legal index are reported by Freeman and 
Valletta. Both data sources are consistent in finding a 
significant positive effect of the legal index on contract 
coverage for police, firefighters, teachers, sanitation and 
streets and highways employees, other local employees, and 
finance and control employees. The parameter coefficient on 
the legal index ranges from a high of .SI for police, to a 
low of .014 for sanitation workers, both in the SOG cross- 
section.
5.5 Police and Firefighter Bargaining Spillover Evidence
The final section of the literature survey consists of 
two articles providing evidence of an institutional link 
between police and firefighters’ bargaining activities and 
outcomes. First, Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) estimate a 
general model of public sector wage determination allowing 
for both occupational and geographic spillovers among 
municipal government employees in 478 cities in 1967. 
Several specifications of an interrelated system of wage
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equations for ten (noneducational> municipal government 
employee groups are estimated. The first specification 
allows for only occupational spillovers, the second only 
geographic, and the third allows for both types. These may 
then be compared with wage equations allowing no forms of 
spillover so that more accurate conclusions of the true 
union effect on municipal employee wages may be drawn. 
Clearly, if spillovers exist* previous estimates of the 
union-nonunion wage differential underestimate the actual 
gap and the impact of public unionism.
First, a system of ten reduced form wage equations 
allowing for occupational spillovers is estimated. The 
presence of spillovers is accounted for by including in each 
employee category wage equation the percent unionized of all 
the other employee categories in the city. (Other city-wide 
explanatory variables include median education, percentage 
of blacks in the population, population density, median 
family income, median value of single family housing, and 
average weekly earnings in manufacturing; estimated 
parameter coefficients for these variables were not reported 
for the spillover models.) Estimation of the occupational 
spillover models indicates that a positive wage spillover 
effect exists in all but two of the wage equations. That 
is, F-tests of the null hypothesis that all of the 
unionization coefficients (except the own-unionization 
coefficient) are zero is rejected for all employee group
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wage equations except two: general con t r o l > and parks and
recreation. Individual unionization coefficients are
usually insignificant according to t-tests for all the wage 
equations* however; this is probably due to the high degree 
of m ultico11 inearity among the unionization variables.
Briefly> results of the geographical spillover model 
indicate significant wage spillovers exist within 
occupations within SMSA's; moreover) the spillovers run 
primarily in one direction: from the suburbs to the central
city. The authors conclude that ignoring occupational and 
geographic spillover effects on the wages of municipal 
employee groups leads to a substantial underestimation of 
the impact of public sector unionism. Additionally) it is 
expected that if a bargaining contract coverage variable 
were substituted for the extent of unionization variable) 
its measured influence on the wages of other employee groups 
would be even greater.
Finally) the last article to be reviewed deals 
specifically with bargaining spillover effects between 
police and firefighters. Victor (1979) examines the 
existence and effects of "key" bargains between a municipal 
employer and one or more municipal employee groups. He 
points out that ignoring pattern-setting wage bargains) if 
they result in spillovers across municipal occupations) 
results in underestimating the potential effects of public 
unionism. More specifically) the effects of pattern-setting
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municipal unions are underestimated* while the union effects 
of pattern-following groups are overestimated.
To test for the existence of key bargains* police and 
firefighter wage and employment equations for municipalities 
in 1975 are estimated by Two Stage Least Squares. Only the 
wage equation results are reported* however. First* the 
models are estimated assuming no pattern-setting behavior* 
next, the models are reestimated assuming key bargains 
exist, as proxied by unionism measures of the pattern- 
setting group. The explanatory variables included are the 
jointly endogenous per capita employment of the department 
under study, city per capita income, per capita budget 
allocation for all municipal services except the one under 
study, a measure of the union strength of the department 
(discussed below), a measure of the alternative private 
sector wage* and per capita intergovernmental grants to the 
city. Again* only the parameter coefficients of the 
variables directly under study are reported: the
unionization measures.
Three alternative measures of "union strength" are 
separately included in the models. The first is the 
proportion of the occupation organized (Ul). Although a 
useful approximation of union strength, a more discerning 
measure would relate specifically to the bargaining process. 
It is well known that many unions and employee organizations 
do not bargain collectively. Some public sector unions
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without written contracts are nevertheless very successful 
in securing favorable wage and nonwage outcomes through the 
lobbying of state legislatures or appropriate city
officials. Thus, a second measure of union strength tested 
is a binary variable equalling one for the presence of a 
recognized union, zero otherwise (U2). And finally, the
third measure, also binary, indicates the existence or 
nonexistence of a collective bargaining contract <U3).
First, the separate police and firefighter wage
equations without spillovers are presented; therefore, only 
the own-unionism measure is included. For both groups,
positive and significant own-unionism effects on wages are 
found. Comparisons of each of the three union strength 
measures reveal that all three are significant, and the 
parameter coefficient on U3 exceeds that of U2, which 
exceeds that of U1 for both groups as expected. That is, 
the more accurate the measure of union bargaining strength, 
the greater is the measured effect on wages.
These results may be compared with the second set of 
results, which hypothesizes a key bargaining relationship. 
Ul, U2, and U3 are separately included in each wage equation 
for both police and firefighters; if the coefficients on 
these union strength variables are positive and significant, 
a bargaining spillover is indicated. In the police wage 
equations, the own-unionism measures U2 and U3 are each 
significant in their separate equations. The parameter
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estimate for U2 is approximately the same as in the first 
set of results (11.1*/. versus 11.2*/.), while the estimate for 
U3 diminishes (12.3*/. versus 9.9 *A) . However, none of the 
three firefighters' unionization measures attains 
significance, leading the author to conclude that 
firefighters are not pattern-setters for police.
In the firefighters' wage equations a different pattern 
emerges. Of the own-unionism measures only U3 is
significant, and like U1 and U2 its coefficient is greatly 
diminished relative to the first set of results. Most 
importantly, all three police unionism measures are 
significant and positive (U1 = 11.VZ, U2=13.4y., U3=10.7*/*) ,
leading to the conclusion that police are the pattern- 
setters and firefighters the pattern-followers. The police 
wage-setting process is the key bargain.
These final two articles shed light on an institutional 
feature of municipal-level employee bargaining. This 
institutional analysis complements the traditional demand 
and supply framework within which both bargaining laws and 
the extent of bargaining coverage are modelled in this 
dissertation.
CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we attempt to model the simultaneous 
determination of bargaining laws and bargaining coverage for 
three public employee groups— teachers, police officers, and 
firefighters. Initially, the same theoretical foundation 
and the same state-wide explanatory variables as employed in 
Topic Two are used in order to provide a direct comparison 
of the aggregative model of public employees versus three of 
its disaggregated components.
The three chosen are all local-level employee groups. 
State-employed or college teachers are omitted because they 
are clearly a group distinct from primary and secondary 
school teachers; the proportion of college teachers who 
bargain collectively is quite small. Also, firefighters are 
almost exclusively employed at the local level. Finally, 
the NBER public sector bargaining law data set, from which 
we derive the legal status of all three groups, describes 
state-wide laws for local police only, which is by far the 
largest group.
By utilizing the same basic econometric procedure and 
the same state-wide explanatory variables, useful
19A
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conclusions can be drawn about the similarities and
differences among all the models of Topics II and III. This
in turn points to future areas of research which are
indicated by the comparisons.
3.1 Estimation Technique
Before analyzing the model results, a few points about
the data limitations for these groups must be noted which
have implications for the use of the Heckman-like
econometric procedure. While the NBER data set provides 
easy access to a substantial amount of information on the
bargaining (and other) law status of all public employee
groups, data on the other jointly dependent variable, 
unionization or bargaining contract coverage as a proportion 
of employees, are difficult to find. For the various sub­
groups of public employees, the data are scattered and still 
available for only a limited number of years. For teachers 
the data used cover three years: 197S, 1977, and 198S. The
197S data are published in the NEA Negotiation Research 
Digest (January 1974). The 1977 and 198S data are published 
in the Census of Governments beginning with the 1977 
publication. These data are the proportion of local 
teachers covered by a collective bargaining contract. For 
firefighters and police, only the comparable Census data for 
1977 and 19BS could be found. (Although the Census of 
Governments is published every five years, 1977 is the first
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year for which bargaining coverage data are available for 
any group* and the 1987 volumes have not yet arrived.)
The major implication for the police and firefighter
models from using 1977 and 1982 (rather than 1970 and 1980 
as in Topic U )  as the observation years is that the major 
period of bargaining law activity was the 19 6 0 ’s and early 
to middle 1970’s; by the late 1970’s* bargaining law
enactments and changes had begun to slow. Being forced to
use these two (later) years means there is less variation in 
the data to explain. In terms of our econometric procedure* 
it appears that using a trichotomous* ordinal dependent 
legal variable is asking too much of the data. For
teachers* even with three observation years similar problems 
occur when using a trichotomous legal index. It appears
that by the 1970’s, the difference between the effects of 
MMC and MBL laws on bargaining activity diminished. Put 
another way, the same level of sentiment seems to underly 
both laws at least for the later observation years.
Due to these data problems* the trichotomous index is 
not truly ordinal in nature. The solution to this problem 
for all three groups is to recategorize the bargaining index 
as a dichotomous variable! the bargaining law or sentiment 
variable takes the value zero if bargaining for the 
individual employee group is prohibited (or no law exists), 
and the value one if the group has either an MMC or an MBL 
statute. This combination appeared a priori to be the
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accurate representation, but a recategorization with 
bargaining prohibited and MMC both taking the value zero, 
and MBL the value one was tested for the purpose of 
comparison; as anticipated* this formulation proved 
unsuccessful. This means, of course, that these three 
models are estimated by Heckman's original formulation for 
one binary and one continuous endogenous variable.
3.5 Estimation Results: Application of the General Model
to Sub-Groups 
3.3 Teacher Results
3.3.1 Equation One (Bargaining Coverage): Simultaneous
Est imat ion
The simultaneous and single equation results for 
teachers from the application of the general model of Topic 
Two are reported in Table 3.3. Simultaneous estimation of 
the bargaining coverage equation for teachers yields the 
following results.
Neither SENTIMENT nor the dummy variable representing 
the pure effect of the law <D3) is significant. As noted in 
Topic Two, one of the legislative dummy variables must be 
omitted to avoid perfect multicol1 inearity; in all three of 
the binary models, the first legal category is omitted, 
i.e., bargaining prohibited (or no law). Therefore, the 
coefficient on D3, a m o r e 'favorable bargaining category, is 
expected to be positive.
m  TABLE 3.3
ctj TEACHERS
Simultaneous Versus Single-Equation Estimation 
(asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis)
Explanatory
Variables
Simultaneous Eq. One 
Bargaining Coverage
Single Eq. One 
Bargaining Coverage
Simultaneous Eq. Two 
Sentiment
Single Eq. Two 
Sentiment
SENTIMENT -1.10 (-0.178) 15.19 (3.86)
G0VWA6E 0.018 (3.9) 0.018 (3.88) -.002 (-0.66) 0.00 (0.52)
EAG -1.45 (-3.20) -1.526 (-3.7)
SOUTH -36.78 (-8.13) -36.12 (-8.6)
PRIVATE UNION 0.036 (0.15) -0.00 (-0.00) -0.01 (-0.15) 0.018 (0.69)
PRIOR-LEG 0.207 (3.025) 0.19 (3.8)
OWN-UNIONIZATION 0.10 (0.99) 0.02 (2.91)
UNFAIR 0.00 (0.05) -0.00 (-0.05)
NWLF -0.04 (-0.38) -0.06 (-2.51)
COPE -0.01 (-0.53) 0.003 (0.37)
Log MAJ-PARTY 4.03 (0.95) 1.79 (1.52)
D2 14.7 (0.65) 24.07 (0.97)
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The insignificance of SENTIMENT is not surprising due 
to the presence of other variables in the equation which 
also represent or determine sentiment; the same result was 
found for the general model as well. The insignificance of 
DE suggests that the existence of more favorable teacher 
bargaining laws does not encourage greater bargaining during 
the sample period. In contrast, a significant law coverage 
effect did show up in the general model, indicating that 
unfavorable bargaining laws constrain general bargaining 
coverage.
Looking at the other variables, GQVWAGE is positive and 
significant; in contrast, it is negative and significant in 
the general model. As previously noted, this variable is 
subject to opposing influences. The positive sign for 
teachers supports the straightforward interest group demand 
effect: assuming union services are normal goods, an
increase in income results in greater demand for these 
services. In addition, GOVWAGE could proxy the effect of an 
increased demand for educational services as a result of an 
increase in income; this increased demand then supports 
teachers' increased demand for union services. (The
rationale for a negative sign on GOVWAGE is the hypothesis 
that workers who support unions tend to be relatively low 
wage employees.)
PRIVATE UNION is not significant for teachers, although 
it is significant and positive in the general model. Like
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G O V W A G E , the sign on PRIVATE UNION cannot be predicted a 
priori. Two opposing effects are possible within the 
context of the special interest theory. The first 
represents the interest group demand of organized labor; 
PRIVATE UNION may proxy the strength of the labor movement. 
On the other hand, as previously discussed, private sector 
rank-and-file union members may be more influenced by their 
position as a taxed group than by their common membership in 
the labor movement. That is, private union members may be 
more influenced by the possibility of an increased tax 
burden to support gains to teachers made possible by 
increased bargaining. In the teacher model, these two 
effects may have offset each other.
PRI0R-LE6 is strongly significantly positive for 
teachers, as for the general model. PRIOR-LEG proxies 
demand for bargaining through the demonstration effect of 
teacher bargaining in neighboring states.
Finally, the last two variables are EAG and SOUTH. As 
expected, both are negative, and also strongly significant. 
As discussed earlier, both variables represent tastes and 
preferences toward unionism. The lower levels of
unionization in the South and in the agricultural sector are 
well known, and therefore both EAG and SOUTH represent 
negative demand shift variables. The same results are found 
for the general model as well.
3.3.2 Single versus Simultaneous Estimation of Equation One
SOI
Ordinary Least Squares <OLS) estimation of the teacher 
bargaining coverage equation provides an interesting 
comparison to its simultaneously estimated counterpart. The 
comparison is of interest because it reaffirms the 
importance of the treatment of bargaining coverage and 
bargaining legislation as jointly determined variables.
First, the two estimation techniques yield extremely 
similar values for both the parameter coefficients and their 
standard errors for all variables excepting those capturing 
the effect of the law. When teacher bargaining legislation 
(SENTIMENT) is treated as a purely exogenous variable in 
single equation estimation, its estimated coefficient is 
positive and highly significant. This implies that the law 
itself exerts an independent influence on the extent of 
teacher bargaining.
When estimated simultaneously, however, the effect of 
the law per se is captured by D2, which is not significant 
far the sample period. This suggests that in single 
equation models of bargaining, with legislation treated as 
exogenous, the legal variable is in fact acting as a proxy 
for sentiment. When teacher legislation and bargaining 
coverage are treated as joint outcomes of the same process, 
with sentiment and legislation explicitly separated by the 
Heckman technique, legislation no longer exerts an 
independent effect.
3.3.3 Equation Two (Sentiment toward Bargaining
soe
Legislation): Simultaneous estimation
Again* Table 3.3 contains the results of the 
application of the general model of Topic Two to teachers. 
Simultaneous estimation of equation two, with SENTIMENT as 
the dependent variable, yields the following results.
First, the jointly endogenous variable extent of
teacher bargaining coverage exerts no significant effect on 
SENTIMENT during the sample period. (In contrast, the level 
of own-unionization is significantly positive for the
general model.) Similarly, D2 is also insignificant (as is 
the effect of the law on SENTIMENT in the general model).
In fact, all the variables in equation two are
insignificant determinants of sentiment toward legislation. 
Both GOVWAGE and PRIVATE UNION are included, and were 
elaborated on in the discussion of teachers’ equation one.
The other variables in the equation will be briefly 
related to their respective hypotheses, which are contained 
in greater detail in Topics One and Two. First, UNFAIR (the 
number of unfair labor practice cases charged against 
employers) represents the negative demand effect of an 
opposition group, as predicted by the special interest 
theory. It proved to be significantly negative for the 
general m o d e l .
Next, NWLF represents a taste factor in the demand 
specification. Based on previous research, including
results from the general model, it is hypothesized to be
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positive. As discussed in Topic Two, non-whites are 
expected to exhibit greater demand for union services, thus 
supporting favorable union legislation, based on their 
relatively greater expectation of the returns to 
unionization.
Third, COPE proxies a special interest legislation 
supply constraint on legislators. Again, this represents a 
political cost variable motivated by the Public Choice
extension of the Chicago School special interest framework. 
As previously noted, a legislator’s political cost of 
passing favorable labor legislation is lower, the more pro­
labor his or her constituents. COPE is a proxy for a
s t a t e ’s preferences towards labor issues: the higher is
COPE, the more favorable are these preferences; thus, the
political cost of benefitting union members by supporting
favorable bargaining legislation is lower.
Fourth, Log MAJ-PARTY is a proxy for the economic cost 
of supplying special interest legislation as put forth by 
the Economics of Legislatures School; it also represents a 
supply constraint and therefore further extends the Chicago 
School theory. Opposing hypotheses are attached to this 
variable, however. The Economics of Legislatures School 
argument is that legislative output as controlled by the 
majority party is subject to strong scale economies. In 
addition, Stigler <1972) predicted positive returns to party 
dominance, but subject to diminishing returns to scale.
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Opposing this is the view that large majority proportions 
represent effective entry barriers to legislatures; rather 
than increasing output through lowered costs of reaching 
agreement, the effect of lower political competition on 
legislative output is that predicted by monopoly theory: 
restricted output levels at a higher per unit price.
Clearly, the second equation of the general model 
applied to teachers performs very poorly. It turns out that 
this is a general pattern for all three sub-groups: good 
results for the first (bargaining coverage) equation, 
unacceptably poor results for the second (bargaining law 
sentiment) equation.
3.3.4 Single versus Simultaneous Estimation of Equation Two
Equation two is estimated separately by the method of 
maximum liklihood applied to a standard binary probit model. 
The results from this method are quite different from the 
simultaneous equation estimates, as shown in Table 3.3.
The result of primary importance is that of bargaining 
coverage. Single equation estimation yields a positive and 
strongly significant effect of coverage on SENTIMENT, 
whereas its coefficient is insignificantly different from 
zero when treated as jointly endogenous using H e c k m a n ’s 
technique. The implication one would draw from the
incorrect s i n o 1e equation specification is that during the 
sample period, greater bargaining by teachers encouraged
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passage of more favorable legislation.
Among the other variables, GOVWAGE, PRIVATE UNION, 
UNFAIR, and COPE are also insignificant in the single 
equation model where they are significant in the 
simultaneous equation model. Log MAJ-PARTY is significant 
at the .10 level, but its positive sign is opposite that of 
the general model of Topic Two (although the hypothesis is 
in fact two-sided). The only variable in the singly 
estimated model significant at the .05 level or better is 
N W L F , and its negative sign does not support its hypothesis.
The performance of separate binary probit estimation of 
equation two is clearly poor, as is its simultaneously 
estimated counterpart. However, the importance of using the 
correct simultaneous specification is indicated again by the 
result on bargaining coverage. It matters a great deal
whether this variable is treated as a purely exogenous or a
jointly endogenous variable.
3.A Firefighter Results
3.A.1 Equation' One (Bargaining Coverage): Simultaneous
Estimation
The simultaneous and single equation results for
firefighters from the application of the general model of 
Topic Two are reported in Table 3.A. Simultaneous 
estimation of the bargaining coverage equation for
firefighters yields the following results.
TABLE 3.4 
FIREFIGHTERS 
Simultaneous Versus Single-Equation Estimation 
(asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis)
Explanatory
Variables
Simultaneous Estimation 
Eq. One
Single Eq. Estimation 
Eq. One
Simultaneous Estimation Single Eq. Estimation 
Eq. Two Eq. Two
SENTIMENT -4.1 (-0.50) 13.5 (3.11)
GOVWAGE 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.12) 0.00 (0.61) -0.00 (-0.56)
EAG -0.48 (-0.99) -0.46 (-0.87)
SOOTH -34.8 (-4.58) -34.78 (-5.99)
PRIVATE ONION 1.05 (3.57) 1.15 (4.2) 0.19 (0.62) 0.018 (0.44)
PRIOR-LEG -8.7 (-0.80) -4.57 (-0.58)
RESIDPOLICE 0.51 (6.09) 0.49 (5.77)
OWN-UNIONIZATION 0.10 (0.99) 0.02 (2.91)
UNFAIR -0.00 (-0.74) 0.00 (0.46)
NWLF -0.10 (-0.51) -0.07 (-2.14)
COPE -0.00 (-0.26) -0.01 (-0.79)
Log MAJ-PARTY -1.10 (-0.68) 2.16 (1.65)
RESIDPOLICE 0.05 (0.66) -0.00 (-0.46)
D2 49.70 (1.30) 45.95 (0.68)
207
SENTIMENT is insignificant, but D2 has a marginally 
significant effect (at the .10 level for a one-tail test). 
The implication is that for the sample period* more 
favorable bargaining laws weakly induced greater bargaining 
coverage for firefighters.
Among the other variables, the most significant by far 
is the single addition to the general model specification: 
RESIDPOLICE. The original motivation behind this variable 
was to test for the existence of an institutional bargaining 
relationship between firefighters and police as discussed in 
the previous chapter: some studies have shown that
bargaining spillovers exist between the two groups.
As a first attempt, the extent of police bargaining 
coverage was included directly as an explanatory variable in 
the firefighters bargaining coverage equation, but it was 
not significant. It is expected that the high degree of 
col linearity among the variables is the cause. In order to 
eliminate the collinearity and provide a second-best 
alternative, a residualization technique was performed by 
regressing police bargaining coverage on the set of 
explanatory variables in the firefighters bargaining 
coverage equation. Then the residual vector from this least 
squares regression was calculated, and called RESIDPOLICE. 
RESIDPOLICE was then entered as a RHS variable in the 
firefighters’ first equation. (A variable called RESIDFIRE 
was calculated in a directly analogous fashion for the
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police m o d e l .>
Two different interpretations of this variable are 
possible. The first is that it proxies the key bargain or 
bargaining spillover between police and firefighters for 
which we want to test. The second is that, as a residual, 
it simply represents some random, unmeasurable components of 
bargaining which we are unable to identify or quantify; if 
significant in the firefighters equation, then, these 
unobservable factors are common to both groups. A third 
possibility is, of course, that some combination of these 
two effects obtains.
As shown in Table 3.4, RESIDPOLICE is in fact positive 
and highly significant, and the best that can be said is 
that the bargaining spillover relationship described above 
may exist. The other variables attaining significance for 
firefighters are, first, PRIVATE UNION, which is positive as 
in the general model; this supports the Chicago S c h o o l ’s 
interest group demand of organized labor hypothesis. The 
remaining significant variable is SOUTH, negative as 
expected, and as in both the general and the teacher model.
Three variables, PRIOR-LEG, EAG, and GOVWAGE, do not 
attain significance for firefighters as they do in the case 
of public employees in general. These results indicate that 
the general model is not directly applicable to all sub­
groups of public employees.
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3.A . 2 Single versus Simultaneous Estimation of Equation One 
A comparison of OLS versus simultaneous estimation of 
the firefighter bargaining coverage equation yields 
implications very similar to those drawn for the teacher 
comparison. As with teachers* with the exception of 
SENTIMENT both methods produce parameter coefficients and 
standard errors which are quite similar. Again* however, 
when estimated by OLS and thus treated as exogenous* the 
variable SENTIMENT <measuring the effect of the law per se 
in the single equation context) is strongly and 
significantly positive. When treated endogenously* the 
effect of the law is captured by D2, and as noted is only 
very weakly significant (and positive).
The comparison of the two model specifications for 
firefighters again emphasizes the importance of using the 
correct specification* very different inferences are drawn 
from the two different models.
3.4.3 Equation Two (Sentiment Toward Bargaining 
Legislation)s Simultaneous Estimation
Table 3.4 contains the results of the application of 
the general model to f i r e f i g h t e r s 1 equation two* with 
SENTIMENT as the dependent variable. As noted, the equation 
again performs very poorly when applied separately to a 
specific sub-group.
As in the teacher model* none of the general model
aio
variables are significant. The jointly endogenous
bargaining coverage variable* then* appears not to affect 
legislation for firefighters for the sample. Basically* the 
only similarity between equation two of the general model 
and equation two as applied to firefighters is the 
insignificance of the legislative shift variable on 
SENTIMENT. Apparently, the law per se has no effect on 
sentiment toward bargaining legislation for firefighters, 
teachers, or the aggregate general model index.
3.A.A Single versus Simultaneous Estimation of Equation Two
Equation two is again estimated separately by binary 
probit analysis. Once again, the differences between the 
separately estimated and the simultaneously estimated 
equation are much greater for this equation than for the 
first. The primary result is that of the jointly endogenous 
bargaining coverage. As in the teacher model, single 
equation estimation indicates a positive and significant 
effect of coverage on legislation. When treated
endogenously, however, bargaining coverage no longer affects 
SENTIMENT.
Despite the poor fit of equation two, it is reassuring 
to note that single equation estimation produces consistent 
results for both teachers and firefighters. That is, in 
addition to the similar result for bargaining coverage, 
those variables which are significant (or very nearly so)
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are the same in both equations. In the firefighter model, 
NWLF is significantly negative and Log MAJ-PARTY
significantly positive; in the teacher model, NWLF is
significantly negative, while Log MAJ-PARTY is close to but 
does not reach significance at the .10 level for a two-tail 
t e s t .
Despite the failure of equation two to yield any 
significant coefficients in the simultaneous model,
nonetheless the comparison between it and its separately 
estimated counterpart once again indicates the importance of 
making inferences based on the more correctly specified
simultaneous model of bargaining laws and bargaining
coverage.
The final sub-group to which the general model is
applied, local police officers, will produce several results 
very similar to those already seen for teachers and
f iref ighters.
3.5 Police Results
3.5.1 Equation One (Bargaining Coverage): Simultaneous
Est imat ion
The simultaneous and single equation results for police 
from the application of the general model of Topic Two are
reported in Table 3.5. Simultaneous estimation of the
police bargaining coverage equation produces the following 
r e s u l t s .
TABLE 3.5 
POLICE
Simultaneous Versus Single-Equation Estimation 
(asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis)
Simultaneous Estimation Simultaneous Estimation Single Eq. Estimation
Explanatory Equation One Single Eq. Estimation Equation Two (Binary Probit)
Variables Bargaining Coverage (OLS) Equation One Sentiment Equation Two
SENTIMENT -14.03 (-0.64) 18.82 (4.96)
GOVWAGE 0.01 (2.93) 0.01 (3.51) 0.00 (0.80) -0.00 (-1.30)
EAG -1.34 (-2.54) -1.32 (-2.46)
SOUTH -0.92 (-0.17) -4.29 (-0.81)
PRIVATE UNION 1.98 (6.70) 1.60 (5.85) 0.16 (0.84) -0.05 (-1.17)
PRIOR-LEG 31.35 (3.23) 20.89 (3.05)
RESIDPOLICE 0.54 (5.73) 0.55 (5.80) 0.05 (0.85) -0.03 (-2.78)
OWN-UNIONIZATION -0.09 (-0.88) 0.07 (3.98)
UNFAIR 0.00 (0.33) -0.00 (-1.02)
NWLF 0.04 (0.78) -0.08 (-2.26)
COPE 0.02 (0.88) -0.01 (-0.66)
Log MAJ-PARTY -0.29 (-0.27) 2.10 (1.50)
D2 43.61 (0.66) 68.95 (1.59)
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Neither SENTIMENT nor the legislative shift dummy DE is 
significant. This is consistent with the teacher results; 
of the sub-groupsj only firefighters produced a (marginally) 
significant coefficient on the legal variable, coinciding 
with the general model result.
Like the other models, this equation performs quite 
well. First, GOVWAGE is significantly positive (as for 
teachers, while it is negative for the general model); 
second, PRIVATE UNION is strongly significant and positive 
(as for firefighters and the general model both).
Turning to the final variables, it is interesting that 
SOUTH is insignificant; it is strongly significant in all 
the other models. EAG, however, is significant and negative 
(as for teachers and the general model). Lastly are the two 
variables PRIOR-LEG and RESIDFIRE, with the latter being the 
only deviation from the direct application of the general 
model to police. PRIOR-LEG is positive and significant (as 
for teachers and the general model). RESIDFIRE also 
performs very well: it is strongly significantly positive, 
just as its counterpart RESIDPOLICE is in f i r e f i g h t e r s ’ 
equation one.
3.5.E Single versus Simultaneous Estimation of Equation One
As mentioned, a comparison of the OLS estimated and 
simultaneously estimated police bargaining coverage 
equations generates implications essentially identical to
those for teachers and firefighters. Excepting the variable 
representing bargaining law status (SENTIMENT in the single 
equation model? D2 in the simultaneous model)? both 
estimation methods produce very similar parameter 
coefficients and standard errors. As is familiar by now? 
treating the law as purely exogenous leads one to conclude 
that favorable bargaining laws exert a significant positive 
influence on the extent of police bargaining. When one 
allows for the endogeneity of legislation? however, the 
coefficient on the legal variable D2 loses significance for 
the sample period under study.
In all four models? the pure effect of the law on 
bargaining either disappears (teachers? police)? or is 
severely diminished (firefighters? the general model) when 
legislation and bargaining are estimated as joint outcomes 
of the same process. Furthermore? evidence from
simultaneous estimation of all four models indicates that 
the bargaining coverage equation has good explanatory power 
and is reasonably robust. Finally? the consistency with 
which OLS single equation estimation matches the results 
from simultaneous estimation (excepting the endogenous 
SENTIMENT) provides further evidence of the reliability of 
the Heckman estimation technique.
S.5.3 Equation Two (Sentiment Toward Bargaining 
Legislation): Simultaneous Estimation
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Once again a consistent pattern is seen for the general 
model applied to the sub-groups. Unfortunately, for
equation two, with SENTIMENT as the dependent variable, the
pattern is not encouraging. The variables in equation two
provide only slightly better results for police than for
teachers and firefighters.
As reported in Table 3.5, the jointly dependent 
variable bargaining coverage exerts no significant effect on 
sentiment toward police bargaining legislation. However, in 
an interesting departure from all three of the other models, 
D2 is significantly positive for police. It may be recalled 
from Topic Two that the legislative shift variable was close 
to attaining significance; it was noted at the time that the 
p o s s i b i 1 itv that the law per se affects p e o p l e s ’ attitudes 
or sentiment might still be considered an open question. 
The direct application of this general model to three 
distinct employee groups resulted in a significant 
legislative effect on sentiment in one of them.
In common with the other sub-groups, however, no other 
variable in equation two came anywhere close to 
significance. In general, the general model does a poor job
of explaining legislation for sub-groups of public employees 
in a simultaneous equation framework.
3.5.A Single versus Simultaneous Estimation of Equation Two
Binary probit estimation of police equation two yields
2 1 h
the same pattern as seen for teachers and firefighters? in 
addition* comparison of the two estimation techniques 
results in patterns and implications entirely consistent 
with those attached to the other two sub-groups.
First* the major result is a comparison of the results 
on the endogenous bargaining coverage variable. Single 
equation estimation* i.e.* treating coverage as exogenous* 
produces a strongly significant and positive coefficient; 
when properly treated as endogenous* once again the extent 
of bargaining coverage loses all significance (see Table 
3.5) .
Second* in addition to bargaining coverage the other 
significant variables produced by probit estimation are 
similar to those for the other two sub-groups. As noted* 
simultaneous estimation produced only one significant 
variable* D2. Single equation estimation produces two 
besides coverage: NWLF (negative), and RESIDFIRE
(negative). The negative sign on the latter variable is 
unexpected* one hypothesis is that it implies bargaining 
compet i t ion (in contrast to spillovers) between police and 
firefighters. This result has not been found in previous 
literature, however* and it runs counter to its sign in the 
correctly specified simultaneous model of this Topic. It is 
therefore concluded that RESIDFIRE’S negative sign in single 
equation analysis is one more indication of the 
inadvisability of drawing inferences from incorrectly
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specified models of legislation.
3.6 Modifications of the Sub-Group Models
It has become clear that the general model of Topic Two 
performs well only for the bargaining coverage equation; 
equation two is virtually worthless as far as identifying 
individual variables significantly affecting sentiment 
toward any of the sub-groups. In order to try to capture
any systematic differences between the three distinct 
employee groups of this Topic, each sub-group is re- 
estimated separately in the hopes of improving upon the 
general model specification.
It is necessary to repeat here that the well-known 
problems caused by highly col linear data (large standard 
errors, extreme variations in parameter coefficients and 
standard errors resulting from the deletion or addition of a 
single variable) are particularly severe for the less 
aggregative individual group analysis than for the aggregate 
general model of Topic Two. This does not allow a great 
deal of confidence to be placed in inferences from the sub­
group models; certainly they are not as robust as the 
general model.
The collinearity problem and its consequences for 
attempting to specify the individual employee group models 
in a systematic fashion are illustrated by experience with 
the variable Log MAJ-PARTY. It is difficult (if not 
impossible) to include this variable in the sub-group’s
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second equation without causing all of the variables, in 
virtually any combination, to be insignificant. 
Collinearity diagnostics indicate that it is severely 
collinear with the intercept, which clearly cannot be 
omitted. (This is not surprising, since the natural 
logarithm function serves to compress variation. However, 
the problem is only worsened by attempting to substitute the 
variable MAJ-PARTY and its square for the natural logarithm 
of MAJ-PARTY, in order to test the desired hypothesis of 
diminishing returns.)
The point is that many different specifications of each 
model were tested. The final models are the "best" which 
could be found given, as always, the inherent limitations of 
the model, data, and estimation procedure. Unfortunately, 
some variables with strong theoretical justifications could 
not be included due to collinearity problems and data 
p r o b l e m s .
Two final points: first, the chosen specification for
each sub-group was tested on each of the other two groups as 
another test or check of the individual model specification 
procedure. In all cases, the original formulation for each 
employee group was superior. And second, despite numerous 
attempts, no other specification for police proved superior 
to the general model. Therefore, the following section 
contains only the employee groups teachers and firefighters.
519
3.7 Tea c h e r s ; Refinements on the General Model-
Simultaneous Estimation
3.7.1 Equation One b a r g a i n i n g  Coverage)
The single change in teachers' equation one is the 
addition of UNE (a s t a t e ’s unemployment rate)j as shown in 
Table 3.7. UNE, which in cross-sectional data represents 
structural differences, is highly significant and negative.
There are two other consequences in equation one of 
changing the specification of equations one and two. 
SENTIMENT now becomes marginally positively significant (in 
the general model specification it is insignificant), and 
PRIOR-LEG loses significance.
3.7.5 Equation Two (Sentiment Toward Bargaining 
Legislat ion)
The primary purpose of the modifications of the sub­
group models is to improve equation two. This was
accomplished for teachers by the deletion of NWLF and Log 
MAJ-PARTY.
With these changes in equations one and two, equation 
two now has three variables with explanatory power. The 
first is UNFAIR, which is marginally significant and of the 
hypothesized sign. The latter two are of greater interest 
in the context of the Heckman model. D2 is now significant 
and positive, joining the police general model specification 
in its suggestion that laws are capable of influencing
o<N
CM
Explanatory
Variables
TABLE 3.7 
TEACHERS
Modification of the General Model 
(asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis)
Simultaneous Estimation 
Equation One
Simultaneous Estimation 
Equation Two 
Sentiment
SENTIMENT 11.71 (1.39)
G0VWAGE 0.02 (3.98) -0.00 (-1.43)
EAG -1.94 (-3.05)
SOUTH -35.28 (-7.50)
PRIVATE UNION 0.10 (0.32) -0.00 (-0.17)
PRIOR-LEG 0.10 (1.14)
UNE -3.64 (-3.20)
OWN-UNIONIZATION -0.07 (2.07)
UNFAIR -0.00 (-1.41)
COPE 0.00 (0.72)
D2 -23.07 (-0.91) 50.06 (2.10)
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attitudes. And surprisingly, the extent of bargaining 
coverage becomes significantly positive, matching the result 
on legislation generated by single equation binary probit 
estimation. (This is the only sub-group for which this 
particular reversal o c c u r s . >
Obviously, as noted at the outset these changes cause 
one to doubt the reliability of the model for the individual 
employee groups. In fact, it became very clear early in the 
model specification process that none of the sub-group 
models was particularly robust. Again, one is strongly 
cautioned against viewing the final results of any sub-group 
specification with great confidence.
3.8 F i r e f i o h t e r s : Refinements on the General Model-
Simultaneous Estimation 
3.B.1 Equation Dne (Bargaining Coverage)
The following two changes were made in the 
f i r e f i g h t e r s ’ bargaining coverage equation: PRIQR-LEG was
deleted, and PCY (per capita income) added (see Table 3.8.).
Interestingly, PCY is significantly positive; this 
tends to support the hypothesis that the income effect 
dominates for the normal good fire protection services, 
which tends to support the demand for firefighter 
unionization. After the modifications, GOVWAGE is
significantly negative, changing from insignificant in the 
general model. No other significant changes occur in
CM
CM
CM
Explanatory
Variables
TABLE 3.8 
FIREFIGHTERS 
Modifications of the General Model 
(asymptotic t-statistics in parenthesis)
Simultaneous Estimation 
Equation One 
Bargaining Coverage
Simultaneous Estimation 
Equation Two 
Sentiment
SENTIMENT -8.66 (-0.90)
GOVWAGE -0.01 (-2.04)
EAG 0.10 (0.22) .
SOUTH -24.78 (-3.89)
PRIVATE UNION 0.94 (3.06) 0.13 (1.07)
PCY 0.01 (2.51)
RESIDPOLICE 0.54 (7.28) 0.03 (1.15)
OWN-UNIONIZATION -0.06 (-1.14)
UNFAIR -0.00 (-0.81)
PRIOR-LEG 2.02 (1.09)
POPD -0.00 (-0.70)
D2 75.72 (1.46) 90.65 (1.76)
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equation one.
3.2.2 Equation Two (Sentiment Toward Bargaining
Legislation)
As with the teacher m o d e l , no variable from the general 
model specification on firefighters was significant. 
Numerous changes were made to this equation to try to 
improve its performance. The '’best" model is reported in 
Table 3.8. Four variables were deleted: GOVNAGE, N W L F ,
COPE, and Log MAJ-PARTY. Two variables, POPD and PRIOR-LEG, 
were added. Unfortunately, these changes resulted in the 
addition of just one variable to significance: D 2 . The one
consistent result of the sub-group equations explaining 
SENTIMENT is the significant and positive effect of 
favorable bargaining laws on p e o p l e s ’ attitudes toward 
public employee group bargaining rights, or more generally, 
public sector unionism.
3.9 Summary
Based on the "best" models for each of the three 
individual employee groups, a number of core variables may 
be identified as having explanatory power across 
disaqqreoated functions, abstracting from their significance 
or insignificance in the aggregate general model. These 
variables have implications concerning the correct model 
specification for the determination of union legislation and
2 2 * t
union outcomes, the usefulness of the Heckman procedure in 
simultaneous estimation in particular, and the economic 
theory of regulation.
3.9.1 Core Variables Across the Three Sub-Groups: Equation
One
The process of specifying a model with explanatory 
power across groups was much easier for the equation on 
bargaining coverage than for the equation determining 
legislative sentiment. Several core variables may be 
identified which systematically affect bargaining coverage 
across at least two of the three groups.
GOVUIAGE, with a two-sided hypothesis, is significant in 
all three sub-group models although it is negative for 
firefighters and positive for the other two groups. PRIVATE 
UNION could also be called a core variable, since it is 
strongly, significantly positive for two of the three 
groups, proxying the strength of organized labor in a state. 
Also, SOUTH and EAG are each strongly and significantly 
negative two out of three times. Finally, for police and 
firefighters RESIDFIRE and RESIDPOLICE respectively are 
very strongly significant and positive. This may indicate 
the presence of bargaining spillovers, or simply 
unobservable factors affecting both the police and 
firefighter bargaining processes.
The effect of bargaining legislation on coverage was
ass
significant for one group* firefighters. This indicates the 
importance of simultaneous estimation of bargaining 
legislation and bargaining coverage for identifying 
similarities and differences across employee groups and over 
time periods. Finally* by explicitly purging sentiment from 
the legal dummy variable via H e c k m a n ’s procedure, the 
uncertainty surrounding the true interpretation of 
legislation variables within a single equation context is 
avo id e d .
3.9.S Core Variables Across the Three Sub-Groups: Equation
Two
Identifying a pattern of core explanatory variables for 
the sentiment toward legislation equation was very 
difficult; in fact the attempt was a failure. The problem 
is not simply that almost none of the variables are 
significant; more importantly, the second equation 
illustrates the lack of robustness of the disaggregated 
employee group models.
The only common significant variable among the three 
groups was D2, the legislative shift variable. At the very 
least, however, this result provides an incentive to improve 
the type of data employed in order to exploit this unique 
feature of H eckman’s simultaneous estimation procedure.
In summary* a reasonably clear pattern of core 
explanatory variables was discerned for the first equation
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explaining bargaining coverage. The absence of such a 
pattern in equation two, explaining sentiment toward
bargaining legislation, could simply result from the greater 
difficulty in identifying factors affecting sentiment for 
any group; that is, the problem of unobservable variables 
may be particularly acute. On the other hand, it is 
possible that the differences among these three employee 
groups elicit systematically varying public perceptions of 
them; these, in turn, affect the intensity of favorable Dr 
unfavorable sentiment toward bargaining rights.
A general pattern may not exist in explaining the 
determinants of sentiment toward disparate public sector 
employee groups. Future research attempting to distinguish 
between these two possibilities may have some success by 
using municipal level data. It may be that there is a
pattern for explaining sentiment toward locally-organized
unions, but that it can only be discovered through the use
of local or SMSA level data.
CONCLUSION
The three topics of this dissertation have used the 
economic theory of regulation to model simultaneously the 
determinants and effects of public sector bargaining laws 
for a general model of public employees plus four individual 
employee groups. To begin the analysis, Topic One derived a 
single-equation general model of bargaining legislation 
across states and over time. Topic Two then added to this 
the "effects" equation describing the extent of public 
employee unionization, and estimated this general model 
simultaneously. Finally Topic Three, employing
fundamentally the same methodology as in the previous topic, 
disaggregated the general model into three individual 
employee groups (teachers, firefighters, and police), and 
estimated them separately. The final two topics each
contrasted the single versus simultaneous equation results, 
providing general support for both the m o d e l s ’ theoretical 
foundation and for the simultaneous specification of 
unionization and the legal environment regulating it.
The empirical results from each Topic reaffirm the 
importance of the major contribution of this dissertation: 
modelling the process surrounding the regulation of union
2E7
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outcomes in a simultaneous ■framework. That is, the 
determinants of public sector bargaining legislation and the 
effects of such legislation on bargaining coverage are 
properly treated as joint outcomes of the same process. Due 
to the econometric difficulties associated with estimating 
one discrete endogenous variable (the legislative index) and 
one continuous endogenous variable (the extent of" bargaining 
cov e r a g e ) » most studies continue to focus on single equation 
estimation of either union outcomes or union regulation.
As the empirical results of this dissertation indicate* 
the inferences from model estimation differ significantly 
according to whether legislation and unionization are 
treated as endogenous or not. Results from the general 
model of Topic Two clearly indicate that causality is two- 
way. Further* results from the estimation of individual 
employee group models suggest that simultaneous estimation 
is necessary to identify similarities and differences across 
functions. The law may exert an independent influence on 
bargaining coverage for different employee groups over 
different spans of time; that is, during the periods of the 
fastest growth in union organizing activity, or the greatest 
activity in legislative changes for a particular group. The 
only way to find out is through simultaneous estimation; 
single equation estimation is not sufficient.
^.1 Summary of the General Model Results
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A . 1.1 Equation One
First, several variables support the demand far union 
services, as derived from the direct application of the 
theory of consumer choice to the union membership decision. 
Among them is G O V W A G E , the negative sign of which suggests 
that workers at the lower end of the intra-firm wage 
distribution have the greatest probability of supporting a 
union. PRIVATE UNION supports the hypothesis that private 
sector labor organizations have an interest in and support 
public sector labor gains.
PRIOR-LEG is a demand side variable, which appears to 
indicate that more permissive bargaining laws in surrounding 
states increase demands for bargaining and unionization 
among workers through demonstration effects. Two taste 
variables, EAG and SOUTH, also strongly and negatively 
influence public sector unionization in their capacity as 
proxies for systematic and unobservable factors affecting 
the perceptions of the costs and benefits of union 
membersh i p .
Finally, on the supply side, the role of the law per se 
independently influences union membership: prohibitive laws
depress membership or bargaining coverage. (Although our 
model cannot distinguish between them, it should be repeated 
that the effect of bargaining laws is as likely to affect 
the equilibrium level of unionization through the demand 
side as through the supply side.)
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^.1.2 Equation Two
The economic theory of regulation provides the 
foundation for the sentiment toward bargaining laws 
equation* and it receives strong support from the results of 
the general model. On the demand side, both PUBLIC UNION 
and GOVWAGE support the Chicago S c h o o l ’s interest group 
hypothesis. The rationale for the former variable is
obvious. For the latter, assuming public sector union 
services are normal goods, an increase in the income level 
of government employees causes demand for these services to 
increase, which in turn supports the demand for favorable 
public sector labor legislation.
Another Chicago School hypothesis, support from 
interested third party groups, is represented by PRIVATE 
UNION. This hypothesis is two-sided, and in the general 
model does not attain significance. PRIVATE UNION will be 
positive if the identification of private sector union 
members with their public sector counterparts outweighs the 
perceived tax burden on private sector membership consequent 
upon greater bargaining activity by government employees. 
Possibly these two effects simply offset one another.
Finally, the inclusion of a proxy for an opposition 
group is motivated by the Chicago School. UNFAIR, as 
expected, represents a negative shift in the demand function 
as a proxy for management opposition to union bargaining
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gains. The final demand variable represents a taste factor. 
NUILF has a significantly positive effect on SENTIMENT, 
confirming the common result of previous research.
Turning to the supply side, the Public Choice School is 
represented by COPE. This factor accounts for the active 
role of constituents and politicians in determining the 
equilibrium level of special interest legislation. As 
expected, COPE, for which greater values represent lower 
political costs of enacting regulation, is positive though 
significant only at the .10 level.
Finally, the economic costs of legislation are 
accounted for by the Economics of Legislatures School. This 
School derives hypotheses concerning legislative output and 
costs by applying the standard theory of the firm to 
legislatures. The variable Log MAJ-PARTY is motivated by 
this analysis, though it has other opposing motivations. 
According to the Economics of Legislatures School, greater 
legislative majorities serve to decrease costs associated 
with the production of legislative output; in other words, 
the costs of reaching collective decisions is lessened.
On the other hand, the application of standard monopoly 
theory yields the prediction of s m a 11er output levels: if
greater majorities serve as effective entry barriers to 
legislative seats, then this monopolistic "firm" should 
produce less output at a higher price. As it turns out, the 
significant, negative coefficient on Log MAJ-PARTY in the
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general model supports the monopoly theory hypothesis.
Lastly) the Heckman legislative shift variables in this 
trichotomous model are insignificant determinants of 
SENTIMENT. H o w e v e r > one of the dummy variables representing 
the pure effect of the law just misses significance at the 
.10 level. One might be led to believe that estimation of 
other employee group models, perhaps during time frames 
notable for greater bargaining law activity, may possibly 
lead to significant law effects.
The following three sections will merely outline the 
major results in terms of significant variables for the 
three individual employee groups. These sections on the 
sub-groups are abbreviated for two reasons. First, the 
implications of these results in terms of the economic 
theory of regulation should be obvious from the preceding 
discussion of the general model. And second, the extremely 
poor results of the bargaining legislation equation for the 
sub-groups indicate that a different approach to model 
specification must be undertaken in order to derive any 
reasonable inferences from these individual employee groups.
4.2 Summary of the Teacher Results
4.2.1 Equation One
The best model for teachers is a modification of the 
general model: UNE is added and is significantly negative.
The most important result for comparison purposes is that
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the effect of legislation on teacher bargaining coverage is 
not significant; additionally, GOVWAGE is significantly 
positive, and PRIVATE UNION insignificant.
4.2.2 Equation Two
The best teacher legislation equation resulted from the 
deletion of NWLF and Log MAJ-PARTY from the general model 
specification. The most important results are that the law 
has a positive and significant effect for teachers, and that 
the extent of teacher bargaining coverage is significantly 
positive. In addition, neither GOVWAGE nor PRIVUN is 
significant, although UNFAIR attains marginal significance.
A . 3 Summary of the Firefighter Results
4.3.1 Equation One
To obtain the best possible model, PRIOR-LEG was 
deleted and PCY added to the bargaining coverage equation. 
The latter variable is positive and significant. Again, the 
major result for comparison purposes is that the law has a 
significant influence on firefighter bargaining. In 
addition, PRIVATE UNION is positive and significant, and 
GOVWAGE negative and significant. RESIDPOLICE, also, is 
very strongly significant and positive.
4.3.2 Equation Two
The best bargaining legislation equation was obtained 
by deleting GOVWAGE, NWLF, COPE, and Log MAJ-PARTY, and
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adding POPD and PRIOR-LEG (although both turn out to be 
insignificant). These changes* and those in equation one, 
cause DE to exhibit a significant and positive influence on 
SENTIMENT. No other variable attains significance.
4.4 Summary of the Police Results
4.4.1 Equation One
The best possible model is the general model 
specification. DE is insignificant, while PRIVATE UNION and 
GOVWAGE are both significant and positive. Also, RESIDFIRE 
is strongly significant and positive.
4.4.E Equation Two
The only variable attaining significance is DE, the 
effect of the law per se on SENTIMENT.
4.5 Implications of the Four Models
Clearly, the sub-group models require substantial, 
independent re-specification if they are to prove useful in 
drawing inferences on the determinants and effects of 
bargaining legislation. Although the bargaining coverage 
equation holds up reasonably well across groups, the 
SENTIMENT equation does not.
In sum, the economic theory of regulation is largely 
supported by the general model results; whether or not the 
sub-group models reinforce this result cannot be inferred
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due to their extremely poor data specification. Without a 
doubt, however, the results of all the models emphasize the 
importance of simultaneous estimation of public sector union 
bargaining regulations and the union activities or outcomes 
to which these laws pertain. Clearly, there are costs 
attached to relying on inferences drawn from incorrectly 
specified single equation models of unionization or 
legislation.
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